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Abstract
This thesis argues for an unorthodox  in terpretanon o f  ]ohn Rawls's egalitarianism as 
a hybrid o f  ‘actual contractualism ’ and ‘m odal contractualism ’. It also offers a 
defence o f the theory so understood. A ccording to actual contractualism , a system 
o f  political institutions and norm s is just only if each person  over w hom  it claims 
au thorin ' actually accepts it in some sense. Actual contractualists stand in contrast 
w ith m odal contractualists, w ho take justice to require that no one could reasonably 
reject the institutions and norm s in question. Rawls is standardly read as a m odal 
contractualist, b u t I argue that his view includes an significant elem ent o f  actual 
contractualism .
The thesis is divided in to  three parts. The first part describes actual 
contractualism  and contrasts it w ith m odal contractualism . It goes on to consider 
the possibility o f  a hybrid theory, which appeals to m odal contractualist reasons to 
justify an actual contractualist test for justice. I suggest that this is an attractive 
view. In the second part I go on to argue that a careful understanding o f Rawls’s 
theory view reveals it to be hybrid contractualist. I elaborate Rawls’s strategy o f 
‘political constructivism ’ in the light o f this interpretation, and attem pt to show that 
it is veiy m uch in the Lockean actual contractualist tradition.
The final part o f  the thesis concerns the justification o f  specifically Rawls’s 
egalitarianism. I con tend  that Rawls’s argum ent for justice as fairness can be seen as 
a detailed effort to explain why his egalitarianism is, in the relevant sense, actually 
accepted by each person, and I argue that as such it succeeds. I then contrast the 
Rawlsian n e w  with left-libertanam sm , another attem pt to  marry actual 
contractualism  and egalitarianism. I argue that Rawls’s is the m ore thoroughgoing, 
unified view, and should be preferred on that basis.
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1. Contractualism and the individualistic ideal of justification
Contractualists about justice are m oved by an ideal o f individualistic justification. 
They suppose that at least part o f the story about why some conception o f justice is 
the n gh t one, the one that we ought to im plem ent in our society, is that it satisfies 
the ideal. But there is m ore than one way to specify w hat it takes to satisfy it. Tins 
thesis considers two familiar bu t contrasting possible specifications and argues that 
there is a way to com bine them  into  a single specification (the 'hy b n d ’ Hew) which 
m am fests the attractions o f  both . It suggests that this specification is to  be found 
in, and offers us the ngh t way to interpret, the later Hews o f  John Rawls, the m ost 
im portan t political philosopher o f the twentieth century.
The contractualist ideal in all its forms starts, unsurprisingly, from  the idea o f  a 
contract. WHhen two people m ake a contract in ordinary circum stances, som ething 
that one o f  them  can say to the o ther if she fears that the o ther may be considering 
breaching the term s o f  the contract is: you signed the contract. O f  course, she may 
also appeal to prudential considerations such as the fact that she can sue for breach 
o f  a lawful contract, or the fact that the term s o f  the contract are in bo th  parties’ 
interests. But the appeal to the person’s having signed the contract contrasts with 
these considerations in that it ordinarily justifies the supposition that the term s o f
the contract have norm ative force for the signatories. Prudential considerations 
may m ake it rational to  act in accordance w ith those term s, bu t the fact o f the 
individual’s having actually signed the contract seems, in itself, also to  justifv a m oral 
obligation on the part o f  the signatories. N ow , the appeal to the fact o f  a person’s 
signature on a contract is an appeal to the idea that that person alone incurred an 
obligation in signing. So a contract creates obligations to abide by its term s for each 
o f  and only its signatories, and in each signatory’s case only because she signed it. In 
that sense, the norm ative force o f a contract’s term s is justified indimduahstically. it is 
justified, one by one, to each signatory by appeal to som ething which is specific to 
her. By contrast, we usually take such things as general principles o f rationality (e.g., 
the principle that one should will the necessary m eans to o n e’s end) to have 
norm ative force with respect to any given individual irrespective o f any particular 
facts about her. There is no  ‘one by one’ justification o f the norm s o f  rationality.
In the contractualist approaches to justice that I consider in Part I, this 
mdrvidualisnc idea o f  justification is applied to the question how  to justify (in 
particular) the term s w hich are coercively enforced by states. Those term s are 
normally taken to  apply to all m em bers o f society, so contractualists seek their 
justification, one by one, with respect to  all m em bers o f societv: they seek, in a 
sense, as m any justifications as there are m em bers. The sim plest application o f the 
individualistic ideal to justice imagines that the coercively enforced term s just are the 
term s o f  a real contract: the social contract. Contractualists adopting this approach 
have standardly tried to show  that these have been accepted by each person— either 
expressly, w ith a signature or declaration, or tacitly. M ore generally, they argue that 
the only just term s are those which are actually accepted by each person. This 
approach, which I call ‘actual contractualism ’, is m ost famously associated with 
H obbes and Locke. Its great attraction arises from  the fact that it allows us to
justify the coercive enforcem ent o f society’s term s o f  cooperation in precisely the 
same way that a con tract’s term s are justified to its signatories: lo o k ,’ we can say,
"you accept(ed) these terms'. A nd it allows us make this appeal to ever}' single person to 
w hom  the term s apply. "\Xliy is this so attractive? Well, first, it has the virtue o f 
familiarity and simplicity. We use this form  o f justification in our everyday lives 
w henever we invoke a past agreem ent in order to  justify an appeal to  obligations 
that we take people to have. But it also has the attraction that it expresses the idea 
that each person should be sovereign with respect to the obligations that she has: 
she should only have those that she has in some sense taken on. I f  the term s o f a 
social contract can be justified to each person by appeal to som ething that she did., 
an exercise o f  her agency, then im posing those term s upon her is consistent with 
seeing her as the creator o f her m oral w orld (at least in the norm ative areas in which 
those term s are so justified). This, I think, is w hat lies at the ro o t o f  actual 
contractualism ’s attraction.
In Chapter i I analyse the fundam ental presuppositions and the various forms 
o f actual contractualism . I start by contrasting legitim acy’ and 'regulative 
conception’ approaches. The form er make the justice o f a coercive social system 
conditional upon  its reflecting some morally relevant aspect o f the particular 
individuals that are m em bers o f the society. The latter do not, requiring instead that 
the coercive norm s o f  a society conform  to principles which are the conclusions o f 
an independent m oral argum ent. But these two can be com bined in various ways, 
as w hen a theorist proposes, as a necessary condition o f justice, bo th  that the 
coercive norm s reflect aspects o f society’s particular individuals and that they 
conform  to  principles which are the conclusions o f an independent m oral argum ent.
Actual contractualism  is a legitimacy approach. The m orally relevant aspect o f 
the particular individuals that a just coercive system reflects is, o f  course, the fact o f
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each individuars having acted in a wav that justifies the im position o f that system 's 
norm s. I argue that essential to actual contractualism  is som e conception o f the 
‘m oral background5— the state o f affairs that obtains prior to anyone's having 
accepted the term s o f any contract— as well as an account o f w hat kind o f 
acceptance justifies the im position o f norm s. Many theorists also tell us w hat was 
or w ould  be justified given their accounts o f these features. I no te  that they could 
legitimately appeal to the relevant individuals' m oral n ew s in doing this, although 
m ost are normally understood  to appeal rather to self-interest.
In the light o f  this analysis, I analyse the views o f H obbes. Locke, and their 
contem porary descendant Nozick. I argue that H obbes proposes a form  o f actual 
contractualism  which subjects every single norm  in a system o f norm s— at least part 
o f  which is taken to be coercively enforceable— to the actual contractualist test. I 
call such an approach ‘thoroughgoing ' and claim that it has an special attraction not 
well accounted for by the value o f autonom y which appears to underlie Lockean 
Hews (including N ozick's). B oth the H obbesian and the Lockean approaches see 
individuals as sovereign in a particular area o f their lives, bu t autonom y adequately 
m otivates only an approach which keeps that area within certain boundaries. So if  I 
am right that the m ore thoroughgoing approach is attractive, som ething m ore m ust 
be said.
The actual contractualist approach is no t the only contractualist approach to 
justice. A nother approach is equally inspired by the ideal o f individualistic 
justification. This second approach, however, does no t envisage the coercively 
enforceable term s which govern our societal relations as the term s o f any actual 
contract. Instead, it asks: w hat w ould be the terms o f a contract which no one 
could reject? I call this approach ‘m odal contractualism 5, and it is the subject o f 
m ost o f  C hapter 2. O bviously the answer to the question that m odal contractualists
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ask is determ ined by w hat's m eant in sating that som eone could or couldn ’/ reject 
som e contract. In some sense, a person could reject any contract, regardless o f its 
content. B ut the fact that som eone could in some sense reject any contract doesn 't 
seem relevant to  the justice o f im posing any contract’s term s, so m odal 
contractualists ask about a m ore specific sense which does seem relevant. Their 
question becom es ‘w hat w ould be the term s o f a contract which no one could 
reasonably reject?'
The reasonableness o f a rejection o f some contract is understood  to be a m atter 
o f  (normative) fact. I f  you decide n o t to sign a contract which represents a fair 
solution to some dispute that w e  have, and your reason for no t doing so is that you 
judge your bargaining posm on to be sufficiently strong that you could negotiate a 
contract that is less fair bu t m ore favourable to you, then (granted this description) 
it is a m atter o f fact, we suppose, that your rejection o f the fair contract is 
unreasonable. This points to  the great attraction o f the m odal contractualist 
interpretation o f  the individualistic ideal o f jusnficauon: it prom ises an account o f 
just term s for the regulation o f our societal relations which are objectively reasonable. 
F or the term s o f  the m odal contractualist contract do n o t track merely w hat all 
parties can agree upon (that m ight be influenced by unfair bargaining advantages or 
failure to think through the likely outcom es o f the contract) or even w hat all parties 
take to be reasonable (with the best will in the world people can fail to give o thers’ 
claims appropriate weight). They track w hat really is reasonable.
W e m ight worry, how ever, that this focus on w hat is objectively reasonable, 
w hat it is unreasonable for people no t to accept, pulls us away from  the 
mdividualistic justificatory ideal that was supposed to  be the basis o f the modal 
contractualist approach. In w hat way, now, are the term s o f a contract that the 
m odal contractualist judges to be just (because no one could reasonably reject it)
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justified one by one, in a way that considers the particular situation o f each person, 
to  those to w hom  they apply? Isn ’t the contract justified to m e simply because it is 
justified by the objective reasonableness o f its terms? The situation seems to be 
analogous to  the justification o f  some rational deduction to a given person: no one 
could rationally reject the deduction, so she should accept it. But as I no ted  above, 
there isn’t anything particularly individualistic about the justification o f rauonal 
norm s.
My discussion o f m odal contractualism  in C hapter 2 concentrates on the 
question what, if  anything, is distinctively individualistic about m odal contractualist 
justification. After surveying various possibilities, I conclude that the distinguishing 
feature is the ‘Individualist Restriction’, which constrains us to argue for the 
reasonableness o f the rejection o f possible contractual term s by appeal solely to 
grounds which are accurately described as those held by single individuals alone. 
This can be said to  retain the ‘one by one’ character o f contractualist justification 
because it m eans that the question we m ust ask in determ ining w hether term s could 
reasonably be rejected is: how  do a given single individual’s grounds for preferring 
term s o ther than the p roposed  term s com pare in turn with each o ther individual’s 
grounds for preferring term s other than the first individual’s preferred terms." W e 
do n o t add up everyone’s grounds for and against each possible set o f  term s and 
then  pick those w ith the highest positive aggregate weight in favour. Rather, we try 
to  find the term s the strongest individual grounds against which are weaker than the 
strongest individual grounds against any alternatives.
Thus we arrive at two com peting interpretations o f the contractualist ideal o f 
individualistic justification, each with its own attractions. In the rem ainder o f 
C hapter 2 I consider the question w hether the two m ight be com bined into a single 
‘hybrid contractualism ’ which m am fests the attractions o f both. I suggest that this
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could indeed be done by identifying as a strong, objectively reasonable ground for 
the rejection o f a con tract’s term s the fact that an individual actually rejects it. But 
this also creates certain puzzles that the hybnd contractualist m ust solve if her view 
is to  be viable. Forem ost am ong them  is the following. M odal contractualists 
suppose that we have a vert' pow erful reason to find and comply w ith principles 
that no  one could reasonably reject. This is a com ponent o f their n ew . This 
pow erful reason m ight plausibly be supposed to bring us to reconsider any n ew s 
that we have which w ould otherwise lead us to  reject principles that no  one could 
reasonably reject. But if principles that no one could reasonably reject are principles 
that no  one actually does reject, as the hybnd n e w  holds, then that pow erful reason 
is a reason to  reconsider any n e w s  we m ight have that w ould lead us actually to 
reject principles that no one else actually rejects. There is thus a pressure for 
consensus. D epending  on just how  pow erful we suppose the pow erful reason to 
be, that pressure m ight be a pressure for consensus on anything, justice m ight 
therefore be settled upon  merely through coordination rather than by anything like a 
balancing o f  the kinds o f considerations that we w ould w ant to inform  its content. 
This is a puzzle for hybnd  contractualists.
2. Rawls and hybrid contractualism
In Part II, our focus shifts from  contractualist fram eworks and their interpretations 
o f the individualistic justificatory ideal to the later work o f john  Rawls. The 
‘hypothetical contractualism ’ o f  Rawls’s early work is standardly interpreted  as a 
form  o f  m odal contractualism , and in his later work Rawls indeed explicitly aligns 
him self with the m odal contractualist views o f T.M. Scanlon. How ever, I argue that
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within his m odal contractualist fram ew ork Rawls identifies as a ground for the 
reasonable rejection o f  any o f  a range o f liberal pohncal principles the fact that a 
person does no t, in a certain sense, actually accept those principles. Appealing to 
the idea o f ‘the burdens o f  judgm ent’— factors which account for and explain the 
reasonableness o f  disagreem ent about fundam ental m oral m atters— Rawls claims 
that we are com pelled to accept the justice o f liberal pohncal principles which 
safeguard the basic freedom s o f conscience, thought, speech, and religion, among 
others. But there are a range o f possible liberal political principles, and given the 
burdens o f judgm ent we cannot say that any one set in this range is m ore reasonable 
than another. The jusnce o f  im posing a specific set, therefore, is dependent on their 
actually being accepted— in an ‘overlapping consensus’— by each reasonable person 
(where to  be reasonable is to accept the necessity o f liberal principles in light o f the 
burdens o f judgm ent and to seek to im pose only principles that no one could 
reasonably reject). Thus we find a seed o f actual contractualism . albeit heavily 
constrained, at the core o f  the Rawlsian m odal contractualist view. This makes 
Rawls a hybrid theorist.
In fact, as I argue in C hapter 3, Rawls shouldn’t constrain the actual 
contractualism  o f his hybrid theory as he does. The burdens o f  judgm ent, I claim, 
justify a m uch m ore w ide-ranging actual contractualist test, one which requires not 
only that the specific liberal egalitarian principles o f ‘justice as fairness’— Rawls’s 
favoured contractual term s— actually be accepted by each person, bu t also that 
liberal principles in general be accepted by each person. For the burdens o f 
judgm ent explain the reasonableness o f disagreem ent no t only on non-pohtical 
m oral m atters and on the specific form  that a liberal political set o f principles 
should take, bu t on liberal principles themselves. I f  the burdens o f  judgm ent show 
us that it is unreasonable to  im pose the principles o f some m oral view on som eone
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w ho does no t accept it, then they show us that it is unreasonable to im pose a liberal 
system on som eone w ho does n o t accept it. The actual contractualism  that Rawls 
takes the burdens o f judgm ent to  imply is under-ranging than he realises.
In the rem ainder o f Chapter 3 and in C hapter 4 I develop and defend the 
revised Rawlsian n e w  that this leaves us with. I start bv arguing that we can solve 
the puzzles that I raised for hybnd views in general at the end o f  C hapter 2. W ith 
regard to the puzzle I descnbed a m om ent ago, I argue that a plausible construal o f 
the im port o f the m odal contractualist reason that we have to find and comply with 
principles that no one could reasonably reject is as follows: appropriate respect for 
that reason entails no t that one is willing to  jetnson any n ew s that one holds wluch 
m ight conflict w ith w hat no one else actually rejects, bu t that one is willmg to 
reconsider carefully one’s grounds for affirm ing them  and perhaps alter them  in the 
light o f that. This creates a pressure towards consensus, but no t towards a 
consensus that can be secured merely by settling on contract term s chosen at 
random . Individuals’ m oral starting points will make a difference. This solunon to 
the puzzle also helps, as it turns out, to  solve o ther puzzles which the hvbnd view 
raises. It also lends the hvbnd  theory certain attractions that m odal contractualists 
have claimed for m odal contractualism  w ithout being able to show clearly why. O r 
so I m aintain.
I also explain, at the end o f Chapter 3, how  w hat Rawls takes to be necessary for 
the justification o f  justice as fairness— that each person shares the fundam ental 
elem ents out o f w hich justice as fairness is constructed— is an acceptable construal 
o f  ‘actual acceptance’ from  an actual contractualist po in t o f view. My explanation 
appeals, first, to  the idea that some form  o f consent is n o t an essential part o f the 
distinctive actual contractualist form  o f justification (an idea I introduce in Chapter 
1), and, second, to  the idea that it is plausible to appeal to the exercise o f agency
16
involved in affirm ing a m oral outlook as a justification for the im position o f norm s 
derived by elaborating elements o f  that oudook.
Three Rawlslan innovations are particularly pertinent for the defence o f  the 
hybnd view as I develop it. O ne o f them  is the "burdens o f judgm ent' basis for its 
actual contractualist com ponent, which I have just discussed. The second is the 
em phasis that Rawls places on the moral character o f individuals’ reasons for 
rejecting and accepting p roposed  contract terms. This is an idea wTuch can also be 
found in traditional acmal contractualist views (as I point out in C hapter 1) but 
which tends to be underem phasised. It is plausible to construe actual acceptance in 
an actual contractualist theory— especially a thoroughgoing actual contractualist 
theory— m term s o f  congruence no t with individuals’ rational self-interest bu t wnth 
their considered m oral views. Clearly this fits w'ell widi the burdens-of-judgm ent 
basis for actual contractualism . A nd it does not, I claim, underm ine the 
fundam ental attractions o f  acmal contractualism  in the first place.
The third Rawlsian innovation is w hat I call the "head-first’ approach to the 
acmal contractualist legitimising process wThich is part o f acmal and hybnd 
contractualist n e w s  alike. The head-first approach asks w hether the term s o f some 
p roposed  contract w ould be actually accepted by those wdio are b rought up under it. 
rather than w hether they w’ould be actually accepted by individuals in o ther 
circum stances such as the traditional acmal contractualists’ ‘state o f  natu re’. 
A lthough the head-first approach invites charges o f indoctnnauon , which I spend 
the second half o f C hapter 4 m eeting, it is helpful in that it reduces our dependence 
on histoncal speculation as com pared to traditional acmal contractualists. 
Nevertheless the argum ent for any particular set o f  term s m ust, in a hybnd 
framework, depend on a great deal o f empincal understanding and m oral 
psychology. In the first half o f  C hapter 4 I bnng  together the various reasons that
Rawls offers as part o f  his ‘political construc trn sr strategy to show that the term s o f 
justice as fairness w ould be able achieve the ideal o f individualistic justification as it 
is in terpreted  by the hybnd framework.
This is n o t an easily achieved goal because ]ustice as fairness, a liberal 
conception o f  justice, w ould engender a pluralistic society— one in which different 
individuals affirm a range o f incom patible m oral views. This partly explains why the 
Rawlsian n e w  escapes charges o f indoctrination; bu t it also makes it difficult to 
show that each individual brought up under the institutions o f justice as fairness 
would come to endorse the term s o f the social contract that it sets. The political 
constructivist strategy, as I argue, explains why various obstacles that we m ight 
expect to stand in the way o f  unanim ous actual acceptance o f  any set o f term s in 
such a pluralistic society do no t in fact do so. But it rem ains to be show n all die 
same that an overlapping consensus w ould anse on justice as fairness.
3. Hybnd contractualism and egalitarianism
Justice as fairness articulates a strongly egalitarian social contract, in the sense that it 
prioritises equality in the distribution o f material m eans, and this fact about it 
represents a greater barrier to the plausibility o f supposing that it could pass the 
acmal contractualist test that Rawls sets for it than does the fact d iat it also 
safeguards the basic liberties. This is for two reasons. First, traditional acmal 
contractualist approaches to  justice tend to have a built-in bias in favour o f 
contracts safeguarding the basic liberues because it is part o f their conception o f the 
pre-societal state o f nature which forms the backdrop to the contract that we are 
m ore or less equally free to do, think, and be as we wish. N o  one, it is supposed,
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would be prepared  to  give up that freedom  except insofar as dom g so w ould 
eliminate conflict, and no  one person is pow erful enough to  force a contract which 
is inegalitanan in its treatm ent o f  individual liberty. Since such conflict w ould be 
eliminated by restricting and enforcing each person’s freedom  so that it is fully 
com patible with each other person’s equal freedom , it seems unlikely that any 
further restriction w ould be agreed to. H ence a bias in favour o f the basic liberties. 
N ow , given this bias in traditional acmal contractualism , it seems m ore likely that 
Rawls’s acmal contractualism  will have difficulty with its strong egalitarianism—  
som ething which it does not share with traditional acmal contractualist views— than 
with its endorsem ent o f  the basic liberties.
The second reason to suppose that the strong egalitarianism will pose the 
greater barrier is as follows. I argue in C hapter 4 that part o f  Rawls’s defence o f the 
head-first approach against charges o f indoctrination appeals to  the fact that 
liberalism— i.e. political morality which endorses the basic Liberties— represents, as a 
m atter o f historical fact, a pom t o f convergence for societies which prior to 
becom ing liberal societies were each orgam sed around illiberal or non-liberal m oral 
Hews which differed from  society to society. G ranted tins fact, it seems empirically 
m ore plausible to  posit a consensus on the basic liberties than it does to posit a 
consensus on strong egalitarianism. For strong egalitarianism is not som ething that 
we can so plausibly suppose, as a m ere m atter o f historical fact, to  be a po in t o f 
convergence for even a range o f  liberal societies. Even if ultimately it will turn out 
to be so, we have n o t reached that point yet.
So in Chapter 5 I concentrate on the case for an overlapping consensus on 
justice as fairness’s egalitarianism rather than the case for its liberalism. I offer 
exegesis o f  Rawls’s well-known 'inform al argum ent’ for the egalitarian difference 
principle which stresses its roots m a conception o f fairness which can plausibly be
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attributed to m em bers o f the kind o f liberal dem ocratic society that justice as 
fairness w ould engender. The argum ent starts with the arbitrariness o f the fact that 
each o f us has abilities and endow m ents in different degrees. It then appeals to the 
idea that given the necessity o f the involvem ent (not always in straightforw ardly 
productive wavs) o f each o f us in the particular scheme o f cooperation in which we 
are engaged to  the production o f the specific set o f goods which that particular 
schem e produces, and given also the arbitrariness o f the fact that this is the schem e 
o f cooperation which produces the goods that we want, each person has a prima facie 
claim to an equal share. Finally, this equal share is finessed into the share m andated 
by the difference principle as a reflection o f the fact that each o f us could do better 
with respect to the baseline o f  an equal share if we perm it some inequalities.
This is n o t a novel reading. But it is w orth offering in order to stress the 
plausibility o f  the claim that the intuitions o f fairness upon which it is based are 
com m on and uncontroversial. And, perhaps m ore im portantly, it is w orth offering 
in order to dispel the idea that Rawls draws upon an idea o f fairness as impartiality 
which is m uch less plausibly attributed to each person in liberal societies. I try to 
bring out at the end o f the chapter exactly why m ouves o f impartiality with their 
cosm opolitan im plications are no t required to support justice as fairness’s 
egalitarianism despite objecnons which arise in the light o f the possibility that 
individuals m ight ‘shop around’ for alternative cooperative schem es in which they 
do better. This explanation highlights once again the im portance o f the moral 
character o f individuals’ reasons for actual acceptance in the Rawlsian hybnd 
framework.
In the final chapter I summ arise the hybnd contractualism  that I have 
developed and defended before considering its similarities and contrasts w ith the 
acmal contractualist tradition. (I concentrate on the acmal contractualist tradition
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because the m odal in terpretation o f  Rawls’s contractualism  is well-known and. in 
any case, there is no  great tradition o f  m odal contractualism  with which to com pare 
the hybnd new .) I note the unusual (for a philosophical political theorv) empincal 
emphasis o f the hvbnd  n e w  bu t suggest that this should be thought o f  as in keeping 
w ith the acmal contractualist tradm on. I also note that the hvbnd in terpretation o f 
Rawls offers an interesting and plausible understanding o f his n e w  that pohncal 
philosophv should be ‘realistically u top ian’.
I end with a b n e f  com panson o f the hybnd view with another recent attem pt to 
reconcile the attracuons o f acmal contractualism  and egahtanamsm: left- 
libertanamsm . Left-libertanans endorse a ngh t o f  self-ownership which, am ong 
other things, implies an acmal contractualist ngh t against the im posinon o f the 
terms o f contracts which thev do no t actuallv accept. But they also endorse a theory 
o f w orld-ow nership which places stronglv egalitarian condinons on anvone’s 
com ing to  own any tract o f the w orld outside her own person. I argue that while 
left-libertananism  represents an im provem ent on nght-libertanam sm  because o f its 
egalitanan rather than laisse^faire treatm ent o f w orld-ow nership, it represents at best 
no  im provem ent at all in term s o f the reach o f  its acmal contractualist test, which is 
no  m ore thoroughgoing than that o f right-libertanans. N either left- nor nght- 
libertarians subject their favoured original principles o f w orld-ow nership to 
individualistic justification. Left-libertananism  may even represent a step backwards 
from  the poin t o f n e w  o f  acmal contractualism  if, unlike nght-libertananism , it does 
no t perm it the im position o f  alternatives to its egalitanan original principles o f 
w orld-ow nership even if  each person actuallv accepts them . The hvbnd view, by 
contrast, represents an im provem ent on libertarianism both  in term s o f its 
egahtanamsm  and in term s o f  the thoroughgoingness o f its acmal contractualist test. 
For various reasons w hich I note, it mav seem to be a rather unsatisfying theory all
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the same. I hold, how ever, that this is a reflection o f the deep difficulties involved 
in satis fling  bo th  the contractualist ideal and the egalitanan intuitions that many 
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1. Actual contractualism
O ne way to interpret the fundam ental contractualist ideal o f individualistic 
justification is as follows. A m oral conception satisfies the ideal, we can sav, if and 
only if each relevant individual actually accepts it. I shall call this the 'acmal 
contractualist’ in terpretation o f the contractualist ideal. Acmal contractualist 
theories o f justice, then, m ake a m oral conception’s satisfaction o f  the ideal in its 
acmal contractualist interpretation necessary for the realisation o f  justice.
Eventually I shall defend an acmal contractualist interpretation o f  John Rawls’s 
contractualism . I shall begin by sketching in m ore detail the general features o f 
acmal contractualist theories o f justice.
T he description I just gave o f tbe acmal contractualist in terpretation o f the ideal 
o f individualistic justification involved three main ideas. First, the idea o f a moral 
conception, the land  o f  thing that satisfies the ideal. Second, the idea o f  a relevant 
individual, w hose acmal acceptance o f the m oral conception in question is necessary 
and sufficient for the satisfaction o f the ideal. A nd third, the idea o f acmal
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acceptance itself. The idea o f  a m oral conception is simply the idea o f a coherent 
set o f norm ative principles and conceptions o f  persons and institutions and their 
roles and aims, together w ith an account o f their basis.1 In  a m oral conception 
appropriate for a theory o f (societal, rather than intersocietal) justice the principles 
and conceptions o f  persons and institutions and so on are those invoked in order to 
spell ou t requirem ents o f  justice. W hich o f  the requirem ents that we face are 
requirem ents o f justice and which are no t is an awkward question which I skate 
over here. I shall say that any correct principle o f  coercive enforcem ent o f some 
other norm  makes that o ther no rm ’s requirem ents ipso facto requirem ents o f justice, 
and that it is also sufficient for requirem ents to be requirem ents o f justice that they 
are created by norm s which are part o f a m oral conception that endorses die 
coercive enforcem ent o f at least some norm s even if no t those in question.‘ Any 
m oral conception which sets out institutions and principles which create
1 The idea o f a moral conception I take from Rawls, although he never specifies precisely what he 
understands by it. The idea is nonetheless fairly clear from his discussion o f ‘polmcal conceptions’, 
which constitute a subset o f all moral conceptions. See PL, pp. 11-15. Rawls’s K anban 
constructivism offers another example: see “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” in Rawls’s 
Collected Papers, p. 305.
2 Although affirmation o f any set o f norm s usually implies die appropriateness o f the em ployment of 
some kind o f pressure to conform , coercion is a particularly senous kind o f pressure to conform  
which makes the cost o f non-conform ity higher than do other kinds. This goes some way towards 
justifying the focus on coercion as the key feature o f requirements o f justice. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, 
“Is the Basic Structure Basic?” , p 124: “although I am no t sure that Rawls would or should construe 
the basic structure in purely coercive terms, there is one obvious reason for domg so that does not 
seem arbitrary, namely, that the coercive structure is coercive P It seems obvious to Scheffler that 
coercion is im portant in a way that moral disapproval, say, is not, and that this would be a reason for 
concentrating primarily on coercive institutions.
requirem ents o f  justice is a moral conception appropriate for a theory o f justice.' 
F rom  now  on, w hen I use the phrase ‘m oral conception5— and I shall use it often—  
I shall m ean ‘a m oral conception appropriate for a theory o f justice’.
I shall look at the idea o f the relevant individual and the idea o f actual 
acceptance implicit in the acmal contractualist interpretation o f the fundam ental 
contractualist ideal in a m om ent. First, a w ord about the connections betw een 
acmal contractualism , justice, and legitimacy. As I shall frame the issue, acmal 
contractualist theories o f justice can be either w hat I call ‘pure legitimacy theories’ 
or ‘com bined theories’ b u t no t ‘regulative conception’ theories. In the next section 
I explain this way o f  fram ing things in detail. Then, after I have said m ore about 
relevant individuals and acmal acceptance, I describe the general structure o f acmal 
contractualism.
2. .Actual contractualism and approaches to justice4
W e ought to act in accordance with those institutions and principles o f justice in our 
society which are justified. I f  a principle which forbids harm ing in m ost 
circum stances is justified, for example, we ought no t to harm  in those 
circumstances. Some institutions and principles may be coercively enforced, and
? A h e th e r these institutions are those o f Robert Nozick’s minimal state, those o f Rawls's 'basic 
structure’, or otherwise will depend on the content o f the moral conception in question. This is not
predeterm ined by the conception o f which requirements are requirem ents o f tustice that 1 propose
here.
4 My account in this section owes a great deal to that o f A. lohn Simmons in his helpful discussion m 
“justification and legitimacy” .
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the coercive enforcem ent o f them  m ust be part o f w hat is justified. Coercive 
enforcem ent is n o t an extra which comes automaacaUv when the subject m atter o f 
principles is w ithin a certain range. It is optional, and if it is included it too  m ust be 
justified.
The wav in which theories o f justice justify the principles, m stituuons, and 
coercive enforcem ent o f institutions and principles vanes from  theory to theory. 
Suppose that a tyrannical dictatorship, unjust in anyone’s book, is transform ed 
instantaneously so that its insututions and principles, including its laws, are those 
advocated by some theory o f justice. Some theones o f justice w ould say o f this 
m iraculously transform ed society that we could know from  this alone that it had 
becom e, instantaneously, a just one. They w ould say this regardless o f die relations 
or attitudes or behaviour o f the m em bers o f society beyond the disposition to act in 
accordance with the institutions and principles. Call theones o f justice that w ould 
say this pure regulative conception theones o f justice. O ne example o f a pure regulative 
conception theory is utilitarianism. (Non-rule) utilitarians think that if the (fully 
conform ed with) institutions and principles o f a society are such that they produce 
the greatest happiness o f the greatest num ber, then that society is just. I f  the 
m iraculous transform ation involved the sudden establishm ent o f such institutions 
and principles, it w ould in d iat instant becom e, on a utilitarian theory, just.
N ow , we suppose, I think, that at least part o f  the reason that we have to act in 
accordance w ith just institutions and principles is that these institutions and 
principles are those o f our society. But pure regulative conception theones o f justice 
do n ’t m ake this fact a central com ponent o f their explanations o f  why we ought to 
act in accordance with the institutions and principles d iat they advocate. They tell 
us that these institutions and principles are the ligh t ones, simply, and that therefore 
we ought to be im plem enting and acting in accordance with them  in our society.
I f  we thought that all just individual action were entirely determ inable in 
advance o f the establishm ent o f any institutions and principles to prescribe it, then 
it w ouldn’t m ake m uch sense to suppose that even part o f the reason that we have 
to act in accordance with just insntuuons and principles is that they are those o f our 
society. I f  we could know  w hat justice w ould require o f jack in even ' conceivable 
situation that Jack could find him self in, and w ithout consulting the institutions and 
principles established in any society that jack happened to be a m em ber of, then 
w hat role could the fact that the institutions and principles o f  the sociep- o f  which 
jack is a m em ber are those o f  that society possibly play in accounting for the reason 
that Jack has to act in accordance with them r Since we do suppose that part o f the 
reason that we have to act in accordance with just institutions and principles is that 
they are those o f our society, it can’t be the case that we think that just individual 
action is entirely determ inable in advance o f the establishm ent o f any institutions and 
principles to prescribe it.
But this on its own doesn’t tell against pure regulative conception theones, for 
am ong the institutions they prescnbe m ight be legislative institutions with the 
discretion to  legislate a range o f things within certain constraints. A just society 
w ould have to  have these institutions, bu t we may know this w ithout knowing 
precisely w hat will be required o f  individuals in a just society, because we may not 
know  which o f  a range o f  possible mles that are consistent with justice have been 
prescribed by the institutions. So, for example, a theory o f  justice m ight (albeit 
implausibly) say that w hether or not there should be an absolute prohibition  on 
striking others w ith o n e’s fists should depend upon how  long it takes the tallest 
m em ber o f  society to count everyone else. I f  it takes her longer than a certain 
am ount o f  time, then there should be an absolute prohibition. If  not, there should 
not. In this case, just individual action isn’t entirely determ inable in advance o f  the
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establishm ent o f  the institution which involves the tallest m em ber o f society's 
counting everyone else. So pure regulative conceptions aren’t inconsistent with the 
supposition that part o f the reason that we have to act in accordance with just 
institutions and principles is that they are those o f  our society. They are therefore 
no t ruled out on that basis as plausible conceptions o f justice.
So if  we still think that som e part o f the explanation why we ought to act in 
accordance with just institutions and principles goes missing in a pure regulative 
conception theory we had better refine our understanding o f w hat it is. I propose 
that the poin t is n o t merely that the relevant institunons and principles are those o f 
our society bu t that they reflect, in some important sense, the particular, distinct 
persons we are. T hat is why the fact that the pure regulative conception theory that 
I just imagined can’t prescribe just action w ithout reference to the m ake-up o f the 
relevant society isn’t enough for it to respond adequately to the intuition. The time 
it takes the tallest person in society to count everyone else is no t reflective o f us in 
any important sense.
O f the theones o f justice which are not pure regulative conception theones, 
those w hose explanations o f  why we ought to act in accordance with just 
institutions and principles make reference solely to facts about the particular persons 
we are in die relevant sense I shall call pure legitimacy theones o f justice. These 
theories take these facts to be relevant because they are said to give nse by 
them selves to obligations to comply with the institutions and principles o f society. 
They make those institutions and principles, including principles licensing coercive 
enforcem ent, just. Y our society is just if and only if its m em bers have the 
obligations generated in the relevant way and regardless o f w hether the principles 
and institutions o f its m oral conception m eet any independendy specified 
conditions. In principle, any set o f institutions and principles could be just on a
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pure legitimacy theory, although m each case this will o f  course depend on exactly 
how  obligations o f  justice are supposed to depend upon facts about the relevant 
persons. Theories o f  justice which make it a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the justice o f a society that it be ruled (usmg force) by a person with hereditary tide 
to the th rone  are obviously pure legitimacy theones. That p erson ’s subjects ought 
to  com ply w ith the legislation o f their m onarch simply because they are subjects o f 
that m onarch (a fact about them  w hether they are ruled by her or not). Their 
subjecthood is a special obligation-generating fact about them . If  they were subjects 
o f some other person, then  this m onarch’s rule w ould n o t be just, even if w hat she 
legislated was exacdy w hat the rightful m onarch w ould legislate. (Compare the 
obligation that I m ight be taken to have to obey my parents.'
Pure regulative conception theones and pure legitimacy theones lie at opposite 
ends o f  a spectrum . In betw een are theones o f justice which com bine the two (see 
Figures 1 and 2 below). This can be done in three different ways. The first and 
perhaps m ost obvious way to com bine them  is to subject some o f  the institutions 
and principles o f a m oral concepnon to a pure legitimacy test and others to a pure 
regulative conception test. So, for example, we m ight say that this society’s 
constitution ought, if it is to  be just, to m eet a set o f condm ons determ ined 
independendy o f  any facts about these parncular persons w ho com pose this society. 
But at the same time we m ight say that die laws no t pertaining to the constitunon 
ought to be determ ined by m ajonty vote, conceived as a m eans o f m aking known 
the general will. O r we m ight say that the person with legitimate claim to the throne 
ought to govern w ithin a clearlv bounded area outside which the conten t o f the laws 
should be independent o f  her legislation. I shall call theones which com bine 
regulative conception and legitimacy views in this way split condition theones.
30
The second way to  com bine them  is to offer an account o f  why we ought to 
behave in accordance with just institutions and principles which sees us as obliged 
only because o f both facts about our persons and the fact that those institutions and 
principles m eet conditions that those o f a m oral conception ought to  m eet 
independently  o f facts about us. Only if  a society’s m oral conception m eets the 
relevant conditions and each o f its m em bers has obligations generated in the way 
that the account specifies can the society be said to be just. So, for example, we 
m ight say that every institution and principle m a just society ought to  reflect the 
general will and ought to  be justified according to some criterion independent o f 
facts about the particular, distinct persons w ho com pose society. I f  the m oral 
conception reflects the general will bu t does no t m eet the independent criterion it is 
no t just. I f  the m oral conception m eets the m dependent criterion bu t does not 
reflect the general will it is no t just. I shall call theones which com bine regulative 
conception and legitimacy views in this way dual condition theones.
The third way to com bine the two views is a m ixture o f tire first two.
According to mixed condition theones, we ought to behave in accordance w ith some just 
institutions and principles in society’s m oral concepuon because they m eet certain 
conditions a la pure regulative conception theones. O r we. ought to behave in 
accordance with them  because they are appropriately reflective o f  the distinct 
persons we are a la pure legitimacy theones. O r w’e ought to behaye in accordance 
with some because they m eet certain conditions and with others because they reflect 
the distinct persons that we are. In addition, we  ought to behave in accordance with 
still others both because they m eet certain conditions and because they are 
appropriately reflective o f  the particular, distinct persons we are. So, for example, 
som eone m ight advocate a theory wtiuch held that a certain area o f  legislation, 
outside wtiuch the law’s should be set in stone, should be goyerned by a person with
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legitimate claim to the throne but so that her decrees were coextensive with what is 
justified independendy o f her will. This would be a mixed condition theory.
Fipure 1.
Mixed condition theory 
Pure legitimacy theory
All principles and institutions in society's moral conception 
Som e pnnciples and instutions | Other principles and institutions 
Pure regulative conception component
conception^ theory _ | _________________________________ | | component
Split condition theor^ p g 7 a “ c Z c Z ~  compos
tegnmec) component 




Pure regulative conception theones subject all elements of a society If moral conception to a 
regulative conception test (blue) only. Pure legitimacy theones subject all elements of a society / 
moral conception to a legitimay test (red) only. Split condition theones and mixed condition 
theones subject some elements of a society !r moral conception to one test, some to the other. Mixed 
condition theories also subject some elements to both tests.
Fipure
Dual condition theory
All principles and institutions in society's moral conception
S om e principles and instutions Other principles and institutions
egvlathe conception component
ieffitimacy component
Dual condition theones subject all elements of a society 's moral conception to both a regulative 
conception test (blue) and a legitimay test (red).
Now, actual contractualist theories may be pure legitimacy theories or they may be 
combined theories (i.e. either split, dual, or mixed condition theories). But they
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cannot be pure regulative conception theones. since they always include the 
requirem ent that a just society satisfy the ideal o f individualistic justification— in its 
acmal contractualist m terpretanon— of the relevant moral conception. As we saw at 
the outset, the acmal contractualist m terpretanon of the ideal involves relevant 
individuals’ acmal acceptance o f the moral concepnon. So jusnce is no t attainable 
w ithout acmal acceptance, and the explananon o f why a moral concepnon is just 
m akes mehrmnable reference to a fact about the parncular. distinct persons that 
com pose society: the fact o f th en  acmal acceptance. This is why acmal 
contracmalists cannot be pure regulative concepnon theorists.
Acmal contractualist theories which are also pure legitimacy theories set no 
further conditions for the jusnce o f any given society beyond that its moral 
concepnon should m eet the acmal contractualist m terpretanon o f the contractualist 
ideal. Acmal contractualist theones which are com bined theones set m dependent 
condm ons on at least some o f the m snm nons and pnnciples o f society’s moral 
concepnon and require the sansfacnon o f the contractualist ideal with respect to at 
least some others: they have a regulative concepnon com ponent. The m ost 
dem anding form  o f acmal contractualism  is dual condinon acmal contractualism. 
W hereas theones with a pure regulative concepnon com ponent concentrate only on 
the con ten t o f  at least some m snm nons and pnnciples, and theones with a pure 
legitimacy com ponen t concentrate only on obliganon-generating facts about 
m em bers o f  society with respect to at least some m snm nons and pnnciples, dual 
condition acmal contracm alists set dual condm ons on the entire conten t o f moral 
conceptions. These condm ons are: that they fit with some non-legitimacy based 
jusnficanon (the regulative concepnon com ponent); and that they m eet the acmal 
contractualist m terpretanon o f the contractualist ideal (the legitimacy com ponent).
In setting them selves this challenge, dual condinon acmal contracm alists
acknowledge the appeal o f bo th  pure legitimacy theones and pure regulative 
conception theones. O n  the one hand, they respond, as pure regulative conception 
theones do, to  our convicnon that justice with respect to any insntution or principle 
is a m atter at least to  some extent independent o f w hat anyone thinks is just at a 
given time. All o f the people, as we m ight pu t it, are m istaken som e o f  the time; 
even those w ho lose out under some m oral conception may collude in their own 
oppression. Indoctnnanon  is possible and powerful, so we m ust look beyond the 
views and actions o f  those subject to given m snm nons and principles in order to 
determ ine w hether the society which im plem ents the relevant m oral concepnon is 
just. To grant that any m stitunon or principle m eeting a legitimacy criterion (at least 
on some versions) is just is to ignore this convicnon.
O n the other hand, dual condinon acmal contracm alists acknowledge m ore 
fundam entally the supposm on that part o f  the reason that we have to act m 
accordance with just m snm nons and principles is that they reflect the distinct, 
particular persons that we are. They also have, m oreover, the advantage o f an 
attractive account o f the ground o f the obligations to comply with just m snm nons 
and pnnciples that we take ourselves to have. A dual condinon m onarchist theory, 
for example, says that a society is just if and only if  the person w ho is enntled to the 
throne im plem ents insnm tions and principles which themselves m eet certam further 
conditions. (Obviously the regulative conception com ponent m ust be consistent 
unth m onarchy.) But the necessity o f the m le o f a m onarch w ho has a legitimate 
claim to the throne is unconvincing as a com ponent m a theory o f  justice. Universal 
acmal acceptance o f a m oral conception is m uch m ore appealing as the basis o f 
legitimacy than the ancestry o f the person w ho im poses the m les, w hatever they are.
A dual condition theory whose account o f legitimacy is acmal contractualist 
looks to  be an appealing fram ework, then. The Rawlsian mew that I am going to
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defend operates within it. For the m ost part o f this thesis, how ever, and for the 
entirety o f this chapter, I shall be concentrating on the acmal contractuaiist 
com ponent o f this kind o f  theory. This is because the regulative conception 
com ponent— the argum ent for the principles o f justice that proceeds from  the 
original position— of Rawls’s theory o f justice is well-known. (I do discuss it, 
nevertheless, in m ore detail in C hapter 5.) I consider the question o f  the basis o f 
acmal contractualism ’s appeal further on in this chapter. But first I w ant to clarify 
the ideas o f acmal acceptance and o f the relevant individual implicit in the acmal 
contractualist interpretation o f the ideal o f individualistic justification.
3. Two variables: scope and acceptance
The acmal contractualist interpretation o f the contractualist ideal o f individualistic 
justification, recall, says that a m oral conception satisfies the ideal if and only if each 
relevant individual actually accepts it. The content o f acmal contractualist theones 
changes according to two vanables representing a range o f wTays to think about the 
ideas o f acmal acceptance and o f the relevant individuals whose acmal acceptance 
m atters whiich we find in this interpretation o f the ideal. The first vanable, which 
I’ll simply call ‘acceptance’, concerns the construal o f the idea o f acmal acceptance 
o f a m oral conception. \Khen has a conception actually been accepted by som eoner 
This is a quesuon about how  we interpret empincal facts. W e m ight say any o f a 
range o f things. A t one extreme, we m ight say that a m oral conception has actually 
been accepted by som eone if  she is no t making violent efforts to im plem ent some 
alternative. Acmal contractualist justification o f all sorts o f conceptions may be easy 
to secure if we say this. For example, it may be secured in a society in which a few
live like kings and the rest are too busy scraping together a living to try to overthrow  
the current regime. A t the o ther extreme, we m ight say that a m oral conception has 
actually been accepted by som eone only if  she freely puts her signature to a 
declarauon o f consent to it after years o f studying the argum ents for it and for the 
alternatives to it and she repeats such signed declaration o f consent on a daily basis. 
Acm al contractualist jusnfication o f a m oral conception o f  any kind is extremely 
unlikely to  be feasible if we say this. So in determ ining the conten t o f acmal 
contractualism  it is necessary to decide upon and argue for one o f many ways to 
understand acceptance.
WHiat is fundam ental to all constm als o f the variable o f  acceptance, however, is 
the idea that individuals should som ehow  have control over the im position on them  
o f norm s in the areas we take to  be subject to the acmal contractualist test. The 
individual is treated as an agent w hose actual actions alone, construed as acceptance, 
should determ ine w hether and which norm s constrain her in those areas. This is 
the source o f acmal contracm alists’ ability to justify the term s o f their favoured 
contract by saying to each individual: ‘you accepted it5— the basic idea in the acmal 
contractualist interpretation o f the indrvidualisnc ideal o f justification. H ow ever we 
construe the acceptance, for this to have any force at all as a distinctive form  o f 
justification it m ust state, or at least infallibly track, the fact o f the relevant 
individuars acmal exercise o f  her agency. W e are, that is, looking for som ething 
that can genuinely be understood  as an exercise o f agency rather than, say, the 
outcom e o f a com pulsion or the only metaphysical possibility. O therw ise to  say ‘you 
accepted it’ doesn’t have force distinct from  ‘that’s w ho you are’, the justificatory 
basis o f legitimacy Hews in general, or from  ‘that’s the way things (morally) are’, the 
justificatory basis, roughly speaking, o f regulative conception views.
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But notice that the form  o f acmal contractualist justification as I ’ve just 
specified it does no t imply that acceptance m ust be construed so that it involves 
individuals’ consciously accepting the term s o f the contract in an everyday sense (i.e. 
by consenting to  or agreeing to them). WTiat marks out acmal contractualist 
justification, I suggest, is that it makes the legitimacy o f the im position o f norm s 
upon  an individual dependent upon an exercise o f that individual’s agency which 
can then  be appealed to in justifying the contract to her. Structurally speaking, this 
sufficient to distinguish it from  legitimacy approaches m ore widely and o f course 
also regulatiye conception approaches. I see no reason to go further and insist that 
the exercise o f  individual agency that it appeals to be consent in some form .' That 
does not, however, m ean that any exercise o f agency will do as a constm al o f 
acceptance: it makes no sense at all, for example, to suppose that your whistling on 
your way to work tom orrow  constitutes acceptance o f my coercion o f you in 
accordance with a m oral conception that I pick out at random . Plausible acmal 
contractualist accounts m ust plausibly connect their constm als o f  acceptance to the 
m oral conception accepted and to their concern with acmal contractualist 
justification in the first place. Express consent as a constm al o f  acmal acceptance 
seems plausible because it is part o f our ordinary practice o f taking on new 
obligations. Tacit consent is also part o f that practice and so seems plausible too .6
3 Cf. Rawls, Collected Papers, p. 210, n. 16, where Rawls suggests that Locke (undoubtedly an actual
contractualist) uses tacit consent in a sense which means that for him ‘'an obliganon to obey the rules 
laid down by a legitimate political authorin' can arise independently o f a perform ative act. whether
express or tacit, although no t w ithout a prior voluntary act."
6 Both o f these are readily understood as exercises o f individual agency. In the case o f tacit consent, 
surveys o f  conditions necessary for someone's behaviour to be construed as tacit consent make it 
clear that the possibihn' o f dissent m ust have been available and understood— which implies that the
But all the same we should n o t suppose that traditional construals o f  acceptance 
such as free, inform ed consent are the only plausible construals that could be 
consistent with actual contractualism. O ther acmal exercises o f  individual agency 
m ight also be appealed to to justify the im posm on o f  norm s; doubts then will be 
about their plausibility rather than their consistency with acmal contractualism . 
Further on I shall defend a non-consent based constm al.
The second variable, scope, concerns the constituency to which justification is 
taken to be owing. This may seem surprising. Shouldn’t constituency be no t a 
variable but a constant, viz., all individuals w ho will be obliged to comply with the 
institutions and principles o f moral conception in question? But if  the consatuency 
is delimited thus, acmal contractualism  may fail to live up to the contractualist ideal 
alm ost regardless o f the value it assigns to the first variable. Some individuals may 
no t be capable o f giving acmal acceptance on any assignm ent o f  the variable o f 
acceptance which even rem otely tracks whatever it is that makes us interested in it 
in the first place. Yet we may still w ant to say that these individuals are subject to 
the authority im plem enting the m oral conception in question. W’e m ight think, for 
example, that people w ho are insane or people in comas or people w ho are 
pathologically incapable o f complying with norm s are obliged to comply with the 
institutions and pnnciples o f the nght moral conception. But such individuals may 
no t be capable o f  accepting those pnnciples on any understanding o f acmal 
acceptance that we find it plausible to apply in general.
\JChy isn’t this problem  o f scope simply a counterexam ple to acmal 
contractualism? Acmal contractualist theones are supposed to offer an arnculauon
failure to dissent counts as an exercise o f the agent’s choice. See e.g. Simmons. Moral 'Principles and 
Political Obligations, pp. 80-3.
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o f the ideal o f  individualistic justification. O n any plausible form ulation they may 
fail to  secure the actual acceptance o f each o f those w ho will be subject to  rule 
according to  the principles o f the moral concepnon in question. So why shouldn’t 
we reject actual contractualism? The answer is that acmal contractualism — and only 
actual contractualism — responds, even in a form  which restricts the consntuencv to 
w hom  justification is taken to be owing, to concerns which its p roponen ts take to 
be a reason to  endorse the ideal o f mdividualistic jusnficanon at all. The extent o f 
the restriction, m oreover, need no t be determ ined in an ad hoc m anner bu t as a result 
o f  reasoning which connects with this fundam ental concern. I shall say m ore about 
this below.
4. The shape of actual contractualism
W ith many o f  their com ponents clarified in the preceding secnons, I shall now  try 
to give a b rief sketch o f  the general structure o f actual contractualist theones. As 
we have seen, such theones say that a moral conception or some part o f it m ust 
m eet the condition o f acmal acceptance by each relevant individual. This is their 
defining charactenstic, and their central structural feature is the transition via acmal 
acceptance as at least a necessary condition o f the existence o f our obligations to 
comply with that m oral conception’s institutions and pnnciples. Any plausible such 
theory* m ust offer understandings o f the m eaning o f ‘acmal acceptance’ and 
‘relevant individual’— assignm ents o f what I have called the vanables o f acceptance 
and scope— which are consonant with the underlying attraction o f  acmal 
contractualism ’s m terpretanon o f  the ideal o f individualistic jusuficauon. It m ust be 
made clear w hat is involved in actually accepting a moral conception.
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N ow  nonce that in postulating the necessary condition o f actual acceptance, 
actual contracm alists take each relevant individual to  be, in effect, the bearer o f a 
m oral right against, at the very least, coercion to behave in accordance w ith some 
m snm nons and pnnciples which she does no t actually accept. (This is minimally a 
ngh t against coercion because as I snpulated in secnon 1 above, a m oral concepnon 
spells out at least coercively enforceable m snm nons and pnnciples.) This nght 
form s at least part o f the moral backdrop for the actual contractualist theory. A 
correlate o f  the dem and for acmal acceptance, this m oral backdrop is the second o f 
acmal contractualism ’s m am  structural features. The transition to an actually 
accepted m oral concepnon m ust take place against this m oral backdrop.
Such theones need no t say anything m ore, and some pure legitimacy versions 
m ight not. They m ight o f  course descnbe the (relevant part o f the) m oral 
concepnon that they think m ost likely to achieve acceptance and, therefore, to be 
that o f a just society, bu t this descnpnon w ould do no norm ative work. I f  no one 
actually does accept such a concepnon, the fact that it seems m advance m ore likely 
to  achieve legitimacy through acmal acceptance than som ething that everyone 
actually does accept does n o t make it ngh t to  im pose it.
But the m oral backdrop needn’t be restricted to a nght agamst coercion to 
behave m accordance with pnnciples that one doesn’t accept. An im portan t way m 
which it m ight be expanded beyond such a restncnon is this: the m oral backdrop 
itself is taken to m clude certain m snm nons and pnnciples o f  justice. This is no t 
consistent, however, w ith a pure legitimacy theory. The transm on via acmal
It i s  reasonable to talk o f justice with regard to a society subject to the original moral conception if 
the moral conception includes pnnciples mandating the coercive enforcem ent o f lnstirauons and 
pnnciples. The lack o f a state— understood as haring a monopoly on the legitimate use of force—  
does not m my n e w  render inapplicable talk o f justice. See Secuon 1 above.
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contractualist acceptance to  the accepted m oral conception takes place against the 
background o f  another m oral conception some o f which, at least, is no t itself 
subjected to  the actual contractualist test. H ow  this works out depends on the kinds 
o f restrictions that the pnnciples o f the background moral conception are taken to 
impose. Suppose that the institutions and pnnciples that the background moral 
conception  involves are taken to im pose absolute restnctions on w hat can be 
accepted, so that society cannot be just except if these institutions and pnnciples are 
part o f its m oral conception. In that case society is just p n o r to the acmal 
contractualist transition to a new  m oral conception and it may not be afterwards. If 
the newly accepted m oral conception violates the onginal conception’s restnctions, 
it’s no t just. I f  it doesn’t, it is just, bu t to the extent that the new moral conception 
simply repeats the restrictions o f the onginal one, acmal acceptance is dom g no 
w ork at all. The original m oral conception may, however, leave room  for discrenon 
over vanous dom ains o f  conduct— it may say nothing about them  except that 
regulation o f them  m ust m eet the acmal contractualist test— in m uch the same way 
that an unalterable constitution requiring dem ocratic decision-m aking leaves room  
for collective discretion over those dom ains about which it perm its democratic 
decisions to be made. In that case in those dom ains the acmal contractualist 
requirem ent does do w ork in justifying institutions and pnnciples governing those 
domains. The picture as a whole is (for all I have said) a split theory: some aspects 
o f the advocated m oral conception subjected to a pure regulative conception test, 
others to a pure legitimacy test. That both tests are m et suffices for the justice o f 
society.
So the onginal m oral conception, which is no t subject to the acmal 
contractualist test, determ ines the content o f the new moral conception directly, 
because it simply specifies part o f the final m oral conception. A nd (depending on
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the grounds that inform  individuals' acmal acceptance) it may do so indirectly, 
because it may exercise an influence on the conten t o f the o ther part. So, for 
example, the onginal m oral conception m ight stipulate robust nghts o f  self­
ow nership8 bu t say nothing about acquisition or ownership o f property except that 
the relevant institutions and principles m ust m eet the acmal contractualist test. But 
the nghts o f self-ownership may inform  the conten t o f w hat each person actually 
accepts with regard to institutions and pnnciples o f property' acquisition and 
ownership. For instance, the physically stronger may no t intim idate the weaker into 
accepting unequal nghts o f acquisition. To the extent that w ithout such 
intimidation the nghts o f  acquisition will be m ore equal, the onginal m oral 
conception inform s the conten t o f the final m oral conception which includes 
instim tions and pnnciples o f  property acquisition.
These are the possibilities that present them selves if the m oral backdrop in an 
acmal contractualist theory involves a m oral conception whose restnctions are taken 
to  be absolute. Suppose, now , that the instim tions and pnnciples o f the background 
m oral conception are taken to  im pose restncuons which are no t (all) absolute, so 
that the m oral conception legitimised by the acmal contractualist transition may 
justly involve restnctions which contravene norm s im posed under the onginal 
conception. In this case, a society is just only if to the extent that its m oral 
conception deviates from  the onginal background m oral conception, it is actually 
accepted by all m em bers o f  society against the backdrop o f that m oral conception. 
The endorsem ent o f  the onginal m oral conception as part o f the acmal 
contracmalistis m oral backdrop has the effect o f specifying not only a set o f 
instim tions and pnnciples which are just even if they are n o t accepted by each
8 See Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Jnequahti, p. 32.
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person bu t also, as with the absolutely restricting background m oral concepnon 
view, a set o f  bargaining positions which may inform , in the way I described a 
m om ent ago, the conten t o f  any just devianons from  the conten t o f the onginal 
m oral conception through actual acceptance. For, as I claimed above, the moral 
backdrop m ust be in place as part o f the acmal contractualist requirem ent o f acmal 
acceptance o f  the m oral conception that is ultimately produced and endorsed. ^Xliat 
people accept against this background, rather than against any other, is, then, w hat 
is relevant.
In either case the expanded backdrop may also inform  the content o f  the new 
moral conception in another way that it is w orth bringing out. As we have just seen, 
since the acmal contractualist transition must take place against the just background 
o f the original moral conception, individuals’ bargaining positions are set by the 
conten t o f the original m oral conception. N ow  how  things are for individuals 
against the m oral background determ ines their bargaining positions regardless o f 
w hether it is expanded or not. How ever, w hen it is expanded there is a certain 
m oral endorsem ent on the part o f the theorist o f those bargaining positions: they 
are the nght bargaining positions for individuals to have, no t just those which 
individuals happen to have. The expanded m oral backdrop sets a m oral baseline.
The no-agreem ent po in t therefore represents no t the impossibility o f justice given 
the circum stances, as it w ould in an unexpanded backdrop, bu t instead acts as 
justice’s default position. In som e cases this fact m ight affect w hat a person w ould 
consent to. Suppose that the m oral backdrop includes libertarian self-ownership 
rights which may be replaced if their replacem ent passes the acmal contractualist 
test. Suppose further that I am very m uch opposed to these nghts because I see my 
role and that o f  others in my society as tools in the service o f the glory o f God.
A nd suppose, finally, that everyone else in my society is also very religious, but
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nevertheless affirms greater individual liberty than I do (if no t as m uch as the 
libertarian m oral backdrop). N ow , against a minimal m oral backdrop, I m ight have 
contem plated refusing to accept anything bu t my glory-of-G od m oral concepnon.
It is highly unlikely that this m oral concepnon could have secured unanim ous 
acceptance, bu t in that case, if I had also refused to  accept anything else, there 
would have been no moral concepnon that it w ould be just to im pose on us all. 
Jusnce simply w ouldn’t have applied in our socien\ since the fallback posm on— the 
m inimal moral backdrop— w ouldn’t have involved the im posinon o f any moral 
concepnon itself. I m ight have thought this preferable to giving w hat I see as a 
w atered-down religious m oral concepnon justice’s seal o f approval, and so have 
decided to hold out for my favoured m oral concepnon or nothing at all. By 
contrast, against the libertarian moral backdrop, I m ight setde for the w atered-dow n 
moral concepnon as morally closer to my favoured moral conception than die 
backdrop itself— better that jusnce involves some o f my religious aims dian that it 
involves none, as it will if there is no  unanim ity— and therefore accept it. So the 
fact that the expanded m oral backdrop sets a m oral baseline with jusnce’s seal o f 
approval may, quite apart from  the fact that it sets (say) levels o f material well-being 
and non-interference from  others, inform  the content o f any m oral concepnon diat 
passes the acmal contractualist test.
The m oral backdrop, then, is a fundam ental part o f any acmal contractualist 
theory. A t m inim um  it includes the ngh t no t to be coerced to conform  to some 
m snm nons and pnnciples o f  jusnce that one does no t actually accept, bu t it may be 
expanded to include any num ber o f further nghts. pnnciples, and m snm nons. Such 
expansions are no t m consistent with the moral ngh t which is the foundanon o f die 
theory’s acmal contractualism. Against the m oral backdrop, entailed by it as 
necessary for the permissibility o f any devianons from  it, acmal contracm alists
specify a procedure o f actual acceptance bv which specified relevant individuals can 
com e to  be subject to a m oral conception involving such deviations. As we have 
seen, this m uch is com m on to all acmal contractualist theones.
Dual and m ixed condition acmal contractualist theones add a third com ponent: 
an account o f  the content o f the to-be-accepted pans o f the advocated moral 
conception that is necessarv, in addition to their acmal acceptance-denved 
legitimacy, for them  to be just. The idea here, as we saw in secnon 2 above, is that 
we have m o  dimensions o f assessm ent o f the relevant parts (which may be ^7/the 
parts, as in dual condition acmal contractualist theones) o f m oral conceptions—  
their legitimacy, understood  m acmal contractualist term s, and the independent 
soundness o f  their pnnciples— m both  o f which the relevant parts m ust m easure up 
in order to be counted, on the theory, just.
N ow , this further regulauve concepnon com ponent in a dual or m ixed 
condinon acmal contractualist theory o f jusnce need no t be connected in any way to 
the legitimacy com ponent. O ne could consistently endorse brutal dictatorship, say. 
as necessary for jusnce even as one endorsed as also necessary a m oral background 
and a legitimising process o f acmal acceptance which together m ade it incredibly 
unlikely by one’s own admission that justice should ever be achieved (because no 
one would, against that background, actually accept the brutal dictatorship). But 
even setting aside the con ten t o f die regulative conception com ponent (i.e. brutal 
dictatorship), this w ould be a rather unattractive view. W hat could m otivate us to 
endorse both  aspects o f  it at once? It is m uch m ore likely diat a dual or mixed 
condition theorist w ould offer a regulative concepnon com ponent which seemed 
likely at least in its norm ative implications (as opposed to the full argum ent for it) to 
gain die acmal acceptance o f the relevant individuals against the m oral background
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in question .' The resultant view m ight still be curiously divided in the sense that 
there is no reason to  suppose that it would come about because o f  the soundness o f 
its pnnciples (for all we have said the reasons that individuals w ould take themselves 
to  have to actually accept it could have nothing to do with that), bu t it w ould not 
verge on the incoherent in the way that the brutal-dictatorship actual contractualism  
does.
This suggests the possibility o f a theory w hose favoured m oral conception 
w ould be actually accepted by each relevant individual on precisely those grounds 
which are taken to justify it independently o f its legitimacy according to its 
regulative conception com ponent. '(This, surely, is the political ph ilosopher’s 
ideal.)1" An actual contractualist theory like this would have a unity that is missing 
from  those like the two I distinguished in the preceding paragraph. M ore 
significantly, it w ould include, as part o f its account o f why anyone should suppose 
that the relevant individuals w ould actually accept the m oral conception, an appeal 
to  moral reasons (those drawn upon in the regulative conception com ponent) that 
those individuals are taken to have and the fact that they take themselves to have them.
This w ould be, I think, o f som e interest in an actual contractualist theory. It is 
evident that nothing inherent in the actual contractualist interpretation o f
9 This is how  I read the relationship between Parts I and II o f Anarch) . State, and Utopia (hereafter 
ASU) and Part III o f the same book. In Part III Nozick offers arguments for a ‘framework for 
utopia’. This framework turns out to be coextensive with the minimal state which he argues in Parts
I and II is legitimate because o f its compatibility with nghts-respecting '(largely) invisible hand 
processes which include actual acceptance. He openly disavows any connection between the 
legitimacy argument and the arguments for the framework at p. 333. See section 5 below.
10 See Michael M'alzer’s discussion o f the ‘heroic’ political philosopher in “Philosophy and 
Democracy” .
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individualistic justification excludes appeal to the fact that individuals take 
them selves to have such reasons to accept (part of) a given m oral conception in 
order to  show why that conception w ould m fact actually be accepted. O ne tends 
to expect explanations only from  self-interest or prudence o f the actual acceptance 
o f  a given m oral conception. Unified dual and mixed condition theones do not 
conform  to this expectation. As I shall suggest in the next section, they are no t as 
rare as one m ight suppose either: two o f  the m ost im portant contracm alists m the 
history o f philosophy set us the challenge o f m eeting at once both  regulative 
conception and acmal contractualist conditions o f justice. But this aspect o f their 
mews tends to  be underem phasised.
The in troduction o f m oral reasons to explain individuals’ acceptance o f some 
m oral conception should no t be supposed to be especially objectionable. The key 
point is that (in addition to their role in the regulative conception com ponent) they 
are in troduced no t as direct explanations o f the legitimacy o f  the m oral conception 
in question, b u t as explanations o f  individuals’ actual acceptance o f that conception 
which itself explains its legitimacy. The plausibility o f an acmal contractualist theory 
which um tes its two com ponents in this way turns, then, partly on the plausibility o f 
attributing to the individuals whose acmal acceptance o f a proposed  moral 
conception is in question acceptance o f the arguments that constitute the regulative 
conception com ponent. But this isn’t especially objectionable.
This idea reaches its apotheosis in dual condition acmal contractualism . O n this 
mew, evert* aspect o f  the advocated moral conception is subject to both  a pure 
regulative conception test and a pure actual contractualist legitimacy test and m ust 
pass bo th  in order for a society im plem enting it to be considered just. The 
explanation o f its passm g the latter test is explained m term s o f each individual’s 
acceptance o f  the m oral conception on the basis o f the reasons advanced in favour
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o f  the form er test. To the extent we find the ideal o f mdividiialistic justification 
appealing on its own and appropnatelv interpreted in the acmal contractualist test, 
an acmal contractualist legitimacy test which applies to the entire conten t o f the 
favoured m oral conception is to  be preferred over one that doesn’t. To the extent 
that it seems to  us that good reasons for m oral conceptions independent o f 
anyone’s acceptance o f them  suggests that there is som ething good about 
im plem enting them , a regulative conception test which applies to the entire content 
o f the favoured moral conception is also to be preferred over one that doesn’t. It 
may seem that these two justificatory ideas pull in different directions. But they can 
be reconciled in dual condition acmal contractualism.
So far I have been outlining acmal contractualist fram eworks w ithout relating 
them  to familiar contractualist accounts. In the next section, then, I explain how 
H obbes and Locke can be read as fitting into these frameworks. This will help to 
illustrate the foregoing discussion. In addition it will give us some reference points 
for a discussion o f  the appeal o f acmal contractualism, which I consider in the 
section after that.
5. Hobbes. Hocke, A  o^ick, and actual contractualism.
Both H obbes and Locke can be read as acmal contracmalists in my sense. Their
theories exhibit m any o f  the features o f the various types o f acmal contractualism
that I have been describing. Each o f them  argues that through individuals’ acmal
acceptance a m oral conception may be insnm ted that w ould have no legitimacy
otherwise, and each o f  them  describes a moral backdrop against which this moral
conception is established.
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H obbes’s m oral backdrop involves m uch less than Locke’s, and in particular it 
involves no elem ents o f  a m oral conception itself. Each person in the state of 
nature has w hat H obbes calls a ‘ngh t o f nature’ which he defines as:
the libe rty .. .to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation o f his 
own n a tu re .. .and consequently, o f doing anything, which in his own judgment, 
and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest m eans thereunto. 1
But H obbes doesn’t think that this nght correlates with .-any duties on the part o f 
others. It is a H ohfeldian liberty nght. So in effect there are no norm s o f justice (in 
my sense) in the state o f nature: nobody is under a coercively enforceable obliganon 
to do anything. A lthough there are such things as the ‘laws o f nature’ in H obbes, 
m ost o f these create no dunes except when one is assured “ that all shall observe the 
same law’s tow’ards h im ” .1" O ne can only be assured o f this w'hen there is “a 
com m on pow er, to keep [men] in awe” 1'— the sovereign. So the laws o f nature 
create dunes only after the social contract by w7hich H obbes supposes that a 
sovereign is created has been m ade.14
n H obbes, "Leviathan, 1.14. H e goes on to say that therefore “evert' man has a nght to evert' thmg: 
even to one another’s body.”
Leviathan, 1.15.
1 ? Leviathan, I I I - .
14 The one exception might be H obbes’s fundamental law of nature: to seek peace (see Leviathan, 
1.14). But we can discount this, for (among other reasons) it is not a pnnciple o f justice in my sense, 
since it is no t to be coercively enforced and it is not part o f a moral backdrop which includes 
principles that are to be coercively enforced.
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The H obbesian contract itself consists in each individual's transferring his 
unlim ited liberty right to  the ‘m ortal god ' which is the sovereign. This is normally 
effected through “ the express words, 7 authorise all his actions” t '  It w ould be 
consistent with H obbes's fram ework for individuals to transfer only som e portion 
o f their unlim ited rights to  the sovereign.16 But H obbes claims that “ [t]he only way 
to e re c t.. .a com m on pow er” o f the sort necessary to keep peace is “to confer all 
their pow er and strength upon one m an, or upon one assembly o f m en, that may 
reduce all their w ills.. .unto one w ill''.1
This brings us to individuals’ reasons for making the contract by which civil 
society is established. Famously, the state o f  nature is, in H obbes’s view, a 
“condition o f war o f every one against every one” . Life in it is “ solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short” .18 Escape from  this “miserable condition” into a state in which 
the awe o f a com m on pow er “ tiefs] them  by fear o f punishm ent to the perform ance 
o f their covenants, and observation o f [the] laws o f  nature” is the poin t o f the 
contract.19 So is H obbes here appealing to individuals’ acceptance o f m oral reasons 
for the m oral conception that he advocates, or to m ere self-interestt Both types o f 
explanation are present in leviathan and, correspondingly, H obbes can be read both  
as advocating a dual condition and as advocating (almost) a pure legitimacy theory:2'1 
the form er insofar as the laws o f nature and other features o f the H obbesian moral 
conception represent necessary conditions o f the justice o f that m oral conception,
13 leviathan. 11. 21 .
16 And indeed the right to defend one’s own body cannot be transferred, as I noted above.
1 Leviathan, I I .I - , my italics.
18 Leviathan, 1.13.
19 Leviathan, I I . 1 ~.
20 The qualification ‘alm ost’ has to do with the inalienability o f the right to defend oneself.
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and the latter m sofar as it is advocated solely on the grounds that it is what 
mdividuals do accept. Insofar as H obbes’s is a dual condition theory, it displays the 
interesting unity that I described in the preceding section: the reasons that H obbes 
takes there to  be for making the m oral conception he advocates independently 
necessary conditions on the justice o f society are also those that he takes individuals 
to affirm and consequently upon which to base their acceptance o f  the moral 
conception that the contract licenses.
H obbes’s w ould be a dual condition rather than a ?nixed condition actual 
contractualism — or, alternatively, it w ould be a pure legitimacy theory rather than a 
com bined theory o f any sort— because o f  the norm ative emptiness o f the moral 
backdrop that I described above. Setting aside the inalienable right to self-defence 
(which is nevertheless consistent with the sovereign’s punishm ent o f one), no aspect 
o f H obbes’s favoured m oral conception is just unless it has been accepted by each 
individual subjected to  it. (An individual is no t subject to it w ho w ithholds his 
acceptance.)-1 In a m ixed as opposed to a dual condition theory, recall, some parts 
o f the advocated m oral conception are either n o t subject to the actual contractualist 
test or else no t subject to the regulative conception test. Insofar as H obbes can be 
read as offering both  tests as conditions o f the justice o f a m oral conception, it is 
plausible to  suppose that they both  take in the full extent o f  that conception. In any 
case it is plausible to read him as subjecting all parts o f  his favoured m oral 
conception to at least the actual contractualist test.
This is a respect m w hich H obbes contrasts with Locke. O n Locke’s account in 
the Second Treatise of Government, the legitimacy o f  the state's authorin ' depends upon
21 See l^emathan, II. 18.
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the actual consent o f those subject to  it.~ But Locke’s m oral backdrop includes 
w hat is, in my term s, a m oral conception. It includes principles perm itting the 
coercive enforcem ent o f a range o f principles pertaining to the distribution o f 
liberties and goods. These principles would rem ain in force if  no  one ever exited 
the state o f nature via the social contract.
T he institutions and principles o f Locke’s moral backdrop are no t all absolute; a 
m oral conception may involve m sntuuons or principles which contradict some o f 
them  and still be just if it has been actually accepted by each person subject to it.
(No one, however, may “willfully” give up his own life to an arbitrary pow er.)-’ As 
we saw above, even non-absolute moral conceptions in the m oral backdrop may 
inform  the conten t o f  the moral concepnon ultimately adopted; and so it is with 
Locke. H obbes’s moral concepnon includes a certain equality o f treatm ent o f each 
m em ber o f  society (see e.g. ljemathan, 1.15) which, if he is interpreted as a pure 
legitimacy theorist, is best explained by the effective equality o f  bargaining posm ons 
in his miserable state o f nature. The life o f even the strongest rem ains solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.-4 A nd to the extent that Locke’s favoured moral 
conception subjects the equal rights and libernes which it grants individuals to the 
actual contractualist test, these too are to be explained by the equality o f  individuals’ 
bargaining positions in the state o f nature. But a better explananon o f  Locke’s 
endorsem ent o f  this equality is his moral backdrop, the equality o f (libertarian) rights 
that each person has in the state o f nature.
22 Locke. Two Treatises, II, §95.
23 Two Treatises, II, §6 and §23.
24 See Allan Gibbard, “Constructing Justice” , p. 2"70.
To explain. Locke, like H obbes, does m ention the insecurity o f life in the state 
o f nature. But he places no weight on the idea that this arises through disobedience 
to the law o f nature. Instead he emphasises the individual insecurity m herent in a 
situation in w hich each has the right to judge and enforce the law o f nature in his 
own case, as he supposes we do in the state o f nature."' People are, as they are in 
H obbes’s state o f  nature, “constantly exposed to the invasion o f  o thers” .26 But this 
is because o f  partiality in the administering o f natural law rather than because o f 
H obbesian licence." This being so, it is plausible to suppose that for Locke, the 
contract is to be m ade under the conditions o f individual freedom  created by 
w idespread compliance with the natural law in the first place, rather than under 
conditions in which retributive violence has reached such a level that the situation is 
indistinguishable from  a H obbesian state o f  war. (Indeed, he emphasises that the 
state-founding consent m ust be free, which implies that at the time o f  each 
individuars consent, at any rate, his natural liberties were being respected; and he 
denies at one po in t that “m en are bound  by prom ises, which unlawful force extorts 
from  them .”)"8 Arguably, were it no t m ade under these conditions, it w ould not 
legitimise the governm ent it creates.
The Lockean law o f  nature, unlike the law o f the state established through the 
contract, is no t subject to  the actual contractualist test. Since it inform s the content
23 See especially Two Treatises, II, f§123-~’. Also §90: “for the end o f civil society being to avoid and
remedy those inconveniences o f  the state o f nature, which necessarily follow from every m an's being
judge in his own case .. A
20 Two Treatises, II, §123.
2 Cf. Two Treatises, II, §6: “though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state ot licence.”
28 See Two Treatises, II, §§192, I T .  Cf. Rawls, Theory, pp. 112-3, 96-"’ (original version revised 
version).
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o f the m oral conception ultimately advocated bv Locke— because acceptance m ust 
be m ade under conditions o f w idespread compliance with it— there is a sense in 
which Locke’s actual contractualism  is less thoroughgoing than H obbes’s.
A lthough in theory— to the extent that Locke is a pure legitimacy theorist— any 
m oral conception m ight be accepted by individuals in Locke’s state o f nature and 
consequently justified, as a m atter o f fact it seems highly unlikely that at least a large 
num ber o f individuals will accept anything which restricts their liberties further than 
the natural law does, as indeed Locke points out at Two Treatises, II, £131.
It is possible to read Locke as a mixed condition actual contractualist. (N ot a 
dual condition actual contractualist since it is possible on Locke’s n e w  to have a 
justified m oral concepnon— and thus, in my terms, a just society— which is not 
accepted by any individual. That moral conception is o f course that o f the law o f 
nature.) H e makes repeated reference to the features and aims o f a just state (chiefly 
the protection and preservation o f individuals’ property, understood  to include 
“lives, liberties, and estates”) y'1 These features, though often invoked as reasons for 
individuals to  accept such a state, sometim es also seem to be viewed by Locke as 
necessary conditions them selves.3' So it may seem that, for Locke, a governm ent 
w hich does n o t act in accordance with that primary aim, or which violates the 
constraints in question, cannot have the authority it claims— even if  the m em bers o f 
society’ have consented to  this authority. To the extent that Locke really is 
com m itted to this view, he is in my terms a mixed condition actual contractualist:
29 Two Treatises, II, §123.
30 See for example Two Treatises, II, §§131, 135. 138. 142.
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the regulative conception test is applied to  all aspects o f just m oral conceptions, the 
actual contractualist test to  some.'11
\SCTiat o f the process o f actual acceptance itself on a Lockean picture? Like 
H obbes, Locke founds the state on express consent. Tacit consent famously plays a 
role, bu t it is secondary. For although Locke does discuss tacit consent, he does so 
in the context o f the problem  o f “how  far anyone shall be looked on to have 
co n sen ted .. .where he has m ade no expressions o f it at all” .1'  In reply, he says that 
w hen som eone “by inheritance, purchase, perm ission, or otherways, enjoys any part 
o f the land” governed by the state, he submits to its authorin '— but only for as long 
as he enjoys any part o f the land. ” Since, presumably, diere is at the time o f the 
original contract no state and so no possibilin' o f  enjoym ent o f land under the 
jurisdiction o f  the state to count as tacit consent to the state’s authorin ', and since 
Locke describes tacit consent in no other context, it seems to me that the state can 
come to govern that land in the first place, on Locke’s view, only through express 
consent. Thus express consent is the p n m an ' foundation o f the state’s legitimate 
authority over individuals.
Free individuals could in principle consent to any moral conception apart from 
one which involves their willingly giving up their lives to an arbitrary' power, but
31 Cf. Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy”, pp. ~45-6. Simmons thinks that as well as (in mv 
terms) an actual contractualist account o f individual states’ legitimacy, Locke offers a “general 
argument for the m oral and prudential preferability o f states ruled by limited governm ents to life in 
the state o f nature” . An argument for the moral preferability o f such states certainly am ounts to what
I am calling a regulative concepnon test (albeit a somewhat limited one. since it determines only that 
one type o f arrangement is preferable to one other) in Locke’s new .
32 Two Treatises, II, §119.
33 See Two Treatises, II, §120-21.
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Locke emphasises the rationality o f their consenting only to a m oral conception 
which safeguards their p ro p e rty /4 As with H obbes, this can be read in two ways.
To the extent that Locke is a mixed condition theorist, we can understand his 
theory as having some o f the interesting unity whereby the reasons given in the 
regulative conception conditions on a just society are also those for which it is 
supposed that individuals will actually accept one’s favoured moral concepnon and 
so legitimise it according to the pure legitimacy com ponent. This helps, in addm on, 
to m ake Locke’s view m ore plausible in the following sense. As we saw a m om ent 
ago, Locke’s theory is plausibly read as starting from  a state o f nature in which there 
is w idespread compliance w ith the law o f nature. If, however, individuals in that 
state o f nature are understood  to be entirely self-interested to the poin t o f  disregard 
for the law o f nature, then Locke’s theory may be correct bu t will appear far m ore 
utopian than he seems to have taken it to be. For why should even a com m itted 
Lockean suppose that we will ever have the conditions under which actual 
acceptance o f Locke’s favoured m oral conception will legitimise ltr But if 
individuals in the state o f  nature are instead to be understood as broadly law of 
nature-abiding, then this problem  {qua internal difficulty in Locke) dissolves/’3
To the extent that Locke’s is no t a mixed condition theory but a pure legitimacy 
theory, the passages emphasising the ranonality o f consent to a m oral concepnon 
which safeguards individual property m ust be read as full explanauons o f  why this 
(our, Locke’s) m oral conception ought to have the aims and features in quesuon, 
viz., because those aims and features are wThat was as a m atter o f fact consented to.
34 See for example Two Treatises, II, §§21. 120, 123-6, 131, 136, 149.
35 Also pertinent in this regard is Locke’s restriction o f scope to those “capable o f knowing the law”. 
See Two Treatises, II, §§5~-63.
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I f  some other aims and features had been consented to, this state w ould have been 
unjust to  have these aims and features instead o f those. The rationality o f  consent 
to this m oral concepnon can be seen as a guide to unvenfiable histoncal fact.
W hichever interpretation we adopt o f either Locke’s or H obbes’s view, we 
should be careful no t to  lose sight o f the fact that histoncal fact, and n o t any 
putauve guide to it such as rationality, has precedence. If  we were to discover that 
individuals, even irranonally, consented in fact to some m oral concepnon other than 
that which H obbes or Locke favours, this w ould m ake the im position o f  the latter 
unjust. O n pure legitimacy readings it w ould also be sufficient to m ake the 
im position o f the form er just. The fact that it w ould no t have been rational to 
choose this way cannot, on an actual contractualist theory, be sufficient to render 
such a choice irrelevant to the jusnce o f a m oral concepnon. O n an actual 
contractualist theory, actual acceptance is a necessary condm on o f  justice: that is the 
point.
But as I argued in Section 3 above, there is som e room  for m anoeuvre with 
respect to w hose actual acceptance counts and w hat counts as their actual 
acceptance. If  one restricts scope to  those w ho are rational, say, one may expect 
that the appeal to  rationality as a guide to histoncal fact will be m ore accurate. Still, 
although this rules out the irrational choice o f an irrational individual as pertinent to 
the justice o f  a m oral conception, it does not rule out the irrational choice o f a 
rational individual. I f  no  gap is left between w hat som eone m ust (rationally) accept 
and w hat she does (actually) accept, we are no longer actual contractualists, since we 
are no longer appealing to any real exercise o f individual agency.
H obbes appears no t to restrict scope even to those w ho are rational. His 
argum ents for the m oral conception he advocates turn ultimately on the need for or 
law o f self-preservation, which is plausibly enough attributed to even* individual.
Since w hat counts for H obbes is the wiU o f these contracting parnes. and as he 
makes clear at Leviathan, 1.6, voluntariness is independent o f “rational appeute” . 
there appear to be no  further restrictions. Locke is m ore problem anc. H e does 
restrict scope, excluding those no t capable o f “ such a degree o f reason, wherein 
[they] m ight be supposed capable o f knowing the law” .36 A nd he takes having this 
degree o f reason to am ount to being som eone w ho chooses in her “proper 
in terest” .” So to preserve Locke as any kind o f actual contractualist at all we had 
better place weight on the only individuals he m entions as excluded by his 
definition, namely children and “lunatics and idiotT rather than anyone w ho m ight 
choose other than in her self-interest. '8 O therw ise the free consent o f contracting 
parties cannot be o ther than as Locke specifies; and failure to consent, too, would 
automatically rule one out o f  the group o f those w hose consent is necessary to 
legitimise the state. I shall therefore assume that it is consistent with Locke's 
specification o f  scope that the m oral conception that meets the test o f actual 
acceptance m ight at least in principle be other than that which Locke describes as 
proper to the state. (This is no t an unorthodox reading.)
O ne other actual contractualist whose mews it is w orth descnbm g by way o f 
illustration o f  actual contracm alism  is Locke’s contem porary descendant Robert 
Nozick. N ozick is interesting from  the point o f view o f my current discussion 
because he clearly delineates the various features o f actual contracm alism  (as I term  
it) in his argum ent for his favoured moral conception, the ‘minimal state’. Like 
Locke, N ozick envisages a state o f nature regulated by a deontological m oral
36 Two Treatises, II, §60. By ‘the law' Locke means the law of the state o f nature. People not capable 
o f such a degree o f reason are no t free in an im portant sense. See §§56-63 and below.
3 See especially Two Treatises, II, §§5’7-9.
38 Two Treatises, II, §60.
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conception o f ‘nghts as side constraints5, which he explicitly affirms as the m oral 
backdrop for the actual contractualist legitimising transition to the minimal state. 
(Though unlike Locke he sees all these nghts as alienable.) “ Like Locke, N ozick 
restricts scope fairly drastically, bu t he presents an argum ent for doing so, claiming 
that this m oral conception is justified as the m oral backdrop because o f  an 
inviolability that hum ans ought to have which is founded on their rationality, am ong 
other things.4*' (Nozick is less insistent than Locke, however, that this should 
inevitably lead to the acceptance o f  the m oral conception that he favours: a 
peculianty o f his account is that at times he suggests that it merely needs to be 
plausible that this conception could have m et the actual contractualist test for it to be 
just.)41 Like Locke, N ozick goes on to argue that against this m oral backdrop his 
favoured m oral conception w ould anse through voluntary transactions between 
individuals and, later, betw een individuals and ‘protective agencies’;”" bu t unlike 
Locke, he is explicit about his concepnon o f voluntariness.4’
y! See e.g. .4.5X3 p. 331. On occasion Nozick retreats from his com m itm ent to the alienability o f our 
nghts. See e.g. pp. 292-3. where he savs that only an ‘analogue’ o f a more-than-mimmal state under 
which each person retained the option to “opt out” o f its arrangements could be legitimate.
40 I sav m ore about this in Chapter 6.
41 See for example .4 SU, p. 2” 6; cf. X ozick’s discussion of ‘explanatory political theory’ at pp. 6-9. 
Simmons reads N ozick as simply having two aims in mind: first, to show that a minimal state could 
anse and would be better than anarchy; and second, to show under what conditions any particular 
state is legitimate. See Simmons, “justification and Legitimacy”, p. ”44. Cf. Rawls. "Lectures on the 
History ol Political Philosophy, pp. 30-2.
4: Voluntary transactions involving some members o f society under the ultimately accepted moral 
conception are necessary, but no t involving all o f them: for the minimal state rules legitimately even 
vis-a-vis some within its territory who have not participated in such transactions. This is because of 
the prior right o f a would-be state to prohibit non-parucipants from enforcing their nghts themselves
59
N ozick’s n e w  also illustrates very clearly the distinction betw een the actual 
contractualist legitimacy condition and the regulauve conception condition. Insofar 
as a regulative conception argum ent inform s the moral backdrop o f an actual 
contractualist theory, its relation to the legitimacy condinon is som ew hat complex: 
as we have seen, it determines the content o f one possible just m oral conception 
(that o f  the state o f nature) and at the same time may inform  but does not 
necessarily determ ine the content o f another just moral conception, the one 
favoured by the theorist. Things are simpler when the regulative conception 
argum ent operates entirely independently as it does (to the extent that there he 
offers such an argument) with Hobbes.
Nozick offers bo th  the backdrop-determ ining version and the m dependent 
version. We find the latter in Part III o f Anarchy, State, and Utopia thereafter ,-lSU). 
There Nozick offers argum ents for a ‘framework for utopia’ winch turns out to be 
coextensive with the minimal state, and which in Parts I and II he has argued is 
justified because o f  its resulting from  actual contractualist acceptance against the
so long as it compensates them by enforcing them on then behalf (see .4SU, chapter 5). So N ozick’s 
is a split condition theory to that extent: some aspects of the moral conception he endorses are just 
although they do not m eet the actual contractualist test; others are just only because they meet that 
test. In fact the overall view is a mixed theory: the moral backdrop includes coercively enforceable 
principles which explicitly inform — Nozick makes a virtue o f this— the moral conception that would 
be accepted, as with Locke; and as I go on to point out in the main text, Nozick also offers an 
entirely m dependent regulative concepnon argument for the minimal state.
43 Nozick goes beyond Locke in claiming that only by violating nghts could a state m ore extensive 
than his favoured minimal state anse (e.g. a t .d J T . p. 333). But this doesn’t seem consistent with his 
belief in the alienability o f our nghts. or with the “eldntch tale” which he uses to explain how  “what 
is recognizable as a m odern s ta te .. .might anse from a minimal state w ithout any blatant violation of 
anyone’s nghts through a senes o f individual steps each arguably unobjectionable’' (p. 290).
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m oral backdrop o f nghts as side constraints. N ozick openly disavows any 
connecnon betw een this latter lusnfication and Part I l l ’s argum ents for the 
fram ework for utopia.44 If  N ozick supposes that the argum ent o f  Part III justifies 
the minimal state and shows every other moral concepnon to be unjustified, then 
,4SL  as a whole offers an interesting mixed condm on actual contracm alism. Actual 
acceptance is, as we see from Parts I and II, necessary for the justice o f the minimal 
state. It is inform ed by, and to some extent determ ined by the (also necessary) 
m oral backdrop which Nozick supports with a regulative concepnon argum ent. But 
there is also the independent regulanve conception argum ent o f Part III which 
imposes a further necessary condition on the justice o f im posing a moral 
concepnon. It m ust be a fram ework for utopia. Individuals’ acceptance against the 
appropriate m oral backdrop o f some other m oral conception w ould be insufficient 
for its justice.
(This mixed condm on theory w ould not have the interesting unity that I 
discussed earlier. N ow here does N ozick suggest that individuals’ legitimising 
acceptance o f the minimal state w ould be based on reasons furnished by the 
argum ents o f Part III.)
This brings to a close my exposm on o f the suucture o f acmal contracmalism. 
F or the rem ainder o f  this chapter. I focus on the underlying m otivation for acmal 
contracmalism.
44 A v 4 3 T T, p. 333.
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6. _Autonomy and the appeal of actual contractuahsm
As we have seen, it is a fundam ental presupposition o f actual contracm alism  that 
individuals have a prior moral right against (at least) coercion to behave in 
accordance w ith (at least some) institutions and principles insofar as they do not 
accept those principles. I have already said that the acmal contractualist 
in terpretation o f  the contractualist ideal o f individualistic justification is attractive. 
B ut why is it so attractive? W hat is it about being able to say ‘you accepted these 
term s’ to each person that we care about? A n obvious and standard answer is that it 
is a concern for the value o f individual autonomy. In this section I want to argue 
that at least in the form  that m ight be thought to underlie the actual contracm alism  
o f such theorists as Locke or Nozick, this value can’t be the whole stori' o f  the 
attraction o f acmal contracm alism , since it fails to explain why Locke’s is no t clearly a 
superior theory com pared with H obbes’s. Instead I ’ll suggest a m ore abstract 
conception o f autonom y as the source o f acmal contractualism ’s basic appeal. M ore 
will need to be said, however, to  explain how  w hat I called ‘thoroughgoing’ acmal 
contracm alism  taps this source. Further on, in Chapter 3, I argue that Rawls offers 
us a plausible explanation o f the right sort.
In one familiar sense, individual autonom y seems fairly clearly to explain at least 
part o f  the attraction o f  som e acmal contractualist mews. This is the sense that we 
tend to have m m ind w hen we talk o f living an autonom ous life, o f  bringing a 
person up to be autonom ous. (I’ll use ‘autonom ous living’ to m ean this sense o f 
individual autonom y.) Acmal contractualists, as we have seen, arm each person 
with the pow er actually to veto putative conceptions o f justice. A principle o f justice 
does no t m eet the contractualist ideal o f individualistic justification, and so a 
society’s m oral conception is n o t just, if any one person in that society does not
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actually accept it.4'" This veto  is granted to each person in the form  o f the moral 
right that I in troduced earlier against, minimally, coercion to behave in accordance 
with some institutions and principles o f justice which she does n o t actually accept. 
In some cases, this right can be seen as one elem ent in the service o f the ideal o f 
autonom ous living. The basic thought is as follows. A utonom ous living requires 
that the way in which one’s life goes, the things one does and thinks, and the 
obligations that one takes on, are controlled to at least a fairly large extent by 
oneself. Y ou do no t achieve the aim o f autonom ous living if others or 
circumstances alone determ ine w hat you do and think and the obligations that you 
take on. So a theory which aims at the ideal o f autonom ous living for individuals 
m ust make it the case that the things a person does and thinks are open only or 
ultimately to her control, or else open to o thers’ control only because she has 
accepted, in some sense, that they should have it. Hence a range o f rights against 
aggression and force and the like. Similarly, we m ight suppose, her obligations 
should be taken on by her rather than im posed on her from  w ithout. H ence the 
actual contractualist right. N ote  that the nghts against aggression etc., however, 
could be im posed w ithout anyone’s actual acceptance, since they exist to seme the 
same ideal that the acmal contractualist ngh t semes. These would exist alongside 
that right even p n o r  to  anyone’s actual acceptance o f anything.
This descnpnon  fits those acmal contractualist theones w hose m oral 
backdrop— against which the transition to the legitimate im posinon o f a moral 
conception takes place via acmal acceptance— includes m ore than the bare acmal 
contractualist nght, including those o f  Locke and Nozick. The m oral backdrop for
45 Although a conception o f justice may m eet the individualistic ideal with respect to everyone who 
does accept it, it fails to do so with respect to a society as a whole in which not everyone accepts it.
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their actual contracm alism  includes equal, robust nghts o f self-ownership for all. 
granting each person the coercively enforceable right, in Locke’s w ords, “to  dispose, 
and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole p ro p e rty .. .and 
therein no t to  be subject to the arbitrary will o f  another, bu t freely follow his 
ow n.”46 A lthough one m ight argue that this concepnon o f autonom ous living is too 
minimal, so that it fails genuinely to guarantee each person the possibility o f an 
autonom ous life, it seems reasonable nevertheless to claim that it is a concepnon o f 
autonom ous Irving rather than anything else that drives this specification o f  the 
m oral backdrop and the acmal contractualist condition on changes to it. The 
Lockean ideal o f  autonom ous living may be m ore akin to Berlin’s neganve Liberty 
than to a substantial Razzian ideal, bu t it nevertheless makes sense to suppose that a 
fundam ental Lockean com m itm ent is that individuals live autonom ously in the state 
o f nature.
But neither Locke nor N ozick is w hat I called a 'thoroughgoing’ acmal 
contractualist. The m oral backdrops that they specify are influential even if not 
unalterable (that depends upon  w hether individuals may through acceptance 
legitimise a less libertarian m oral conception),4 and they are not subject to the 
acmal contractualist test. So to an extent the moral conceptions ultimately endorsed 
by Locke and N ozick reflect a set o f norm s which do not satisfy the ideal o f 
individualistic justification as it is interpreted by acmal contractualists. Perhaps this 
m ight be taken merely to  reflect the implausibility o f taking that ideal to require 
anything m ore were it n o t for the fact that we have, in H obbes, a thoroughgoing
46 Two Treatises, II, C.5L Nozick approvingly quotes similar passages from Locke. Clearly Locke does 
not mean to include the freedom to dispose o f these things in wavs that violate the duties that others' 
having the same freedom  places on each person.
4 See section 4 above.
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actual contractualist w hose theory is no t ipso facto implausible. H obbes, as we saw, 
specifies (at least on one reading) a m oral backdrop which is normacivelv empty 
apart from  the requirem ent o f individual acceptance to  legitimise a m oral 
conception.
N ow  I think that it is w rong to say that H obbes’s theory is driven (or that the 
attraction derives from), as Locke’s and N ozick’s may plausibly be thought to be, 
the ideal o f autonom ous living. I think this for the following reasons. O n even a 
fairly minimal conception o f w hat the conditions for an autonom ous life involve, an 
autonom ous life is surely one w hose direction is no t predom inantly governed by the 
need to survive.48 So we can say that individuals live autonom ously only in 
conditions in which their lives are no t predom inandy governed by the need to 
survive. If  an acmal contractualist theory is based on die ideal o f autonom ous 
living, then, its moral backdrop should be such that individuals in it should not—  
normally, at any rate— lead lives which are predom inandy governed by the need to 
survive.
B ut in H obbes’s state o f nature, individuals’ lives are normally predom inandy 
governed by the need to survive. That they are ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ is due to 
the difficult}' o f  m eeting this need: “there is no place for industry; because the fruit 
thereof is u n certa in .. .and which is w orst o f all, continual fear, and danger o f violent 
death” .49 So either it should no t be thought o f as based on autonom ous living (in 
even a minimal sense) or else it is, bu t fails to realise that value adequately. If  the 
latter were the case, there w ould surely be very litde to recom m end a H obbesian 
view— Locke’s theory w ould be clearly an im provem ent. But I take it that H obbes’s
48 Cf. Raz’s "hounded wom an' example at The Morality oj Freedom, p. 3 4.
4‘J Feviathan. 1.13.
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theory is no t plainly an inadequate or underdeveloped version o f Locke’s. And part 
o f the explanation o f its attraction is the thoroughgoing nature o f its actual 
contracmalism.
O ne objection to this analysis o f H obbes is that it casts doubt on the idea that 
even Locke’s n e w  could be based on autonom ous living. For one m ight suppose 
that m the sense that they may be locked m to a spiral o f escalating retribution for 
rights violations, individuals m Locke’s state o f nature too lead lives predom inantly 
governed by the need to survive. But it is plainly m uch m ore plausible to suppose 
that Locke’s n e w  is based on the value o f autonom ous Irving. So the argum ent 
against reading H obbes as com m itted  to the same value m ust be mistaken.
But this is to ignore the po in t I m ade in the preceding section that Locke should 
be taken to n e w  actual acceptance as legitimising the accepted m oral conception 
only against a background o f  w idespread compliance with the laws o f nature. It is 
this background which he should be understood to endorse as a state o f 
autonom ous living, even if it carries with it the risk o f the sort o f  (Lockean, rather 
than Hobbesian) state o f  w ar that makes it rational for individuals to accept a moral 
conception which deprives them  o f individual rights o f punishm ent. I f  Locke 
supposes that acceptance in a situation where retributive violence had reached a 
bloody peak could legitimise the accepted moral conception, it w ould be plausible to 
doubt that his H ew  was aimed at autonom ous kving too. But he does not.
W hat, then, explains the attraction o f H obbes’s thoroughgoing actual 
contractualism? O ne suggestion is that it is radically constructivist, an explanation 
o f the foundation o f morals: all morals are to be constructed through the 
legitimising process o f  acmal acceptance agamst a backdrop o f no morals. (This is
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how Dam d G authier’s H obbesian approach works.)3*' But this doesn’t sit easily with 
the interpretation o f H obbes as a dual condition actual contractualist. H obbes, I have 
claimed, supposes that his favoured m oral conception can be “ found out bv reason” 
independently o f anyone’s acmal acceptance, and thus can be read as including a 
regulative conception com ponent in his mew. As I read his mew, it’s therefore not 
the case that just any moral conception can be legitimised by acmal acceptance, as it 
would be on a radically constructivist mew which privileged acmal acceptance as 
H obbes does. Nevertheless, acmal acceptance too is a necessary condm on o f the 
existence o f the obligations o f the favoured m oral conception.
So the ideal o f  autonom ous living is not, I conclude, at the heart o f acmal 
contractualism ’s appeal— not in all its forms, at any rate. Could there be some other 
explanation which w ould account for the appeal o f m ore thoroughgoing acmal 
contractualismr' In C hapter 3, drawing on Rawls, I shall suggest that a conception 
o f the individuals as epistemic agents capable o f reaching different bu t equally 
reasonable conclusions about the m oral world makes sense o f the appeal o f  a m ore 
thoroughgoing acmal contracm alism . First, though, I turn to w hat I call ‘m odal 
contracm alism ’, the aval to acmal contracmalism as an interpretation o f the 
individualistic ideal.
3,1 See Gauthier, Morals bj Agreement.
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1. Modal contractuahsm
The ideal o f individualistic justification that underlies contracm alism  is subscribed 
to no t only by acmal contractualists bu t also by those w hom  I shall call ‘modal 
contractualists’. B ut m odal contractualists interpret the ideal in way that is very 
different from  the acmal contractualist interpretations. According to  m odal 
contractualists, a m oral conception m ight satisfy the ideal even if  no one in the 
relevant society actually accepts it. For modal contractualists think that w hat 
m atters is w hether or no t anyone could reasonably reject it. \XTiat individuals actually 
accept and reject is irrelevant: they might unreasonably actually reject a m oral 
conception, or they m ight actually accept one even though they could reasonably 
reject it. In this section I describe and analyse m odal contracmalism.
I focus on the mews o f  T.M. Scanlon and Thom as Nagel, w ho are the p re­
em inent contem porary exponents o f modal contracmalism. The term  is mine, 
however, so before I go on I should say som ething to justify the introduction o f a
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new term  to describe their new s. I note first that Scanlon him self describes his 
view simply as contractualist. But plainly his view is no t w hat I have been calling 
actual contractualist. Nagel describes Scanlon’s view, and by implication his own 
similar view, as ‘hypothetica] contracm alism ’."' But that will no t do for our 
purposes here for the following reasons. First, Scanlon straightforwardly demes 
that his view is hypothetical contractualist, and I think that he is ng h t to do so.3'
O n  a natural understanding o f hypothetical contracmalism, he argues, claims about 
m oral w rongness are identified with non-norm ative claims about w hat people would 
or would not do under certain conditions. This is how  Rawls is m ost 
straightforwardly read, and his theory has been viewed as the paradigm  o f a 
hypothetical contractualist theory. Scanlon does no t identify claims about moral 
wrongness with non-norm adve claims in this way; on the contrary, he says, he 
identifies them  with claims about what individuals could reasonably reject which are 
unambiguously norm ative themselves. So even if it is true to  say that Scanlon’s 
theory deals with hypothetical questions, to use the same term  for bo th  Scanloman 
and Rawlsian contractualist views associates them  by definition w hen in fact the 
claim that one should be assimilated to the other has been regarded as a 
philosophical novelty, no t a trivial tru th .33 So it makes sense to use different term s 
for their different views.
A further reason pertains specifically to this thesis. I w ant to argue that Rawls 
should no t be read, as he often has been since Scanlon published “Contracm alism  
and Utilitarianism” , as advancing a view which straightforwardly identifies claims
Dl See Nagel, Equality and 'Partiality, p. 3~.
See Scanlon, “Replies” , pp. 434-5.
33 See Scanlon, “Contracmalism and Utilitarianism” .
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about w hat is w rong (or unjust) w ith claims about w hat no one could reasonably 
reject. Instead, his hypothetical contract theory should be seen as com bining both 
the Scanlonian approach and the actual contractualist fram ework that I described in 
Chapter 1. To describe both  Rawlsian and Scanlonian forms o f contracm alism  with 
the same term  w ould tend to  obscure the structure o f my argument. So, again, it 
makes sense to  describe them  usmg different terms. Given the established 
association o f  Rawls with hypothencal contracm alism  and Scanlon’s renunciation o f 
this label to describe his own view, it seems to me permissible to introduce a new 
term  for the latter. 'M odal contractualist’ seems no worse than any other, so that is 
w hat I shall use.
The essence o f m odal contracm alism  is articulated by Scanlon’s contractualist 
formula:
An act is w rong if and only if any principle that perm itted it could reasonably be 
rejected by people w ho were m oved to find principles for the general regulation 
o f  behavior that others, similarly motivated, could no t reasonably reject.’4
This form ula covers the full range o f 'what we owe to each o ther’, bu t as Nagel 
notes it is natural also to consider it only in application to the special case o f 
justice.3’ Thus we can say that the following articulates the essence o f m odal 
contracm alism  as it applies to the case we are interested in:
d4 This formulation paraphrases what Scanlon savs at p. 4 o f U- hat li e Owe to Eaeh Other ((hereafter
I F I F O ) .
44 See Nagel, Equality and Partiality (hereafter EP). pp. 36-T Scanlon seems to agree that political 
philosophy might put his contracmalism to work in the sphere of justice specifically. See H”U 0 . p. 
245.
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A m oral conception is just (or at least no t unjust) if no  one could reasonably 
reject it as a m oral conception for the regulation o f their single society given the 
aim o f  finding a m oral conception which no one could reasonably reject w ho 
was similarly m otivated.
I shall m ove betw een these two form ulations as seems appropriate in the context. 
But it makes no difference to my argum ent which o f them  we have in m ind as we 
discuss m odal contracm alism  and acmal contracmalism.
2. W hat’s distinctive about modal contractualism? — the question
W hat does it m ean to say that no  one could reasonably reject a principle or moral 
conception? It m eans, to begin with, that the strongest applicable reasons against 
that principle or m oral conception are weaker than the strongest applicable reasons 
against any com peting principle or moral conception. It does no t m ean that there 
are no reasons against it; bu t that despite any such reasons that there may be, it 
would n o t be reasonable for anyone to reject it given the stronger reasons that there 
w ould be for rejection o f  any principle or moral conception that could take its place.
I t’s plain even from  this incom plete descnpnon that m odal contracm alism  
exhibits the following feature which gives it an attraction to rival those o f acmal 
contracmalism: it is concerned with justifiability simphciter rather than apparent 
justifiability. The acmal contractualist interpretation o f the individualistic ideal, by 
contrast, is concerned with apparent justifiability rather than justifiability simphciter in 
the sense that w hat m atters for acmal contractualists is that each person takes a 
given m oral conception to  be justified, as is expressed by her acmal acceptance. O f
course actual contractualists consider umversallv actually accepted moral 
conceptions to be justifiable too. But this flows from  the fact that individuals take 
them  to be so. M odal contractualists do not, at the fundam ental level, concern 
themselves with apparent justifiability, the question w hether anyone takes a given 
m oral conception to be justified, at all.
They are, however, inspired by the idea o f  the individual veto which is realised 
by acmal contractualists. As we have seen, actual contractualists require unanim ity 
for legitimacy and hence justice. M odal contractualists also aim at unanim ity;36 bu t 
rather than the actual unanimity familiar from  acmal contractualist n ew s, they aim 
at a kind o f idealised unanimity, the unanim ity o f reasonable individuals.
Y et if  the relevant unanim ity o f reasonable individuals on a moral conception is 
obtained if  and only if  no  one could reasonably reject that moral conception, and 
this is explained in term s o f its being supported by the strongest reasons, we might 
w onder w hether m odal contracm alism  is really contractualist at all. W e m ight wonder, 
that is, w hether it genuinely offers an interpretation o f the ideal o f individualistic 
justification. For how, we m ight ask, is the view that a m oral conception is just only 
if no  one could reasonably reject it w ho was m otivated to find principles that no 
one could reasonably reject w ho was similarly m otivated substantively different 
from  a ‘straightforw ard view’ which “dispens[es] with the contractualist 
packaging”3 and says simply that a moral conception is just only if it is best
36 Nagel explicitly invokes unanimity as his guiding idea. See EP. pp. 33ff; also “Equality” . pp. 116- 
25. Scanlon tends to talk o f "general agreement' rather than unanimity (see e.g. If TF’O, p. 5), but he
means by general agreement the agreement o f all parties rather than the agreement o f most. (Scanlon 
invokes Nagel’s discussion and endorsem ent o f unanimity' rather than matontv as the guiding idea at 
p. 144, n. I ” o f “Contracmalism and Utilitarianism”.)
3 Scanlon, “Replies” , p. 434.
supported by the applicable reasons that exist? I take it that there is nothing 
obviously individualistic about this latter new . It doesn’t involve any ‘one-by-one’ 
justification (see the Introduction, above). But w hat does fram ing the issue in terms 
o f idealised unanim ity add?
The worn,' here can be brought out by considering argum ents that people might 
make for and against utilitarianism. You might, employing the m odal contractualist 
term inology, say: ‘no one w ho was m otivated to find principles which no  one could 
reasonably reject w ho was similarly m otivated could reject utilitarianism, because it 
maximises utility.’ A nd I, employing the same term inology, m ight reply: ‘on the 
contrary, utilitarianism could reasonably be rejected by those with the appropriate 
m otivations, for it favours a situation in which m any people are discom fited for ten 
m inutes and one person is in extreme and enduring pain over a situation in which 
everyone is discom fited for an hour and no one is in extreme pain at all— so long as 
the many are sufficiently m any that their extra fifty m inutes o f discom fort in the 
second situation add up to m ore disutility than that experienced by the person in 
extreme, enduring pain. A nd that is grounds for rejection because it violates Parfit’s 
Priority T 7iew^  according to which “benefiting people m atters m ore the worse o ff the 
people are to w hom  these benefits would go.’” 8 The many w ould have to  num ber 
m ore than utilitarianism supposes they would num ber before it w ould be reasonable 
to favour the first situation over the second.” 9 But couching our argum ents in
38 Parfit, “Justifiability to Each Person” , p. 382.
591 employ this rather complex reply rather than the more straightforward anti-aggregative claim that 
follows from Scanlon’s 'Individualistic Restriction’ because as 1 shall argue shortly, the Individualist 
Restriction and its anti-aggregative consequences are precisely what do distinguish the modal 
contractualist idealised unanimity view from the straightforward mew that w hat’s just is w hat’s best 
supported by the reasons that there are.
m odal contractualist term s in this way doesn’t seem to add anything to the 
substance o f our claims. The force o f your defence and the force o f my reply seem 
completely unchanged if you claim simply that there is good reason to  maximise 
utility and so to  adopt utilitarianism and I claim simply that the Priority View gives 
us good reason no t to adopt utilitarianism.
Acmal contractualists, then, by giving each person an acmal veto over putative 
institutions and principles o f justice, offer us a clear sense m which acmal 
contracm alism  interprets the m dindualisnc ideal. But it’s no t immediately obvious 
that we can say the same o f m odal contracmalism. So is there really anything 
distinctrtely contractualist about m odal contractualism r In the next section I 
consider some candidates that m odal contractualists have suggested to distinguish 
m odal contracm alism  from  the straightforward view. Unless there are such 
distinguishing features, then m odal contracm alism  isn’t contractualist, since the 
straightforward n e w  certainly isn’t. First I consider, and reject, the idea that the 
m odal contractualist account o f m otivation distinguishes it. Then I consider the 
idea that the identity o f the group o f people that we m ean w hen we say that no one 
(none o f them) could reasonably reject a just m oral conception makes a difference. 
I reject this idea too. Finally, I consider the idea that m odal contractualism ’s 
incorporation o f  the ‘Individualist Restriction’— according to which a condition o f 
m odal contractualist reasonable rejectability is that the grounds for rejection are 
elaborated in term s o f  the implications only for single individuals— distinguishes it 
from  the straightforw ard view. This, I conclude, is a viable candidate. I therefore 
take m odal contracm alism  to be distinguished by its incorporation o f the 
Individualist Restriction.
3. II 'hats distinctive about modal contractuahsm? — the answers
Nagel offers the following elaboration o f modal contractuahsm ’s distinctive 
interpretation o f  the contractualist ideal:
As I have said, the search for legitimacy is a search for unanim ity.. .The 
unanim ity in quesnon is neither actual unanim ity among persons with the 
m ouves they happen to have, nor the kind o f ideal unanim ity that simply 
follows from  there being a single right answer which everyone ought to accept 
because it is m dependendy right, but rather som ething in between: a unanim ity 
which could be achieved among persons in many respects as they are, provided 
they were also reasonable and com m itted within reason to m odifying their 
claims, requirem ents, and motives in a direction which makes a com m on 
fram ework o f justification possible. [...]
I f  such a hypothetical unanimity were discoverable, it w ould explain the 
rightness o f the answer rather than being explained by it. T hat is, it w ould no t 
be possible to  discover w hat everyone should agree to by following a single 
course o f reasoning which everyone can follow to the right result. Rather, the 
n gh t result w ould be discoverable only by finding that different persons, 
reasoning from  their different perspectives, will converge on it.6"
It seems to m e that we can discern in this passage two suggestions as to w hat is 
distinctive about m odal contractuahsm. The first is that the reasonableness o f those 
w hose perspectives are being taken into account makes a difference to which 
principles could be reasonably rejected. W hat people ‘provided they were also
611 EP, pp. 33-4.
reasonable’ could reasonably reject is different from  w hat people could reasonably 
reject if they were no t reasonable. The thought is that reasonable people are 
m otivated in a specific way, and this is partly w hat determines which principles and 
m oral concepnons applicable to them  will be just. So here we distinguish between 
the sense o f reasonable in ‘reasonable individuals’ and the sense o f reasonable in 
‘reasonable rejecuon’. The first instance o f ‘reasonable’ w ould be cashed out as 
som ething like: ‘com m itted within reason to m odifying their claims, requirem ents, 
and m otives in a direction which makes a com m on framework o f  justification 
possible’. The substance o f  reasonable rejection would be cashed out in terms o f 
the objective strength o f the reasons for and against principles that individuals with 
appropriately m odified m otives could give.
This w ould seem to perm it modal contractualists to drive a wedge between 
m odal contractuahsm  and the straightforward view. It would license the demal that 
justice could be know n independendy o f w hat reasonable people could reasonably 
reject. M odal contractualists could then say that just m oral conceptions are just 
because they m eet the test o f reasonable rejection by individuals as opposed to that 
they are reasonably rejectable simply because they are just.61
Scanlon too  som etim es suggests that w hat he calls the ‘contractuahst account o f 
m oral m otivation’ does make a difference: some reasons for rejection are made 
relevant by the appropriate m otivation o f the contracting parties, whereas others are
61 In what follows I tend to concentrate on Scanlon's account rather than Nagel's. This is for w o  
reasons. First, Nagel explicitly takes himself to be drawing on Scanlon’s view, albeit in its earliest 
formulation rather than that o f IF1F0. Second, Nagel’s account is nothing like as completely worked 
out as Scanlon’s, so naturally discussions o f the foundauons and implications o f what I am calling 
modal contractuahsm rend to draw on the latter rather than the former.
made irrelevant.6" In o ther words: some considerations that m ight otherwise be 
taken to  be reasons in favour o f certain principles are shown no t to be such reasons 
after all by other considerations which are brought into focus only by the 
m otivation to find principles for the general regulation o f behaviour that others, 
similarly m otivated, could not reasonably reject. As a result, the answer to the 
question ‘can I reasonably reject this principle?’ changes when the m otivation o f the 
person asking it changes.
This m ight explain why what people take to be the answer to the question 
changes w hen their m otivation changes. But why should w hat it’s reasonable to reject 
change as a result o f  a change in motivation? Although we may grant that these 
other considerations are brought into focus by the m otivation, if they make it 
reasonable to  reject a principle for som eone m otivated to find agreem ent with 
others similarly m otivated, surely they make it reasonable to reject a principle 
anyway— w hether or n o t they are in focus? In his discussion o f reasonableness, 
Scanlon claims that halting the contractualist m otivation “brings other reasons in its 
train. G iven this aim, for example, it w ould be unreasonable to give the interests o f 
others no "weight in deciding wtiiat principles to accept. For why should they accept 
principles arrived at in this way?”6’ But utiiy should anyone think that it’s 
reasonable to give the interests o f others no weight in the first place?
Nagel too  fails to throw' m uch light on this question. The nearest he gets to an 
elaboration o f the first suggesuon is this:
02 See e.g. U'W'O, p. IS ”7
63 W WO, p. 192.
there is for each person an accom m odation o f  his partiality which is reasonable 
in light o f the interests and partiality o f others. I f  he is being m ore partial to 
him self than this in w hat he takes or insists upon, he is being unreasonable. If, 
on the o ther hand, an arrangem ent does not afford him  the consideration which 
it is reasonable for him to require, m virtue o f  the partiality to him self which is 
perm issible even in light o f a due regard for the interests and partiality o f others, 
then he is no t unreasonable to reject it64
The sense in which this m an is being unreasonable if he is m ore partial to him self 
than a reasonable accom m odation would allow m ight be the one we are interested 
in with respect to the first suggestion. T hat is, it seems that one is unreasonable in 
this sense if one doesn’t m odify one’s ‘claims, requirem ents, and m otives’. W hereas 
the sense in which others are being unreasonable if they im pose an arrangem ent 
which does n o t afford our m an reasonable consideration may be different. It may 
be, for example, that the others have the appropriate m otivation bu t simply fail to 
appreciate the force o f our m an’s complaint. For our m an to insist on a scheme 
which correcdy takes in to  account his position w ould be for him no t necessarily to 
urge that they alter their m otivation— i.e. no t necessarily to accuse them  of 
unreasonableness in the first sense— but instead perhaps to appreciate that his 
position has n o t sufficiendv been taken into account.
The suggestion was, recall, that what distinguishes m odal contractuahsm  from 
the straightforw ard view is the fact that the modal contractualist reasonable 
rejection test brings to bear a conception o f appropnate m otivation on the outcom e 
o f the test. W hat’s just can’t be determ ined w ithout asking w hat appropnately
64 EP, p. 38.
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m otivated people could reasonably reject. But w hat Nagel says about the man w ho 
is too  partial to  his own m terests seems no t to help with the question I posed a 
m om ent ago: why should anyone think it’s reasonable to give the m terests o f others 
no weight in the first place? The challenge is this: if independent facts about what is 
best supported by reason ground the judgments about w hat it is reasonable to 
reject, then we w ould see no difference between what it is reasonable to  reject 
regardless o f m otivation and w hat it is reasonable to reject given the appropriate 
m otivation. But why w ould we suppose that w hat it is reasonable to reject 
regardless o f  m otivation w ould not take into account appropriate consideration of, 
and limits on the am ount that justice should cater to, the partiality o f each person, 
bo th  o f which are supposed to be secured, on Nagel’s account, only by the presence 
o f  the appropriate m otivations It seems implausible to think that w hat it’s 
reasonable for me to reject even if I ’m  not appropriately m otivated w ould fail to 
capture an appropriate balancing o f  individuals' partiality.
O ne idea that m ight be thought to help is that w hat’s reasonable vanes in the 
light o f one’s aims m the way that w hat’s rational does. N ow  Scanlon explicitly 
rejects the idea that wdiat’s reasonable just is w hat’s rational given a specified aim. 
Unfortunately, he doesn’t say anything about w hether w hat’s reasonable given a 
specified aim is w hat’s rational given a specified aim. A t the crucial pom t in the 
discussion, he reverts to talking about w hat’s reasonable simphciterf This is o f no 
help, since we know  already that Scanlon thinks w hat’s reasonable simp hater is to be 
m otivated to find agreem ent on principles that no one w ho is similarly m otivated 
can reasonably reject. The question is w hether to be thus m otivated makes it 
reasonable to give the mterests o f others weight m a way that it w ouldn’t have been
63 See lit W O, pp. 192-5.
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w ithout the m otivation— w hether others’ interests provide grounds for reasonable 
rejection in a way that thev don’t if  one isn’t appropriately m ouvated. If  no t— if 
reasonableness requires one to take into account the mterests o f  others even if one 
is no t appropriately m ouvated— then the claim that no one can reasonably reject 
some principle given the contractualist m otivanon hasn’t been shown to am ount to 
m ore than the claim that no one can reasonably reject that principle anyway. A nd 
so the claim that we have reason to govern ourselves by principles that no one w ho 
was m ouvated to  find agreement on principles that no one similarly m ouvated could 
reasonably reject hasn’t been shown to am ount to m ore than the claim that we have 
reason to  govern ourselves according to principles which no one can reasonably 
re]ect simphciter. Everything turns on which principles could be reasonably rejected 
regardless o f m otivation.
The idea underhung the first suggesuon is that reasonable people are willing to 
com prom ise, to find an accom m odation betw een their parual com m itm ents and 
those o f others. This is the sense in which they are willing to change their ‘claims, 
requirem ents, and m otives’. This seems right.66 The problem  with this is that as 
long as the kinds o f facts that make it unreasonable o f them  no t to com prom ise or 
m oderate unrestrictedly partial claims are facts about how others w ould do under 
principles which sausfied those unrestricted claims, as both  Scanlon and Nagel take 
them  to be, then they seem to determine the content o f  the principles that it would 
be unreasonable o f anyone to reject regardless o f w hether or no t in fact they are 
m otivated in the appropriate way. So we still haven’t seen anything to license the 
distinction betw een m odal contractuahsm  and the n e w  that w hat’s right or just is
661 argue that the hybrid contractualist view that I go on to develop below captures this idea better 
than modal contractuahsm does. See Chapter 3. section 4 below.
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simply that which is best supported by reason. The m odal contractualist account of 
m otivation adds nothing substantial to the content o f m odal contractuahsm . The 
principles that it w ould be unreasonable for you to reject if you were m ouvated to 
find principles which no one could reasonably reject w ho was similarly m ouvated 
are the same as the principles that it would be unreasonable for you to reject if you 
were n o t so m otivated.
The second suggesuon about the disnncnveness o f modal contractuahsm  that 
m ight be gleaned from the passage I quoted above is based on the idea that we can 
distinguish betw een the thought that just principles are those that no one could 
reasonably reject and the thought that just principles are those that none o f these 
people (e.g. the people in this society), with their different parucular perspectives, 
could reasonably reject. O f  course if no one could reasonably reject some principle, 
then it fohows that none o f these people could reasonably reject it either. But there 
m ight also be principles that som eone imaginable could reasonably reject but that 
none o f these people could reasonably reject. These principles, so goes the 
suggestion, w ould attain the kind o f unanim ity that Nagel wants even though they 
m ight fail to attain “the kind o f ideal unanim ity that simply follows from their being 
a single right answer which everyone ought to accept because it is independently 
right.” Thus m odal contractualism  would be distinct from the straightforward new , 
since it m ight perm it m oral conceptions that could reasonably be rejected— only not 
by any o f the people in the relevant society.
The trouble w ith this suggesnon is that it produces a view which is simply 
implausible. Think about the kinds o f consideration that ground reasonable 
rejection. Nagel notes that one basis for reasonable rejection is that a system
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“leaves [the person w ho rejects it] too  badly o ff by com parison with o thers” .6 
Scanlon suggests others, including that proposed principles “arbitrarily favor the 
claims o f some over the idenucal claims o f others: that is to say .. .they are unfair.”68 
So our second suggestion about what is distinctive to m odal contractuahsm  with 
respect to these kinds o f considerations w ould be that in some circumstances none 
o f these people could reasonably reject some proposed moral conception on grounds 
o f how  badly o ff they were or that they were arbitrarily disfavoured even though 
(conceivably) someone could reasonably reject it on those grounds.
Let us try to imagine such a case. Suppose that some proposed moral 
conception is such that no one under it is particularly badly off, bu t that were some 
other, m uch m ore badly o ff person to be a m em ber o f society, then she would be 
(and remain) so badly o ff that she w ould have, on Nagel’s view, grounds for 
reasonable rejection o f the m oral conception. (The content o f the moral 
conception w ould no t ensure, that is, that her introduction w ould coincide even in 
due course with her ceasing to be this badly off.)6’ N one o f the people that there 
are in this society, as it happens, could reasonably reject the conception, bu t if we 
change things a little, at least one o f them  could— so it’s no t the case that no one 
(conceivable) could reasonably reject it.
Obviously we m ust abstract away from questions about why the badly o ff person 
w ould be badly o ff  to  the following degree: we m ust assume that she w ould n o t be 
badly o ff for reasons which we view as underm ining the grounds for reasonable
6 EP, p. 38.
68 IFIFO, p. 216.
6-' So we should probably not think o f her introduction as being effected through immigration, for 
example, since there may be particular principles which govern immigration and undermine 
immigrants’ claims to the same treatment as others. See the following paragraph in the main text.
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rejection that being badly o ff provides. So she would be badly o ff in a wav which 
we, as m odal contractualists, w ould think a moral concepnon ought no t to  perm it. 
This means that the fact that no  m em ber o f this society is as it happens sufficiently 
badly off to reject it is a contingent matter. It is n o t thanks to the content o f the 
moral conception itself that no  one is in a position to reject it, since the moral 
conception does no t include provisions to prevent its coming about that anyone 
should be this badly off.
An example o f  the sort o f case in question (which also illustrates the poin t with 
respect to  unfairness as a grounds for reasonable rejection) would be as follows. An 
ethnically completely hom ogeneous society has a consntuaon which is racist, the 
legacy o f older times o f ethnic diversity and divisions. As it happens, no one is 
affected by the constitutional racism, since no one belongs to the races it 
discriminates against. But if som eone from the discriminated-against races were 
introduced into society, she w ould be far worse o ff than everyone else thanks to 
prolusions against people from  those races taking jobs, receiving benefits, and so 
on.7" N ow , it strikes m e as implausible to suppose that modal contractualists would 
w ant to endorse m oral conceptions like th is^ v e n  for societies in which no one as a
m atter o f  fact falls foul o f  the racist constitutionydr has a disability. So if  that is
/
w hat the suggestion under review involves, then it should be rejected. A nd how 
could it avoid involving that?
Som eone m ight object that I am illicitly supposm g here that grounds for 
reasonable rejection are restricted to only those grounds that individuals in the 
relevant group have themselves or can envisage themselves, the actual m em bers o f 
the group that they are, halting. But they are no t to  be thought o f as restricted in
7(1 This example illustrates the point with respect to unfairness as well.
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this way: in considering what could be reasonably rejected, in d in  duals should 
“rely .. .on com m only available inform ation about w hat people have reason to w ant” 
rather than on w hat they ahne w ant or are likely to want. People from  different 
ethnic backgrounds and people with disabilities are people, and so the reasons that 
they w ould have to  reject the moral conceptions in question should also be taken 
into account even by m em bers o f societies in which no one differs in terms o f 
ethnicity or ability.
But if this is right then we lose sight o f the sense in which m odal contractuahsm  
is supposed to be distincuve on the second suggestion. \KTiat none o f these people 
could reasonably reject is surely now  the same as what no one could reasonably reject, 
and w hat cannot be reasonably rejected on the modal contractualist view has not, 
therefore, been shown to be different from  w hat is best supported by reason. For 
considerations from  whose standpoint are now  excluded by the m odal contractualist 
formula? Anything that someone could reasonably reject is som ething that one of us 
could reasonably reject, since we are required to rely on the reasons that everyone 
has rather than those that only we have. (O f course there is an analogue o f the actual 
contractualist variable o f scope to consider here: who counts as som eoner But 
anyone w ho counts as som eone will be such that reliance on generic reasons in 
w7orking out wtiiat som eone could reasonably reject will automatically take her 
perspective into account.) I conclude, then, that the second suggestion does not 
vindicate the thought that m odal contractualism is distinct from  the view’ that what 
is just is that which is best supported by reason.
The final suggestion that I w’ant to consider about the distinctiveness o f  modal 
contractualism  is as follow’s. Scanlon says that his contractualism  accounts for the
1 WW’O, p. 204. Scanlon calls such considerations ‘generic reasons'.
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special significance o f the range o f conclusions that it supports because it 
“recognise[s] that w hat is at stake are the reasons we can offer one another in a 
process o f m utual justification.” “ I t’s no t obvious. however, w hat difference 
recognising this is supposed to make, or indeed that jusnfving principles by appeal 
simply to reasons that we take there to be, as on the straightforward n e w . fails to 
recognise it. O ne thing that Scanlon says is that his contractualism  accounts for the 
special significance o f the moral because it explains the sense in which failure to 
recognise m oral reasons is so m uch m ore im portant than a failure to recognise other 
reasons that there are, vi2., because it reflects a person’s “ failure to see why the 
justifiability o f  his or her actions to us should be o f any im portance” . ' But if it’s 
true that w hat’s unjustifiable on the straightforw ard n e w  is unjusufiable to each 
person, then it’s no t true that the principles picked out by modal contractualism are 
only moral ones so long as w hat’s unjustifiable on the straightforward n e w  includes 
some actions which aren’t immoral. In that case, modal contractualism  doesn’t 
account for the special significance o f the moral. If, however, w hat’s unjustifiable on 
the straightforw ard n e w  includes only immoral acnons, then contractualism  does 
account for the special significance o f the moral. But then so does the 
straightforw ard view. It says (something like) that failure to be m oral reflects failure 
to care about being justified in one’s acnons.
Scanlon’s suggestion can, however, be given m ore substance by the following 
idea. Scanlon has claimed that it is essential to contractualism  no t only that it 
expresses the idea o f  justifiability to each person but also that it respects w hat Parfit
: Scanlon, “Replies” , p. 434.
~3 IBTT'O, p. 159. Cf. Stephen Darwall, “Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay’ . pp. 
204-20".
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has called the Individualist Restriction. 4 A ccording to the Individualist Restriction, 
“ [i]n rejecting some moral principle we m ust appeal to this principle’s implications 
only for ourselves, or for any other single person .” ' Modal contractualist theories 
which respect the Individualist Restriction hold that a principle satisfies the ideal o f 
individualistic justification only if its implications for any given single person are no t 
such that it could be rejected just on the grounds o f those implicanons. For any 
principle justifiable to each person, it follows that the reasons for it are stronger 
than the reasons against it, where the range o f reasons for or against is restricted to 
implications for smgle persons. 6
4 I t ’s not entirely clear whether or not he continues to claim this See “Replies” pp. 432-4. But 
without it there seems to be nothing distinctive about modal contractualism at all. I know of no 
other suggestion which might explain how  it differs from the straightforward new .
D Parfit, “justifiability to Each Person”, p. 3”2. See also If'Tf’O, p. 229: “a central feature of 
contractualism [is] its insistence that the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on various 
individuals' T ysons  for objecting to that principle and alternatives to it.”
■'6 One wav to think about the restriction to implicauons for a single person would be as a restriction 
to implications in terms o f how  badly off the person is (and how badly off she would be under 
alternative principles and how badly off she is compared to everyone else). This is the ‘complaint 
m odel’ o f (modal) contractualism. which Scanlon appeared to endorse originally (see 
“Contractualism and Utilitarianism”, pp. 144-5) but has since explicitly rejected. ((Nagel, who argues 
that contractualism supports an approach under which we pay special attenuon to the worst off 
under proposed principles, can be interpreted as endorsing the complaint model. See HP. pp. 63-~4.) 
According to Scanlon’s m ore recent formulations, considerations o f unfairness, responsibility, and 
other moral notions can involve implications for smgle individuals which may thus be invoked as 
grounds for reasonable rejection without violating the Individualist Restriction. (I say that these 
notions involve ‘implications for smgle individuals’ rather than following Scanlon m saving merely 
that they are ‘individuals’ reasons’ because I find the latter phrasing obscure.) See If Tf '0, pp. 213-8 
and 229.
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The Individualist Restriction makes m odal contractualism  less confusing. 
Because the restriction rules out some kinds o f reasons which m ight justify some 
principles (i.e. those reasons not based on the im plicauons for smgle persons), some 
views which m ight be justified if such reasons were perm itted cannot be justified on 
an Individualist Restriction-respecting m odal contractualist account. To go back to 
our earlier argum ent, for example: one reason that som eone m ight give in support 
o f some form  o f utilitarianism is that m ore utility will be created thereby. But eyen 
if this is true, and even if we concede that utility' is the only good, utilitarianism does 
no t m eet the ideal o f individualistic justification according to an Individualist 
Restriction-respecting modal contractualism  unless its bem g or not being 
im plem ented counts non-circularly as an implication for smgle persons. Now , as 
we saw, one notorious consequence o f utilitarianism is that one person’s life may be 
sacrificed if enough other people w ould benefit m some small way as a result. The 
strongest reason to reject a utilitarian principle that its implications for any smgle 
person give rise to m ight well be, therefore, that o f the sacrificed person, who 
would lose her life. The strongest reason to reject a non-utilitarian principle (as 
com pared only with a utilitarian principle) that its implications for any smgle person 
give rise to m ight well be, meanwhile, that o f one o f the people w ho would benefit 
in a small way if  the utilitarian principle were implemented. So the strongest reason 
that any single person has for rejecting a non-utilitanan principle is m uch weaker 
than the strongest reason anyone has to reject a utilitarian principle. Therefore a 
utilitarian m oral conception is no t acceptable according to an Individualist
~ The non-circularity stipulation means that the failure to implement utilitarian principles couldn’t 
count as an implication for smgle individuals just because it would be wrong or unjust (that is. just 
because it would do them a w rong or an injustice). For that would be to presuppose precisely what 
we are trying to give an account of.
Restriction-respecting m odal contractualism. 8 Here, then, is a way m which modal 
contractualism  can be clearly distinguished from  the straightforw ard view. Modal 
contractualism  thus distinguished is a substantial n e w  in that it holds certain 
considerations that we m ight otherwise suppose to be reasons in favour o f a 
principle or m oral concepnon to be weighdess. '
\KTiether or no t any given contractualist actually accepts the Individualist 
Restriction, it can be seen that it’s a fairly natural restriction for m odal 
contractualists to impose. If  you distinguish betw een individualistic justification and 
justification simpliater, taking the form er to  be fundam ental in the case o f justice, it’s 
natural to suppose that what you w ant to know  is w hether that principle’s 
implications for any given single individual should be accepted, given the 
implicanons for other single individuals o f alternative principles. It has been 
suggested by some philosophers that the Individualism: Restriction is inessential to 
what I am calling m odal contractualism. Parfit, for example, claims that it is 
plausible that “in rejecting some principle, each person could appeal to the burdens 
that this principle w ould im pose no t only on her, but also to other people” and 
concludes that “ Scanlon could give up his Individualist Restriction w ithout giving 
up, or in any way weakening, his idea o f jusufiability to each person .”8" David Brink
’’8 See Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitananism”.
7y Aggregative considerations are those m ost clearly ruled out by the Individualist Restncuon, but 
there may be others (Scanlon rules out impersonal considerations, for example, at If TFO. p. 200). 
Nagel identifies him self with Scanlon's contractualism but nevertheless appears to accept some 
aggregation (see “Equality” , p. 125, and EP, p. 68). However, he seems uneasy about the 
compatibility of this with the pairwise com panson that he takes to be fundamental to the idealised 
unanimity realised by (what I am calling) modal contractualism.
80 Parfit, “justifiability to Each Person” , p. 388.
argues that allowing aggregative considerations as the basis for reasonable re]ecnon 
comes closer to  the ideal o f imanimitv than does an Individualist Restriction - 
respecting m odal contractualism .81 But the putanvely modal contractualist view that 
Parfit suggests instead appears to have nothing to distinguish it from  the 
straightforward view. It appeals simply to the truth o f distdbuuve principles such as 
the Priority View (see above). Brink, m eanwhile, describes a n e w  which he him self 
takes to  be non-contracm alist which is, effectively, Scanloman contractualism  
w ithout the Individualist Restriction. So given my analysis o f  Scanlon and Nagel, 
the m ost prom inent contem porary m odal contractualists, and despite these 
philosophers’ claims to the contrary, I shall assume from now on that the distinctive 
feature o f m odal contractualism  is its respect for the Individualist Restriction.8'
4. First-order normative modal contractualism
W hat w ould be involved in building a first-order normative m odal contractualist 
theory? I have claimed that w hat is distinctive about modal contractuahsm , what 
distinguishes it from  the view that the just moral conception is that which there is 
least reason to reject, is its requirem ent that reasons for the rejection o f  a moral 
conception respect the Individualist Restriction. This m eans that certain kinds o f 
arguments for m oral conceptions are ruled out, and that in turn m eans that reasons 
to suppose that those m oral conceptions should be preferred to o ther m oral
81 See Brink, “The Separateness o f Persons, Distributive N orm s, and Moral Theory” , pp. 269- 0 and 
279-80.
82 See Michael O tsuka’s “Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims o f Individuals” for further 
arguments supporting this assumption.
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conceptions may turn out to be inadmissible in a m odal contractualist first-order 
theory.
But once the Individualist Restriction is taken into account, form ulating a first- 
order m odal contractualist theory is simply a m atter o f identifying and comparing 
the (Individualist Restriction-respecting) reasons that there are in favour o f 
com peting m oral conceptions. For illustration, consider the following three 
possible m oral conceptions: utilitarianism, strict egalitarianism, and w hat I shall call 
‘arbitrary pnon tanam sm ’. Utilitarianism is familiar enough in broad outline to need 
no further explanation for the purposes o f this example. Strict egalitarianism 
requires that each individual have exactly the same am ount o f each relevant good. 
Let us stipulate that as it turns out this is very little, perhaps because Rawls-style 
incentives are necessary to increase even the smallest share, or because ‘lumpy’ 
goods are simply throw n away. Arbitrary pnontanam sm  works as follows: the share 
o f the w orst o ff is maximised as a result o f a Rawls-style difference principle, but 
only once a third o f  the population is arbitrarily excluded (on the basis o f earlobe 
length, say) from  taking up the incentives which are used in order to increase the 
total sum o f goods and thus the m inim um  share. Thus, because everyone is m ore 
or less equally talented, the w orst o ff under arbitrary* pnontanam sm  are better off 
than under either strict egalitarianism or utilitarianism.
N ow , the chief considerauon in support o f utilitarianism over egalitarianism and 
arbitrary pnon tanam sm  appeals to its maximisation o f utility, even though that may 
involve the sacrifice o f some people for the sake o f a small increase in utility per 
person remaining. Arbitrary pnontanam sm  is chiefly supported by the 
consideration that the w orst o ff would do a lot worse under the o ther two 
principles, bu t clearly it is arbitrarily discriminatory. (We focus on the w orst o ff 
because she is likely to be the individual with the strongest reason for rejection
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under any given concepnon.)8’ Strict egalitarianism is no t (let us say) unfair, but 
evidently it fares worse than arbitrary pnontanam sm  in term s o f the level o f well- 
being o f the w orst off. Assume that there are no other relevant dimensions o f 
assessment besides these three and that no other moral conceptions may be 
proposed.
As we saw in the preceding section, the chief consideration in support o f 
utilitarianism violates the Individualist restncuon. N o  single in d in  dual can claim that 
her loss (of the small increase in utility gamed as a result o f the sacnfice o f one 
person under utilitarianism) under arbitrary pnontanam sm  or stnct egalitanamsm 
provides her with a reason to reject either o f those moral conceptions which is 
stronger than the sacnficed person’s reason to reject uttlitanamsm. The fact that the 
aggregate loss under the com peting conceptions may be greater than the sacnficed 
person’s loss is ruled out as irrelevant by the Individualist Restncnon. (The point is 
not that it is outweighed.) So m sofar as this is the reason that utilitanans can give in 
suppon  o f their view against arbitrary pnontariam sm  and stnct egalitanamsm, it has 
nothing to  say m its favour for a m odal contractualist. But as regards fairness, 
utilitarianism does do better than arbitrary pnontanam sm  in a dimension which 
respects the Individualist Restriction:84 it does not arbitrarily discriminate against 
anyone in its calculus. So in that dimension there may be a tie between 
utilitarianism and stnct egalitanamsm. But m the choice betw een those two alone 
strict egalitanamsm m ust win, since the only reason that utilitanans can give against 
stnct egalitanamsm is ruled out altogether.
83 See Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism”, p. 145.
84 At least according to the complaint-model rejecting Scanloman view.
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As regards the choice between stnct egalitanamsm and arbitrarv pnontanam sm , 
however, it’s no t clear w hat a modal contractualist should say. Presum ably the 
worst o ff individual under stnct egalitanamsm has a reason for the rejection o f that 
conception, based on how  well she fares, which is stronger than that o f the w orst 
o ff individual under arbitrary pnontanam sm  based on how well she fares. But on 
the other hand, no  one under stnct egalitanamsm is arbitrarily discrim inated against, 
so those w ho are arbitrarily discriminated against under arbitrarv pnontanam sm  will 
have a reason for its rejection based on that consideranon which finds no 
counterpart under stnct egalitanamsm.
Form ulating a m odal contractualist first-order norm ative theory given only these 
three concepnons and the three dimensions o f assessment to choose from is, then, a 
m atter first o f  determ ining which dim ensions o f assessment (reasons for m oral 
conceptions) do no t violate the Individualist Restnction and then determining, on 
the basis o f those that rem ain, which theory is best supported. In our example this 
involves ruling out the chief reason m support o f utilitarianism and then 
determ ining which o f  the three concepnons is best supported by reasons o f fairness 
and the well-being o f the w orst off. Utilitarianism is poorly supported by either 
reason in com parison with the other two, so it will be ruled out. Perhaps then we 
will decide that halting the level o f well-being that the w orst o ff person under stnct 
egalitarianism has gives one a reason for the rejecnon o f that m oral concepnon 
which is stronger than the reason that being arbitrarily discriminated against gives 
the w orst o ff short-earlobed individual under arbitrary pnon tanam sm  to reject that 
m oral conception. Perhaps we will not. But what is clear is that this will be a 
m atter simply o f  discerning and comparing the relative strength o f the (Individualist 
Restnction-respectnng) reasons that there are.
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The same holds outwith the artificial constraints o f this example. The range o f 
m oral conceptions available to  choose from  is m uch larger, o f  course, and there are 
other Individualist Restriction-respecting reasons for rejection which cannot be 
captured in term s o f individual levels o f well-being or arbitrary discrimination. 
Scanlon suggests, for example, that grounds for rejection may be given by 
considerations o f nghts and entitlements, o f individual responsibility, and o f 
urgency o f need.83 But the same basic approach applies: consider the Individualist 
Restriction-respecting reasons that may be offered for and against moral 
conceptions, and choose that conception which is least rejectable, in the sense that 
the strongest reason against it is weaker than the strongest reason against any 
com peting conception. So, for m stance, w hen Scanlon proposed in 
“Contractualism  and Utilitarianism” that Rawls be read as advancing what I am 
calling a modal contractualist theory, he based his reading on the idea that certain 
conditions on the parties’ choice in Rawls’s original position are best viewed as 
expressing “the strength o f the objection that the ‘losers’ might have to a scheme 
that maximised average utility at their expense, as com pared with the counter­
objections that others m ight have to a m ore egalitarian arrangem ent.”86 The 
thought underlying the construction o f the original position is simply that once we 
have discounted Individualist Restriction-violating reasons, the strongest reason 
against average utilitarianism here is weaker than the strongest reason against ‘a 
m ore egalitarian arrangem ent’. The original position is to be interpreted as a means 
o f ensuring that our choice is guided by the Individualist Restriction-respecting 
reasons that there are.
85 See inro, pp. 214, 223-8. and 248-93.
86 “Contractualism and UtilitarianismC p. 148.
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So w hat wiU a m odal contractualist theory o f justice look like? That will depend 
upon which Individualist R estnction-respectm g reasons we take there to be.
Reasons relating to  levels o f in d in  dual well-being will surely be am ong them , as they 
are in Scanlon’s and Nagel’s new s. But whichever such reasons we do take there to 
be, a moral conception’s conform ity to  them  will be necessary and sufficient for 
justice. I f  the strongest reason against some egalitarian moral conception is weaker 
than the strongest reason against some com peting moral conception, then to the 
extent that our choice is restricted to those two moral conceptions, the egalitarian 
m oral conception is the m ore just.
5. Moda/ contractualism and actual contractualism
Could a m odal contractualist be at the same time an actual contractualist? That 
depends on w hether the consideration appealed to by actual contractualists as 
grounds for the rejection o f proposed m oral conceptions produces reasons which 
do no t violate the Individualist Restriction. The consideration is simply that a 
relevant individual does no t actually accept the moral conception in question. A sa  
reason for the rejection o f that conception, this does not violate the Individualist 
Restriction. A n appeal to my actual non-acceptance o f a m oral conception may not 
be an appeal to facts about my well-being. But it can be seen as analogous to an 
appeal to a m oral conception’s arbitrary treatm ent o f me in the sense that it is an 
appeal to the principle’s implications for me, a single individual.8 It is no t an appeal
8 Even if we choose to endorse the complaint model, so that arbitrarv treatm ent o f me is not clearly 
a reason for reiection. still my actual non-acceptance might be thought to provide grounds for
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to the implications o f the m oral conception for any aggregate group. So a modal 
contractualist could identify non-acceptance as a reason for rejection w ithout losing 
her gnp on w hat is distinctive about m odal contractualism.
O f course n o t many m odal contractualists would identify non-acceptance as a 
reason for the rejection o f a moral conception— m uch less the only one, as a pure 
actual contractualism  founded on m odal contractualism  might. But it w ould not 
obviously be inconsistent with modal contractualism  for them  to do so. One 
difficulty, however, is that if  there is no  m oral conception that each person actually 
accepts, the actual contractualist claims that no moral conception is just. That 
would translate into the conclusion that each could reasonably be rejected. But 
Scanlon seems to  den)' that such cases, “in which opposing parties have strong 
objections that are evenly balanced” , could in fact anse.88 If  m odal contractualism 
implies Scanlon’s denial, m odal contractualism  and actual contractualism  are 
incompatible.
Scanlon’s argum ent agamst the possibility o f evenly balanced objections is no t 
particularly powerful, however. H e imagines two people swimming from  a sinking 
ship, one o f w hom  is m uch stronger than the other, w ho chance upon a single 
lifejacket at the same time. He then contemplates the idea that bo th  a principle 
perm itting the use o f force to seize the lifejacket and a principle prohibiting the use 
o f force could be reasonably rejected (one swimmer’s objection to one principle is 
as strong as the o ther’s to the other), since “the considerations on the two sides are
reasonable rejection because living my life in a world structured by a norm ative system that I do not 
accept has severe implications for my well-being.
88 WWO, p. 196.
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the same” .8'' But he rejects this idea on the ground that in fact one o f these 
principles, perhaps com bined with others, will best recognise the “need for some 
decisive solution” as well as the svmmetrv o f the swimmers’ claims. M ore generally, 
he says, “ [t]he very fact th a t .. .objections are symmetrical may poin t the way toward 
a class o f principles that are no t resectable.”9'
To start with, however, that is consistent with the possibility that the fact that 
objections are symmetrical may not po in t the way towards such a class o f principles. 
In the swimmers’ case, indeed, the symmetry o f their objecnons and urgency o f 
their needs m ight point a way to non-rejectable principles, as Scanlon claims. Yet 
perhaps no t all analogous situations point to analogous non-rejectable principles. A 
situation in which each possible m oral conception is actually rejected by someone may 
be like this. (And that m ight simply be a possibility we m ust live with.)
In any case, it’s no t clear w hat Scanlon means when he says that “ [a] principle 
perm itting each to struggle for the jacket at least has the merit o f recognizing the 
symmetry o f their claims” .91 \XTiv w ouldn’t a principle prohibiting them  from 
struggling have just as m uch m erit in that sense? \KTry w ouldn’t a refusal to endorse 
any norm  pertaining to this situation have just as m uch m entr Scanlon’s m ore 
significant po in t seems to be that a principle perm itting each to struggle for the 
jacket has the m en t o f “recognizing.. .the need for some decisive solution” . H ere it 
seems that a principle prohibiting the struggle is weaker.9'  But it’s no t clear at all
«9 KAFO, p. 196.
9(1 lFIFO ,p. 19"'.
91 T 1F 0 , p. 196.
92 Although this may overestimate the decisiveness of violent struggle in determining a ‘w inner’ (and 
underestimate the decisiveness of, say, calmly treading water and hoping that the other person will 
tire first).
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that m this situation there is a need for a decisive solution in the sense o f an 
outcom e which receives morality's seal o f approval (by being the outcom e o f a non- 
rejectable principle). Perhaps rightness and wrongness (or justice and injustice) 
don’t extend to even* act in even* situation. If  the parties go ahead and struggle 
with each other we m ight w ant to  say afterwards that they did w hat they had to do, 
bu t we m ight no t want to say all the same that the winner did no w rong or that there 
was some solution which would have been nght. So although a hybnd o f m odal 
and actual contractualism raises the possibility o f a situation in which even* possible 
m oral conception could be rejected for the same reason— actual non-acceptance by 
some individual— I conclude that this does no t necessarily threaten such a view. 
M odal contractualists needn’t follow Scanlon in denying the existence o f such 
situations.
Is m odal contractuahsm  consistent with all o f the forms o f actual contractuahsm  
that I identified m chapter 1 ? In particular, mixed and dual condition theories may 
appear to be problem atic. According to these versions o f actual contractuahsm, it is 
a condition o f  the justice o f a m oral conception that at least some (all, in dual 
condition actual contractuahsm) parts o f that conception both  are actually accepted 
by each person in society— the legitimacy com ponent— and m eet conditions 
independent o f such acceptance that, we suppose, those parts o f  a just moral 
conception ought to  m eet— the regulative conception com ponent. Could a m odal 
contractualist consistently incorporate both o f these conditions into her account o f 
the justice o f a m oral conception? There are a num ber o f ways in which she m ight 
try to do so, bu t we need only describe one in order to see that it could be done.
O ne way, then, in which someone might incorporate bo th  conditions w ould be 
to account for bo th  the legitimacy com ponent and the regulative conception 
com ponent m a m odal contractualist framework. This w ould involve viewing actual
! non-acceptance as a basis for reasonable rejection. /A t  the same time, failure to be in 
accordance with the moral conception set out in the regulative conception 
com ponent w ould also be viewed as a basis for reasonable rejection. We would sav 
o f the regulative concepnon com ponent that it meets the m odal contractualist test 
o f reasonable rejectabilitv notw ithstanding the reasons provided by actual non- 
acceptance. The reasons provided by anyone’s actual non-acceptance and the 
reasons provided by the independent considerations in favour o f the regulative 
conception w ould be said to be evenly balanced.9’ The result would be that only the
93 It m ight be argued that the reasons invoked bv the regulative concepuon com ponent must add 
force to the complaint against other moral conceptions which is constituted by a person's non- 
acceptance o f it, so that complaints against the moral concepnon endorsed in the regulanve 
conception com ponent will always be outweighed by complaints against other moral concepnons. In 
that case, the possibility arises that a person’s non-acceptance o f some other moral concepnon might 
be insufficient for its rejecnon. I f  this is right, incorporating both actual contractualism and the
regulative concepnon com ponent into the modal contractualist framework may involve treating the
reasons invoked by each o f these com ponents as ‘threshold’ reasons, each sufficient, on its own, that 
is, to ground the rejection o f a moral concepnon. ‘
Scanlon denies the possibility o f such reasons at IFIFO, p. 195. The basis o f his denial seems 
to be the claim that there are no cases in which every principle can be reasonably rejected, because 
consideranons apart from  considerauons of well-being will act as ne-breakers. But this sounds like 
an argument against the possibility o f evenly balanced objecnons, not against the threshold view. So 
perhaps Scanlon’s argument is this:
1. Even in cases where a person stands to lose her life whatever principle we adopt there will be 
considerauons which make it reasonable to favour one principle over the alternauves
2. The loss o f life is not always sufficient for reasonable rejecuon
3. I f  the loss o f a person’s life is not always sufficient for reasonable rejecuon then nothing can be
4. The threshold view is false
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moral conception selected bv the regulative conception com ponent could m eet the 
reasonable rejection test. But even that could not do so unless each person actually 
accepted it.
So far I have argued that there is no  reason to suppose that actual 
contractualism  and modal contractualism are incompatible, even w hen actual 
contractuahsm  takes one o f the m ore com plicated forms that I identified in Chapter 
1. A nd som eone m ight indeed hope to make a hvbnd view plausible. For she 
m ight bo th  accept the Individualist Restriction and want to contend that as a m atter 
o f justice som eone’s actual non-acceptance o f a moral conception should always be 
considered reasonable grounds for the rejection o f that conception. WTiat I want to 
do now  is turn to the m ore specific question o f what such a hybrid n e w  would say.
I shall argue in particular that hybrid theories face two puzzles which they m ust 
solve in order to be plausible.
6. Two putties for hybrid theorists
Suppose, then, that we are m oved both bv the modal contractuahst’s interpretation 
o f the contractualist ideal o f individualisac justification and by the idea that 
individual actual non-acceptance is sufficient to show that a m oral conception is no t
I f  this is not Scanlon’s argument, I am not sure what is. He says nothing else about the threshold 
new . But although this is not the argument against the possibility o f evenly balanced objections. it 
clearly depends on that argument. I rejected that argument above, so I conclude that Scanlon’s 
denial does not show that it is fatal to hvbnd contractualism if it m ust treat as threshold reasons the 
reasons it identifies.
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just. W e therefore develop a hvbnd theory according to which individual actual 
non-acceptance is grounds (and for simplicity let us say the only grounds)9* for 
reasonable rejection o f a moral conception. We say: it is a (sufficient) Individualist 
Restriction-respecting reason to reject principle or moral conception P that 
individual X  actually does no t accept P.
So far so good. But now  the following complication anses. Modal 
contractualists suppose that everyone has reason to find and comply w ith— to n ew , 
ordinarily, as overriding— principles that cannot reasonably be rejected .b Being 
m otivated by this reason is part o f  bem g reasonable.96 This m otivation may make a 
difference to w hether or no t som eone actually accepts proposed principles and 
moral conceptions. Now , in an ordinary m odal contractualist schema this is o f  no 
consequence. Utilitarianism can reasonably be rejected, Scanlon (for example) 
m ight say, since the fate o f the w orst o ff individual under utilitarianism is far worse 
than the fate o f the w orst o ff under some favoured alternative moral conception. 
The fate o f the w orst o ff gives grounds for reasonable rejection which are clearly 
unaffected by w hether or no t she herself or anyone else happens to be appropriately 
m otivated. So there is no  question that utilitarianism can be reasonably rejected on 
these grounds.
But in a hybrid theory things are not so clear. As we saw a m om ent ago, a 
hybrid theorist thinks that it is a (sufficient) reason to reject principle or moral
94 So effectively we are considering the hvbnd theory as a pure legitimacy n e w  for the time bemg.
93 See above. I claimed that the specification of the motivation to comply with this reason m the 
modal contractualist formula is unnecessary, but that was because I take it that it makes no difference 
to the principles picked out by that formula, not because modal contractualists should not suppose 
that we do mdeed have this reason.
See IFTTO, p. 15".
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conception P that individual X  actually does not accept P. But suppose that X  is, as 
it happens, unreasonable in the sense that she is no t m otivated to comply with the 
reason that everyone has to find and comply with principles that cannot be 
reasonably rejected. That means, for a hybrid theorist, that she is not m ouvated to 
find and comply with principles that everyone actually accepts. But w hether or no t 
she has this m otivation m ight make a difference to w hether or no t she actually 
accepts P. It m ight be that if  she had been appropriately m otivated she w ould have 
actually accepted P.
^CTy m ight we suppose that X ’s compliance with that reason might entail such 
acceptance? Well, suppose that you give the reason that you have to find and 
comply with principles that cannot be reasonably rejected priority in your practical 
reasoning. To repeat: this means, on a hybrid theory, diat you give priority to 
finding and complying with principles which, among other things, everyone actually 
accepts. N ow  had you not given this reason priority in this way, there m ight have 
been principles that everyone else actually accepted but you did not, because they 
conflicted with your own m oral outlook. But since you do give it priority, the 
conflict with these o ther norm s is less im portant to you than finding and complying 
with principles that everyone actually accepts. Since compliance with the reason 
that you have to do this will be made possible by your actual acceptance o f the 
principles which otherwise you would not have accepted, you m ight well take 
yourself to have reason actually to accept these principles after all, and you m ight 
therefore actually accept them .9 The m ore weight you give to the reason that you
See Scanlon’s discussion o f the way that acceptance o f this basic reason discounts as any kind of 
reason at all certain considerations which otherwise would have counted as reasons at If If U, pp. 
156-~\
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have to find and comply with principles that cannot reasonably rejected, the m ore 
likely such an outcom e is. I f  you give it absolute or near-absolute weight— as 
indeed we m ight suppose a m odal contractualist would think you should, since this 
is a m atter o f  justice or what we owe to each other— then it is alm ost certain. You 
will alm ost certainly be ready to discount any normative conflict that p roposed 
principles provoke for you in order to find agreement on principles which even-one 
actually accepts. A nd the same goes for everyone else.
If  this is right, I think that the hybrid theorist gives substance to one claimed 
feature o f m odal contractualism bu t also faces a puzzle. The claimed feature is that 
it makes a difference to the content o f w hat it is reasonable to reject that we are 
interested in those wTho are appropriately m otivated— those w ho take themselves to 
have reason to find and comply with principles that no one could reasonably reject. 
This is an attractive idea in itself: that justice proceeds from an appropriate 
reconciliation o f  the m terests o f reasonable people, those w ho are ready to adjust their 
claims in the light o f  the reasonable claims o f others, rather than proceeding from  a 
balancing o f the mterests o f everyone even when they are unreasonable. But a 
hybrid theory gives this idea some substance. Above I argued that as long as the 
facts that determ ine w hether or no t it is reasonable for som eone to reject a principle 
are facts about how  people w ould do under it and com peting principles, then 
w hether or n o t any given individual is m otivated to find and comply with principles 
that no  one could reasonably reject makes no difference to the con ten t o f such 
principles. W hether she finds them  and complies with them  or not, the reasons are 
there, independent o f  her motivation. So there is no distinction betw een justice as a 
reconciliation betw een reasonable people and justice as a balancing o f all 
individuals’ interests, reasonable or not. But now7 w'e see that bem g appropriately 
m otivated can make a difference: when the facts that determ ine the reasonableness
o f rejecting a principle are facts about how that principle fits with one’s overall 
moral new s, including one’s com m itm ent to finding and complying w ith principles 
that no  one can reasonably reject. So a hybrid n e w  can m ake good, along with the 
Individualist R estncnon, the modal contractualist’s claim that m odal contractuahsm  
is m ore than a mew that says what is just is simply that which is best supported by 
the reasons. W hat the reasons are is no t independent o f individuals’ reasonableness. 
Finding and complying with the reasons that there are requires that we actually do 
aim to find and comply with such reasons.
N ow  the puzzle. At least insofar as we are considering only individuals w ho are 
reasonable in the sense that they give priority in their practical reasoning to the 
reason that they have to find and comply with principles that everyone actually 
accepts, it appears that w hat is just has nothing to do with anyone’s moral (or other) 
mews and com m itm ents aside from  the com m itm ent to the modal contractualist 
reason itself.98 For— so long as it’s given sufficient priority— the reason that an 
individual has to  seek and comply with universally accepted principles will trump 
any reluctance based on her other ws and com m itm ents to comply with principles 
that look likely to  gam universal acceptance. This will be true o f each individual.
N o  one’s mews and com m itm ents apart from the com m itm ent to the m odal 
contractualist reason can be taken to be fixed, a basis for the acceptance or rejection 
o f principles. M eanwhile, the modal contractualist reason in itself doesn’t determ ine 
any first-order principles. So the content o f just principles and m oral conceptions 
may be determ ined by factors which w7ould strike us as arbitrary and so 
inappropriate. The reasons identified by the modal contractualist com ponent o f the
98 Recall the stipulation above that we are considering the hybrid theory as a pure legitimacy theory 
for the time being.
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hvbnd theory do not determ ine their content. N or do the values and principles 
affirmed by individuals— which is where we would expect to find the determ ining 
factors in an actual contractualist view. Yet a self-appointed co-ord inator’s first 
m oral conception out o f a hat, the arbitrary choice o f a random lv nom inated 
person, the principle that the majority w ould accept were considerations o f 
reasonableness no t taken into account— all o f these might determ ine the content o f 
justice. Surely this counts against the hvbnd contractualist?'
O f  course, if  we drop the stipulation that we are considering hvbnd theones as 
pure legitimacy theones and bring in a regulative conception com ponent, then it’s 
no longer the case that any m oral conception could be just. Clearly the moral 
conception specified in the regulative conception com ponent is the only just choice. 
Anything else violates the necessary condition set by the regulative conception 
com ponent. But this doesn’t alter the apparent arbitrariness o f the contribution 
from  the hybrid theorist’s specification o f the legitimacy com ponent, justice could 
easily be secured for the m oral conception specified by the regulative conception 
com ponent: all that’s needed is to co-ordinate individuals so that this is w hat they 
accept, rather than any other moral conception— any of which they w ould equally 
gladly accept in order to facilitate the universality o f actual acceptance. But mere 
co-ordination isn’t an appropriate determ inant o f the content o f w hat’s just, any 
m ore than the arbitrary choice o f a randomly nom inated person is. So the puzzle, 
which I shall call the ‘arbitrariness puzzle’, remains.
I said that this puzzle arises at least insofar as we are considering only 
reasonable people, that is, people who give priority to the m odal contractualist 
reason. A different puzzle (‘the puzzle o f scope reconciliation’) comes to light when 
we consider w hat the hybrid theorist should say about people w ho are not 
reasonable in this sense. Such people would not stand ready to abandon their
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com m itm ents and accept others in order to facilitate universal acceptance. Xow, 
the hvbnd theonst claims that it is a (sufficient) reason to reject principle or moral 
conception P  that a given individual S actually does no t accept P. But w hat if  S’s 
actual non-acceptance o f P comes about only because S fails to recognise the reason 
that there is to  reject a principle or moral concepnon that som eone’s actual non- 
acceptance provides'" In that case even if  evenTone apart from  S accepts P, P— so it 
seems— is reasonably rejectable. But this is only because some people don ’t care 
about w hat can and cannot reasonably rejected. This appears to contam inate the 
conten t o f justice (what cannot be reasonably rejected) by allowing it to be 
determ ined by the views o f those w ho are unjust (who don’t care about what can or 
cannot be reasonably rejected). Surely it should not be so contam inated?
This brings out a question about scope. Modal contractualists and therefore 
hybrid theorists include am ong those whose reasonable rejecnon m atters even those 
w ho are, as a m atter o f fact, unreasonable: unreasonableness is no t a criterion for 
exclusion by the m odal contractualist’s counterpart to the actual contractualist 
variable o f scope (see Chapter 1, section 3 above).99 They care about what 
unreasonable people could reasonably be expected to accept. But w hose actual
y‘' Scanlon discusses this question at TTPO, pp. In actual contractualism the question of
scope is, effectively: to w hom  should we give an actual veto (to be used as she pleases) over 
proposed moral conceptions? It might be plausible to say: only to reasonable people— because, say, 
unreasonable people’s unreasonableness should not be permitted to determine the content o f justice. 
(See below in the main text.) In modal contractualism the question is: implications o f proposed 
principles for whom should be considered among the Individualist Restriction-respecting grounds for 
reasonable rejection? It is not as plausible to suppose that we ought no t to consider unreasonable 
people among those the implications for whom should be considered, since then unreasonableness 
does not as clearly determine the content o f justice as it does for actual contractualists.
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rejection m atters to a hybrid theorist? If  it is no t only those w ho are reasonable, 
then we face the difficult!' just described. But is there any basis interna] to the 
hybrid n e w  for excluding those who are unreasonable from  the set o f  those 
individuals w hose actual acceptance matters?
Perhaps there is. The m odal contractualist ordinarily doesn’t exclude those who 
are unreasonable from  the scope o f those the implications for w hom  o f a proposed  
principle or m oral conception may count among the grounds for the reasonable 
rejection o f that principle or moral conception. Each person will be subject to the 
principles or m oral conception which is ultimately chosen, and it will have 
implications for each person which are surely relevant to the decision w hat it is 
reasonable to reject on the basis o f reasons deriving from implications for 
individuals. That a person is unreasonable doesn’t exclude her from moral 
consideration. How ever, it does give us ground to ignore her actual judgments 
about w hat is right and w rong, just and unjust. These ought no t to have a bearing 
on the question w hat is right and wrong, just and unjust. For they are, ex hypothesis 
no t based on recognition o f a fundam ental reason (that we have to find and comply 
with principles that cannot be reasonably rejected) that there is pertaining to the 
m atter o f  w hat is right and w rong and just and unjust. W hat we w ant to know  is 
w hat such people w ould accept if they recognised this reason, no t w hat they do 
accept w hen they d o n ’t recognise it. Acceptance o f the existence o f  this reason is a 
fundam ental m odal contractualist commitment.
N ow  an unreasonable individual’s actual non-acceptance may, as we saw above, 
be shaped by her unreasonableness in the sense that it is only because she is 
unreasonable that she does no t accept the principle or m oral conception in 
question. She fails to order her norm s and values in the way that reason directs. If 
this is so, to take her actual non-acceptance as a basis for reasonable rejection is
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effectively to allow her actual judgments about what is ngh t and wrong, just and 
unjust, to have a beanng on the quesuon o f w hat really is n gh t and w rong and just 
and unjust. But as we just saw, m odal contractualists need no t do this. A nd  smce 
hybnd theonsts are m odal contractualists, since they adhere to the fundam ental 
m odal contractualist com m itm ent— the view that we have reason to  find and 
comply with principles which cannot be reasonably rejected— it follows that nor 
need they take unreasonable individuals’ acmal non-acceptance, insofar as it is 
inform ed by their unreasonableness, as a basis for reasonable rejection. The 
variable o f scope for acmal contractualists may thus be determ ined by their m odal 
contractualist com m itm ents (as well as any other plausible factors, such as minimal 
rationality conditions and the like). So the hybnd theonst can legitimately exclude 
unreasonable people from  the scope o f those whose acmal acceptance and rejecnon 
counts as a basis for reasonable acceptance and rejection.1"1.
This raises the possibility, however, that the hybrid mew— though consistent 
and evidently incorporating elements o f acmal contractualism— fails to respond 
appropriately to  the fundam ental acmal contractualist m otivation. I argued in 
Chapter 1 that actual contractualist restrictions o f scope are unobjecnonable w hen 
they are driven by fundam ental actual contractualist com m itm ents. H ere, however, 
the restriction in scope is driven by modal contractualist com m itm ents. I also said in 
Chapter 1 that som e specifications o f scope would show that the putatively acmal 
contractualist theory in question was not, after all, acmal contractualist at all. A
10(1 A lia t if  the unreasonable person’s rejection o f some principle is not a p roduct o f her 
unreasonableness? A'ell, so long as we think about what compliance with the modal contractualist 
reason entails in the way I described above, someone’s rejection o f a principle regardless o f what 
others do is always unreasonable, since a reasonable person is, as we saw, prepared to accept 
anything if others also accept it.
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specification o f scope and acceptance which restrict w hat we care about to what 
reasonable individuals do accept and w hat unreasonable individuals would accept 
insofar as they were reasonable sound suspicious in exactly this way. Consistent, 
then, it may be; bu t it is possible that this com binanon o f acmal and m odal 
contractualism  in fact loses sight o f m uch o f w hat is appealing about actual 
contractualism  in the first place. This is the puzzle o f scope reconciliation.
I am no t going to attem pt to solve either o f these two puzzles until later. (I 
shall present solutions to them  as part o f my elaboration o f the Rawlsian hybnd 
contractualism  that I shall be endorsing.) For now  I hope only to have made it clear 
that hybnd theonsts cannot afford to ignore the obstacles they pose to a complete 
elaboration o f the hybrid new .
7. Conclusion
In the first two chapters o f this thesis I have presented two different contractualist 
frameworks which interpret the contractualist ideal o f individualistic justificaaon in 
different ways. Acmal contractualists suppose that the ideal is satisfied with respect 
to a given m oral conception (or aspects o f one) only when each relevant individual 
actually does accept that moral conception. Acmal contractualists can be m ore or 
less thoroughgoing in their acmal contractualism in the sense that they may suppose 
that m ore or less o f the m oral conception im plem ented in our society m ust satisfy 
the ideal in order for it to be just. Those that I have called ‘thoroughgoing’ expose 
even* elem ent o f any moral conception that might be im plem ented to the acmal 
contractualist test. O thers expose only aspects o f any moral conception to the test, 
or expose only those m oral conceptions which deviate from  some default moral
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conception which is no t itself exposed to the test. I have suggested that 
thoroughgoing actual contractualism has a particular attraction distinct from  that of 
less thoroughgoing versions, but I have no t as vet offered any rationale for it. I 
have merelv demed that the obvious rauonale for less thoroughgoing versions— that 
they offer a way to  preserve individual autonomy, understood as ‘autonom ous 
hving’— is adequate to lusufv the more thoroughgoing.
Modal contractualists suppose that the ideal o f individualistic justification is 
satisfied no t w hen evert' relevant individual actually does accept the moral 
conception in question but w hen everyone should. WTiat makes this an 
interpretation o f the ideal o f individualistic justification rather than merely the view 
that w hat is ngh t is that which is simply best supported by reason is, 1 have argued, 
the modal contractualist’s respect for the Individualist Restncuon, according to 
which the reasons that explain why everyone should accept the moral concepuon in 
question m ust cash out in term s o f the implications o f that and com peting moral 
conceptions’ implications for single individuals. This is w hat is distinctive about 
m odal contractualism.
I have suggested that m odal and acmal contractualism m ight be com bined m a 
‘hybnd theory’. In a hybnd theory, a modal contractualist fram ew ork— the 
acceptance o f the Individualist Restriction— is allied to the stipulation that acmal 
non-acceptance constitutes (sufficient) grounds for reasonable rejection. This is a 
prima facie attractive mew, smce it combines the modal contractualist’s plausible 
interpretation o f the contractualist ideal (see Section 2 above) with the attraction o f 
the acmal contractualist veto for each individual. M oreover it gives substance to the 
idea that justice proceeds from a reconciliation o f the mterests o f reasonable 
individuals rather than from  a mere balancmg o f each person’s m terests, reasonable 
or not. But I argued that anyone hopm g to advance a hybrid theory m ust offer a
solution to the puzzles I outlined in Section 6. They m ust show why it does not 
have arbitrary content, and they m ust vindicate the assum ption that it incorporates 
the attractions no t only o f m odal contractualism  bu t also o f actual contractualism.
The contractualist frameworks thus laid out and the hybnd theonst's  challenge 
posed, I turn now  to the developm ent o f a hybnd theory based on Rawls's views in 
PL. It is acmal contractualist in a way that is consistent with m odal contractualism. 
My reading o f  Rawls combines, I hope, the attractions o f acmal and m odal 
contractualism, and vindicates the view that Rawls is m ore o f an acmal 
contractualist than has been standardly supposed.
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1. Introduction
Thus far in this thesis I haye considered two lands o f contractualist approach, acmal
contractualist and modal contractualist, and I have suggested the possibility o f a
third, 'hybnd contractualisnT, which combines the attractions o f those m o . I now 
w ant to turn to the task o f elaborating and deyeloping a hybnd n e w  based on |o h n  
Rawls’s views as set out in Political liberalism (hereafter PJL) and Justice as Fairness: A
Theory of Justice (Theory), led Scanlon in “Contractualism and Utilitarianism ” to
 ^  ^  has
inform ed readings o f  the view Rawls advances in PL. In tins chapter, however, I 
w ant to argue that Rawlsian contractualism should no t be read as straightforwardly 
m odal contractualist in the way that Scanlon proposes. In the first place, on Rawls’s 
own view it mcludes a significant, though circumscribed, com m itm ent to acmal 
contractualism  as well as an account o f the fundam ental basis o f the acmal 
contractualist interpretation o f the individualistic contractualist ideal. This makes it
Restatement (/.TP). Certain features o f Rawls’s original position, as expounded in A
 ^ p ropose/m derstand ing  Rawls £s what I have been calling a m odal contractualist.
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plausible to suppose that Rawls is proposing a qualified form o f hybnd 
contractual!sm. (The qualificauon makes the hvbnd view also a mixed condm on 
view [see Chapter 1, secuon 2 above]: the actual contractualist elem ent creates a test 
only for some parts o f a just society’s moral concepnon.) This should be viewed as 
a good thing, since as I have claimed already, hybnd theones com bine the 
attractions o f bo th  interpretations o f the contractualist ideal. W e can draw on 
Rawls’s account, m oreover, to explain the attraction o f thoroughgoing acmal 
contractualism  and make good the lack that I highlighted in C hapter 1. In the 
second place, I offer an objecnon to the reasoning that leads to the circum scnption 
o f the acmal contractualist element in Rawls. I then reconstruct his view in the light 
o f this objection. The resultant hybnd theon ' is thoroughgoing in its acmal 
contractualism  and founded on a m odal contractualist fram ework. It is a dual 
condition view. For the rem ainder o f this thesis I elaborate this approach and try to 
show that Rawls’s argum ents for the qualified hybnd contractualism  from which it 
is developed can also be employed in its defence.
I begin here with a reading o f PJL which I take to capture/w hat Rawls intended, 
although I bring out elements o f the view thus revealed which are no t emphasised 
by Rawls himself. I argue that this reading shows that Rawls should be thought o f 
as a qualified hybrid contractualist in the way 1 described above. I then challenge 
the basis o f  the qualificauon, namely the claim that acknow ledgm ent o f the ‘burdens 
o f judgm ent’, which explain the reasonableness o f disagreem ent on fundamental 
moral m atters, entails refusal to endorse moral conceptions that don’t safeguard the 
basic liberties. That clears the way for a reconstrucuon o f  Rawls’s hybrid 
contractualism  as including a thoroughgoing actual contractualist test.
I m rn next to a discussion o f the puzzles that face hybnd conttactualism  which 
I raised at the end o f Chapter 2. I suggest a soluuon to the indeterminacy puzzle
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which also perm its us to sidestep the scope puzzle. The solution is that we should 
no t see being reasonable, from the point o f  n e w  o f the hvbnd theory’s modal 
contractualist fram ework, as involving the absolute pnonusation  o f the reason that 
m odal contractualists claim we have to find and comply with principles that each 
person actually accepts. Instead we should see it as involving a readiness to 
reconsider one’s own n e w  in the light o f differences with others. This permits us to 
sidestep the scope puzzle because it entails that even unreasonable individuals’ 
acceptance m atters. For we cannot suppose that if these unreasonable m dinduals 
were reasonable they would not continue to affirm the same m oral conclusions 
anyway. So what it is reasonable to expect them  to accept is no t necessarily 
different from  w hat they actually do accept. Smce the hybnd  theonst’s modal 
contractualist framework involves asking what it w ould be reasonable to expect 
even unreasonable individuals to accept, that fram ework doesn’t restrict the acmal 
contractualist elem ent’s scope any further.
For the rem ainder o f the chapter I consider the question w hether what the 
burdens-of-judgm ent basis for the Rawlsian hybnd theory requires— non-conflict 
betw een an individual’s moral oudook and the m oral conception we seek to 
im pose— can be the foundation for an adequate construal o f acmal acceptance. I 
claim that it can.
2. Political liberalism and hybnd contractualism
P L  proposes a ‘political conception’ o f justice as fairness, the (in my terms) moral 
conception that Rawls defended in Theory. W liat makes it a political conception, 
Rawls explains, is that it is limited in applicability to the basic structure, presented
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with no reference to  the non-polincal values o f any com prehensive doctrine (it has 
w hat Raz calls ‘shallow foundations’)1'". and constructed using the strategy o f 
‘political constructivism ’ from  fundamental ideas which are shared by the m em bers 
of a dem ocranc society as part o f their public political culture.1"-'1"' These features 
make it ‘freestanding’, justice as fairness as presented in Theory, on the other hand, 
is said to be extendable in principle to cover m ore than the basic structure,1"4
K'1 See Raz, ‘‘Facing Diversity: The Case o f Epistemic Abstinence’'.
1,12 See PL, pp. 11-5. Rawls explains the idea o f a comprehensive conception 01 doctrine as follows: 
“A moral conception is general if it applies to a unde range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects 
universally. It is com prehensive when it includes conceptions of what is o f value in human life, and 
ideals o f personal character, as well as ideals o f friendship and of familial and associanonal 
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the lim it.. .our life as a whole. A 
conception is fully com prehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather 
precisely articulated system; whereas a conception is only partially comprehensive when it com pnses 
a num ber of, but by no means all. nonpolmcal values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated. 
Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and comprehensive’ (PL. p.
13).
103 Rawls also says that the political presentauon of justice as fairness takes no stand on the truth of 
the principles in which it issues (’in Raz’s terms, he is committed to ‘epistemic abstinence’. He seems 
to think that this is im portant because each comprehensive doctrine has an “associated theory of 
truth and the status o f values” (PL. p. 150). The implication is that asserting the truth of the political 
conception m ust involve drawing on a “theory of truth and the status o f values” which will be 
associated with a com prehensive doctrine. This idea, which we can call the doctrine o f the 
embeddedness o f truth, seems to me to be at best dubious, and in any case, as Raz argues, it is 
implausible to suppose that we can advocate employing principles without com mitting to then truth. 
So I ignore epistemic abstinence here.
1(14 See Tbeoy, p. 11195 .
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justified partly by reference to a Kantian com prehensrce doctrine,11'' and as such 
constructed using ideas which would probably no t form  part o f a liberal democratic 
society’s public political culture, which w ould be pluralistic (i.e. characterised by its 
m em bers’ adherence to a range o f com prehensive doctrines).116 Rawls hopes to 
employ justice as fairness as a political conception in order to  avoid a problem  that 
he identifies in the argum ent o f Theory- that the K antianism  involved in justice as 
fairness’s account o f stability makes it “inconsistent with realizing its own principles 
under the best o f foreseeable conditions.” It is inconsistent in this way because the 
liberal institutions o f justice as fairness would them selves encourage a pluralistic 
society, and in such a society it w ouldn’t be reasonable to expect each person to 
accept the Kantian justification o f those institutions.1"
A m ong the fundam ental ideas out o f which the political conception is 
constructed is the idea o f society as a fair system o f cooperation.118 which brings in 
rj its train the idea o f citizens as capable o f cooperating on fair term s,1"' which in turn 
^  involves the idea o f citizens as reasonable in a particular sense which Rawls specifies
in detail.11" These ideas together form  ‘the object conception’ o f society as a fair 
system o f  cooperation between citizens conceived as free, equal, reasonable, and
1(0 The appeal to the Kantian doctnne, as Rawls sees it, is a com ponent in the argument for 
‘congruence3, according to which individuals will see the sense of justice as part o f their own good. 
That argument concludes at Theory, pp. 5~4-5 503, but stretches across the final two thirds o f the 
book. See pp. 252-3 222, 445 390. 515/ 452, 528 '462-3, 561, 491, 563 493, 5_’2 / 501, and 5~4- 
5/503. For helpful exegesis see Samuel Freeman, “Congruence and the Good of justice33. ^  
luf’ See PL, p. xvui.
10 PL, p. xix. I sav m ore about this below. 
m  PL, p. 15.
too pj_^ pp 15.2O, especially pp. 18-9. 
no gee pp i9_ 4g.54.
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rational. Reasonableness is characterised bv two basic aspects. The first aspect o f 
the reasonable involves a desire to cooperate on and readiness to propose fair terms 
o f cooperation that it is reasonable to expect all to accept. (This is m odelled in the 
political conception o f  iusnce as fairness bv the em ploym ent o f the original position, 
with all the conditions it imposes upon the parties’ reasoning, and the priority o f the 
principles it produces as those appropriate to regulate social cooperanon.)1 1 The 
second aspect o f  the fundam ental idea o f the reasonable involves acknowledgment 
o f w hat Rawls calls ‘the burdens o f judgm ent'.1 The burdens o f judgm ent tell us 
that, and why, it’s reasonable for people w ho are themselves reasonable and rational 
to differ even in ideal conditions on the fundam ental m oral issues which are the
sm ff o f  com prehensive d o c tn n g ^ so  that none is at f a u l^ f l lu s ,  too, could be said 
to be m odelled by the use o f the original position in the following sense: the original 
position abstracts from  individuals’ com prehensive conceptions o f the good, and so 
captures the idea that it is unreasonable to set things up so that any comprehensive 
conception operates as the standpoint from  which we w ork out principles of 
justice.)11' In fact, Rawls’s discussion makes it clear that the burdens o f judgment 
explain m ore than that. They explain why lt’^reasonable^to differ on moral matters 
simpliciter (i.e. no t just those involved in com prehensive doctrines) as well as on 
some empirical and theoreucal m atters. I ’ll say m ore about this in the next section.
A ccording to Rawls, acknowledging the burdens o f judgm ent sets limits on what 
can be reasonably be justified to o th e rs(/lt ls^herefore in/general unreasonable to
impose a m oral conception on another w ho does no t ^ccept the principles appealed
!
\
111 PL, pp. 4 9 - 5 0 , - 8 ,  305-”’.
1,2 P L  H, §3.
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r  >£ to m its justification, since it is no t unreasonable o f her to reject them . However,
/
(jAv
'  (A'y' one thing that the burdens o f judgment show us can reasonably be justified to and
yS  so im posed on others are the basic liberties. I ’ll discuss Rawls’s reasons for
/  supposing this in m ore detail in the next section too .14
N ow  the question o f the stability o f justice as fairness as a political conception is 
this: can this freestanding conception “gain sufficient support” in the society it 
regulatesr11’ B ut as it transpires, Rawls is no t interested in just anyone's support. He 
is interested in the support that is provided bv an overlapping consensus o f 
reasonable com prehensive doctrines.116 \5CTiether or not there exist enough adherents 
o f unreasonable doctrines which do not support the political conception to 
underm ine stability simpliciter is a m atter which we leave aside. The real aim is to 
show that each person could reasonably be expected to endorse the principles o f 
justice.11 Only then will stability be “ stability for the ngh t reasons” .118
The condition that each person ‘could reasonably be expected to endorse’ the 
political conception is a m odal contractualist condition. In seeking an overlapping 
consensus o f reasonable doctrines Rawls takes him self to be seeking a consensus of 
individuals w ho are reasonable. The two aspects o f  the reasonable he explicitly 
connects with Scanlon’s contractualist account o f m otivation. Scanlon says that die 
basic contractualist m onvauon is a desire to respond to the reason that we have to
1,4 PL, p. 61.
,1;) PL, p. 65.
116 See PL, p. 65 and e.g. pp. 134, 143-4. 
11 PL, p. 13~. Cf. p. xliv. 
m  PL, p. xxxix. n. 5. Cf. p. 391, n. 2~.
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justify our actions to others on grounds that they could not reasonably r e je c t / ' 
Rawls says that desiring to cooperate on and being ready to  propose fair terms of 
cooperation that it is reasonable to expect all to accept and accepting the 
consequences o f  the burdens o f judgm ent are “two related expressions o f [the 
Scanlonian] desire” .1' 1 So he sees him self as seeking an overlapping consensus 
am ong those w ho respond appropriately (i.e. by having the Scanlonian desire) to the 
Scanlonian reason that they have to find and act on principles that no one could 
reasonably reject. The ‘reasonable to expect others to accept’ formula should be 
seen as synonymous with the reasonable rejection formula. (Scanlon him self 
suggests that the latter is merely a m ore precise version o f the form er.)1' 1
Rawls generally speaks o f an overlapping consensus o f reasonable doctrines. So 
we should make clear the connection betw een doctrines and in dividual s.'' '  
Reasonable com prehensive doctrines are, roughly speaking, m ore or less coherent 
norm ative systems expressing a com prehensive and intelligible mew o f the world
/
119 See tf’dRO, pp. 153-8. In “Contractualism and Utilitarianism’', which is the text that Rawls cites. 
Scanlon refers to a desire to justifv our actions to others on grounds that thev could not reasonably 
reject. In ITTF'O, Scanlon argues that w hat’s basic is the reason that we have to do so. not the desire 
to do so. See pp. ”-8.
12(1 PL, p. 49. n. 2.
121 See What We Owe To Each Other, p. 4.
122 At “John  Rawls and the Search for Stability” . p. 898. B arn’ notes that it is “people, not doctrines, 
that go around endorsing conceptions” . (Cf. Scheffler, “The Appeal o f Political Liberalism”, p. 11. )
I think Rawls’s talk o f doctrines affirming the political conception arises innocently out o f a wish to 
stress that individuals’ endorsem ent o f the political conception is based on the grounds provided by 
then comprehensive doctrines. Describing things this way avoids g iv in g  the impression that 
individuals’ support for the political conception is instrumental in the way that it is m a modus vivendi. 
See below.
and which normally belong to a tradition o f thought and doctrine.1-' More 
importantly, though, w hat makes a com prehensive doctrine unreasonable is conflict 
with aspects o f the reasonable itself: “ [w]e avoid excluding doctrines as 
unreasonable w ithout strong grounds based on clear aspects o f the reasonable 
itself.”1-*' So, for example, one wav in which a doctrine w ould be unreasonable is if 
it refused to  acknowledge the burdens o f judgment. Reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, then, are those familiar com prehensive doctrines whose adherents also 
recognise the burdens o f judgm ent and their consequence, the basic liberties; and 
w ho have the desire to cooperate on fair, reasonable terms which is the first aspect 
o f reasonableness. The reasonableness o f individuals is basic here, since it is 
primarily bv reference to the aspects o f reasonableness o f individuals that we 
determine the reasonableness o f a doctrine.
/ S o  w hat’s needed in order to show that it’s reasonable to expect each reasonable 
person to endorse the political conception o f justice as fa irness? /^e ll, we know 
(from the second aspect o f the reasonable) that it’s unreasonable to expect anyone to 
affirm any particular com prehensive doctrine (at least that they don’t already affirm), 
though it’s reasonable to expect them  to affirm at m inim um  the basic liberties as 
part o f  their conception o f justice. W e know  (from the first aspect) that it’s 
unreasonable no t to be willing to p ropose and abide by fair terms o f cooperation 
that it’s reasonable to expect others to endorse. A nd we know that w e’re faced with 
a pluralistic society. So we can say at least this: what w e’re looking for is a liberal 
conception (this is w hat I ’ll call a conception that safeguards the basic liberties)
 ^j Rat’s no t based only on a single com prehensive doctnne. /T hat means that we need
a freestanding liberal political conception. M oreover, we know that everyone 
shares1"3 the various conceptions o f  persons and society that the polmcal concepnon 
draws together.126 So it w ould be reasonable to expect everyone’s endorsem ent o f a 
freestanding liberal conception developed from  these— which is precisely what 
justice as fairness, m its political presentation, is.. (If the fact that everyone shares 
them  doesn’t make it reasonable to expect them  to affirm them , then it seems that 
we can’t go any further than the basic liberties.) A nd that, surely, is in fact all we 
need. O f  course, from  the fact that this is what it would be reasonable to expect 
everyone to endorse we can denve the conclusion that there will be an overlapping 
consensus am ong reasonable people— those who, like us, are m terested in what it’s 
reasonable to expect everyone to accept. But this seems to be an unnecessary 
further move. Isn’t the point that it’s reasonable to expect everyone to accept 
justice as fairness, w hether or no t there is an overlapping consensus on itr 
Yet Rawls expends a good deal o f effort on discussion o f the overlapping 
consensus. ^CTiyr O ne explanation is that showing that it w ould be unreasonable to 
reject justice as fairness, given w hat Rawls takes as given (the definition o f the 
reasonable, the shared elements implicit in the public culture), is not showing that 
enough people would be reasonable to render justice as fairness stable. If  it is 
stable, it’s stable for the ngh t reasons— but how  do we know it’s stable? However, 
the stability question can be answered usmg the psychology o f moral developm ent 
that Rawls offers in Tbeoty and merely rubber-stam ps m PL..1" We don’t need 
anything m ore for that. A better explanation is that the charactensation o f a
12:> PL, pp. 13-4.
126 PL, p. 304; see also “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’1.
12’ PL, p. 143, n. 9.
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reasonable, political conception-endorsing person needs moral-psychological 
plausibility. This we get from  Rawls's account o f how reasonable individuals' wider 
comprehensive doctnnes connect up with the narrower realm o f the values o f the 
(freestanding)' political conception. First, we are told, the values articulated bv the 
political conception are very im portant. '"*' A nd second, they’re congruent with (that 
is, supported by or at least no t inconsistent with) a variety o f non-polm cal 
values1" — the overlapping consensus is no t a modus vivendi. The first part o f this 
account seems to be o f a piece with the basis for the liberal principle o f legitimacy, 
viz., that political pow er is coercive and (more or less) inescapable.1’1 The thought 
is that the poliucal sphere has a deep im portance which translates m to priority for 
the values appropriate to it. The second part relies for its plausibility on Rawls’s 
rather brief account in Lecture TV, §8 o f the relations betw een various 
com prehensive doctnnes in his ‘m odel case’1 ’" and the political conception, wluch 
purports to dem onstrate that affirm ing the values o f the political conception is “not 
a com prom ise” for those w ho also affirm  the com prehensive doctnnes o f the 
m odel case.1”
128 PL, p. 139.
129 PL, p. 140.
130 See PL, pp. 145-9.
131 See PL, p. 13".
132 P L  pp- 145-6.
133 PL, p. LO. See also pp. 385ff. The brevity o f this account might be explained to some extent by 
Rawls claim that we m ust simply leave individuals to work out for themselves how the political 
conception fits with then  wider views (see P L  p. 140). Some kind o f account is necessary, however, 
in order to lend plausibility to the idea that it’s even possible for them to do tins. See Chapter 4 
below.
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But the m ost im portan t explanation for Rawls’s focus on the overlapping 
consensus, I think, is that he wants no t merely to assert that but also to illustrate the 
way in which support for political liberalism leaves room  for a variety o f accounts of 
the realms o f non-political values, in contrast with other approaches to justice which 
are based on a single com prehensive doctnne (such as the Kantian Interpretation of 
justice as fairness which Rawls presents in Theory). D escribing how different people 
reconcile the political conception with their com prehensive doctnnes shows us how 
w hat’s dem anded o f mdividuals by reasonableness is compatible with the range o f 
wider m oral views which w e’d find in a pluralistic liberal society. A nd why, we 
m ight ask, is it im portant to leaye room  for a vanety o f accounts o f the realms of 
non-political values? O ne reason is purely practical: given the desideratum of full 
publicity (in which a full argum ent for a conception o f justice is made publicly 
available), stability is harder to secure in a liberal, pluralisnc society if there isn't 
room  left by that argum ent for the variety o f accounts. But it’s only harder, which 
doesn’t entail that it’s very hard; and anyway if we suppose that w e’ve got the 
conception o f  justice nght in the first place, it w ould be odd to insist on full 
publicity at the cost o f any possibility o f achieving justice. The m ore im portant 
reason is the reasonableness o f differing on fundam ental moral m atters (the 
consequence o f  the burdens o f  judgm ent)/which makes it Unreasonable to expect 
everyone to accept any justification based on fundam ental moral comm itm ents that 
they don’t actually share, except if these fall out from  acceptance o f the burdens o f 
judgm ent themselves. So it’s im portan t to show— and no t merely assert— that the 
political conception doesn’t involve any such justifications— that it doesn’t 
contradict any reasonable individual’s views. Hence we try to show that justice as 
fairness is capable o f  support from  a range o f moral positions: an overlapping 
consensus.
Strictly speaking, the actual existence o f such a consensus is no t a condiuon of 
stability for the ng h t reasons. All we need is stability and a political conception 
which it’s reasonable to expect each person to accept— even if no  one does. It 
m ight be that no one is reasonable, yet sufficient num bers for stability endorse 
justice as fairness anyway. But if  two or m ore people are reasonable, an overlapping 
consensus is necessarily part o f  stability for the ngh t reasons for the following 
reason.1 It is a crucial part in the argum ent for the reasonableness o f expecting 
acceptance o f justice as fairness that the political conception is built out o f shared 
elements. Justice as fairness, and no t some other liberal political conception (recall 
that all reasonable individuals affirm the basic liberties as a consequence o f the 
burdens o f judgment), is appropnate  because it elaborates these elements which 
everyone shares. It w ould be reasonable to expect acceptance o f some other liberal 
political conception if we took other political ideas to be shared.1 Since everyone 
shares them , including anyone w ho is reasonable, it is reasonable to expect everyone 
to endorse justice as fairness. A nd since reasonable people are reasonable, dns is 
what they will do. So there will be an overlapping consensus o f reasonable people if 
there are two or m ore reasonable people.
ATiat this brings out is the im portance o f the role that people’s actual acceptance 
o f these shared elements plays. I can’t reasonably expect you or anyone else to 
endorse any conception o f justice (the basis of) which conflicts with your 
com prehensive doctrine. A nd since there are lots o f different and conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines around, we need to come up with a freestanding political
134 I say ‘two or m ore’ because of course one person's acceptance doesn’t constitute a consensus.
But obviously if there’s one person, her endorsem ent o f the political conception is a necessary 
condition o f stability for the nght reasons for the reasons I go on to give.
135 PL, p. 16".
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conception which doesn’t draw on any single comprehensive doctrine, at least
insofar as it conflicts with others. But notice that the political conception needs to
be congruent with the political parts o f each person’s moral outlook, too. For the
burdens o f judgment, which determ ine this requirem ent in com bination with the
first aspect o f the reasonable, d o n ’t distinguish betw een political values and wider
values: it’s unreasonable to expect anyone (reasonable) w ho differs from  you in their 
view to accept yours on im portan t m oral m atters, political and otherwise, with the 
exception o f endorsem ent o f a liberal conception o f justice. So if we can come up
reasonable, that’s because everyone ju st does agree on the fundam ents o f such a 
conception, no t because the political realm is exem pt from the burdens o f judgment 
(liberal conceptions aside) so that it’s reasonable to require agreement on those 
fundam ents. In other words, it’s because it passes an actual contractualist test. This 
is Rawls’s actual contractualism.
It is no t the case, o f course, that each person  in the overlapping consensus 
actually accepts the relevant political conception in the sense that she actually 
(explicitly or tacitly) consents to it. N o r is it even necessarily true that she would 
consent to it if she considered the question (that depends on the conditions invoked
in the hypothetical), /^vhat m atters is that a person’s actual m oral comm itm ents 
support, or at least do not conflict w ith, the political conception. But as I shall 
argue at the end o f this chapter, that is sufficient for this part o f Rawls’s 
contractualism to be counted actual contractualism. Congruence o f moral
with a political conception which doesn’t conflict with the moral outlook o f anyone
com m itm ents with the political conception is a viable actual contractualist construal
o f the variable o f acceptance. / /
tSo the burdens o f judgm ent are absolutely central to political liberalism. The
‘double ro le’ that Rawls ascribes to them  in his introduction to the paperback
edition o f PJL seriously underplays their significance, though it is correct that they 
have a double role. There, Rawls claims that “they are part o f die basis for liberty 
o f conscience and freedom  o f thought founded on the idea o f the reasonable. And 
they lead us to recognize that there are different and incom patible liberal 
conceptions” .136 The first half o f this is right, although it doesn’t bring hom e the 
force o f the idea that it’s unreasonable by Rawls’s lights no t to accept a liberal 
concepuon. But the second half strikes m e as odd. \\Trho w ould have supposed that 
there mren ’/ different and incom patible liberal conceptions? M oreover, fins doesn’t 
bnng  out at all the actual contractualist force o f the burdens o f judgment, even in 
the restricted sense that applies if we accept the first p a r p / f b e  burdens o f judgment 
make it unreasonable to expect anyone to endorse anything m ore specific than this 
unless they actually already do endorse it in some sense.
This makes political liberalism at once easy and difficult to achieve. O n the one 
hand, it seems to get us to liberalism (i.e., the basic liberties) with barely any effort. 
Bnan Barrv complains, indeed, that the burdens o f  judgm ent argum ent for 
liberalism obviates the need for an overlapping consensus. ’ O n the other hand, to 
get from  liberalism to specifically justice as fairness (i.e., from  the basic liberties to 
these plus Rawls’s second principle o f justice) requires that justice as fairness pass 
an actual contractualist test: we need even 'one reasonable 38 to endorse the
136 PL, p. xllX . / O ,  ^ *  '
^  See Barn-. “]ohn Rawls and the Search for Stability’', pp. 898-901. j  <- /  A : :.
m  A ’e also need to know what could be reasonably expected o f unreasonable people, people who t  
fail to recognise the modal contractualist reason that they have to find and act on principles that no 
one could reasonably reject or who fail to acknowledge the burdens of judgment. For the modal y  ’ 
contractualist framework requires that no one could reasonably reject a just moral conception, not 
merely that no one who is as a matter o f fact reasonable could reasonably reject a just moral
fundam ental ideas from  which the political presentation o f fustice as fairness is 
elaborated. Prima facie this is no t an easy test to pass.
W e have seen that Rawls operates, m PT, within a m odal contractualist 
framework. W e have also seen that he endorses a (somewhat circumscribed) actual 
contractualist test. As I said in the introduction to  this chapter, this is part of a 
mixed condition actual contractualism. It only applies to elements within a liberal 
framework, which itself is no t subject to any actual contractualist test but entirely 
accounted for by the m odal contractualist fram ework, which identifies the burdens 
o f judgm ent as a consideration in favour o f a liberal conception. In the next section 
I shall challenge this part o f Rawls’s n ew . The basis o f the actual contractualist test, 
meanwhile, is also given by the m odal contractualist framework: given the burdens 
o f judgment, it’s reasonable to reject a specific liberal political conception on grounds 
o f actual non-acceptance. This basis for the actual contractualist test shows that 
Rawls should be viewed as a hybrid contractualist.
3. The burdens of judgment as a basis for actual contractualism
As I noted abov^/the burdens o f  judgm ent explain how  people can disagree about 
m atters o f  morality and the good w ithout either party to the disagreem ent being at 
faulty /fw ant now  to discuss Rawls’s reasoning about the burdens o f judgment in
conception. So we need to know  what it would be reasonable for unreasonable individuals to reject. 
Since it is reasonable. \iyou're reasonable, to reject a liberal conception that you don’t actually accept, 
we need to know what these people would accept if they were reasonable so that we can find out 
what they w ouldn’t. This has implications for the puzzle o f scope reconciliation for hybrid theorists 
that I raised at the end o f Chapter 2. I discuss it later on m this chapter.
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more detail. Obviously the cause o f some disagreements is that one side is at fault.
People reason badly, or they fail to see relevant considerations, or they simply make
mistakes. A nd in other m oral and ethical disagreements both sides are at fault for
the same reasons. But Rawls supposes that these are not the only explanations o f
disagreement about such m atters. Som etimes individuals disagree w ithout anyone’s
being unreasonable opdiaving m ade a rm s ta ^ e / th is  is because o f “the many
hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise o f our powers o f reason
and judgm ent” 13"— the many ways in which two reasonable people using correctly
and conscientiously their equal pow ers o f reason and judgm ent can arrive at
different conclusions in moral (and other) matters.
W hat are these hazards." M ost o f those that Rawls lists (although he says that
there are others) refer to the difficulty that we have in com prehending and
appropriately weighting the full range o f considerations which bear upon our moral
and ethical judgments. The evidence is “ conflicting and com plex” ; many ways of
weighing it are reasonable; our concepts are “vague and subject to hard cases” ; we
cannot tell how  far our judgm ents are “ shaped b y . . .our whole course o f life up to
now ” ; and it is difficult to make an assessm ent o f the “different kinds o f normative
consideration o f different force on bo th  sides o f an issue” .14' M oreover, no t every
value, even if it is agreed by all to  be a value, can be realized by one society.'4’ \Khat
is essential to understanding how  these factors explain no-fault disagreement is that
there is no m ethod by which we may be sure that we have come to the right - - .
assessment. O ur concepts, for example, just are vague; it’? no t that some people are
I
_____________________________  /v< . : Lr‘ " >
•v P L  p. 56. ' ' '  /
14(1 P L  p. 5~. J
141 As Rawls notes, this is a theme of Isaiah Berlin’s; since _PL.it has also been one o f Rawls’s.
less vague m their concepts than others. The evidence itself is conflicting, not just 
our interpretations o f  it. The burdens o f judgm ent are significant because together 
they show us that the subject m atter o f morality itself involves uncertain cases and 
unclear boundaries, that the m oral landscape is in itself blurry. The problem  is not
. . f  . . ' l - !"just with our means o f accessing it. As a result, disagreem ent persists, and is ,
reasonable, even w hen the best m eans o f accessing the issues are used. / /
To acknowledge the burdens o f  judgm ent, then, is to  acknowledge that
n
reasonable people may well diff^r'epistemically blamelessliyph even the most
/
im portant o f moral and ethical judgm ents. (Note that Rawls’s descnpnon o f the 
burdens explains not only disagreem ent on com prehensive moral issues but also on 
almost all moral and ethical— including political— issues. The qualificauon arises 
from the putative indisputability o f die burdens o f judgm ent themselves and the 
existence o f the m odal contractualist reason.) Thus the fact o f pluralism is almost 
inevitable in a free society*: individuals will come to affirm different comprehensive 
doctrines.14" Reasonable people see that reasonable others could blamelessly fail to 
reach the same conclusions as them  and recognise therefore that others will not 
necessarily accept their com prehensive doctnne-based jusuficanons o f the use of 
state power.
T hat they will no t necessarily accept such justifications is one thing. \XTat to do 
about that fact is another. Tins is w here Rawls makes his distinctive move: he 
identifies a reasonable indiy*idual’s non-acceptance o f some comprehensive 
doctnne-based jusnficanon— on the grounds o f its conflict with the view that she. 
no t unreasonably, takes o f the m oral landscape-|-as grounds for denying that she —  ^
could reasonably be expected to accept it. The mere fact o f her non-acceptance is I '
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enough once we acknowledge the ^mfdens o f judgment. In other words. Rawls 
identifies the m ere fact o f non-acceptance as (effectively) a reason in the modal 
contractualist fram ework for the rejection o f a m oral conception. He writes:
r
Smce many doctrines are seen to be reasonable, those w ho insist, when 
fundam ental political questions are at stake, on w hat they take as true but others 
do not, seem to others simply to msist on their own beliefs when they haye the 
political pow er to do so. O f  course, those w ho do msist on their own beliefs 
also insist that their beliefs alone are true: they impose therr beliefs because, they 
say, their beliefs are true and no t because they are their beliefs. But this is a 
claim that all equally could make; it is also a claim that cannot be made good by 
anyone to citizens generally. So, w hen we make such claims others, who are
themselves reasonable, m ust count us unreasonable.14
     ' ^  '  ■
The key thought in this passage is that it w ould be unreasonable to impose what I 
am calling a moral conception (i.e. in the political realm) on the basis o f the truth o f 
a com prehensive doctrine which supports it. Im portantly, this is no t supposed to 
be because that doctrine is not true, or even because we cannot know that it is true—  
Rawls demes that he is offering a sceptical view o f the sorts o f claims in
Rquestion144— bijTfather because others m ight reasonably affirm different 
com prehensive doctrines and therefore reasonably disagree about the truth o f the 
doctnne in q u e s tio n /f t  w ould be unreasonable to impose the moral conception on
143 PL, p. 61. Rawls goes on to conclude it is unreasonable not to endorse some form of liberty of 
conscience and freedom o f thought. I don’t see that this follows: see below.
144 See PL, pp. 62-3, 138. and 150-154.
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the basis o f the tru th  o f one’s com prehensive doctrine because it would be 
reasonable for others no t to  accept that com prehensive doctnne. The
/
reasonableness o f  disagreem ent is the fundam ental fact.
The burdens o f judgm ent can help to explain the attraction o f what I called 
‘thoroughgoing’ actual contractualism — at least within the modal contractualist 
framework. In Chapter 1 I argued that the attraction o f actual contractualist views 
which submit alm ost everv aspect o f  p roposed  m oral conceptions to the acmal 
contractualist test cannot adequately be explained in term s o f a fundamental 
com m itm ent to the ideal o f autonom ous living. It can, however, be explained in 
terms o f a conception o f individualists equally authoritative in their epistemic access 
to the moral la n d s c a p ^ e t  reasonably differing in their judgm ents about it. We 
should care about acmal acceptance, eyen o f principles and norm s which determine 
the degree to which we lead autonom ous lives in the sense which is often invoked 
in support o f liberal moral conceptions, because w ithout it we have no way to justify 
the im position o f  those norm s to others given that we ourselves are no more 
authoritative in our judgm ent about the m oral landscape than those upon w hom  we 
seek to im pose those norm s. O ur own acceptance o f them  is sufficient for the 
legitimacy o f their im position upon us, smce our acceptance o f them  consututes 
acceptance o f their truth an 
imposing them .yBut the reasonableness o f  no t accepting them  entails the 
unreasonableness o f expecting som eone w ho does not accept them  to accept a 
justification for their im position which is based upon their truth. In the context o f a 
conception o f individuals as equally authoritative and reasonable in differing in their 
judgments about the m oral landscape, an appeal to the truth o f a moral conception, 
even if it is true, does n o t w ork as a justification that others may reasonably be 
expected to accept— unless everyone already does actually accept it (that it is true).
131
a  their truth w ould constitute a justification for
In that case it is reasonable to expect each person to accept, bv wav o f justification, 
an appeal to the tru th  o f the moral concepnon. But since it w ould be reasonable for 
anyone to deny the truth o f the m oral conception, such an appeal is effectively an 
appeal to the fact that she accepts its truth.
Consider by way o f analog}' the following example. Y ou and I are purchasers 
for an art museum. W e have a limited budget, enough for one o f two paintings that 
are on offer. N either is historically m ore significant than the other or m ore suited 
to our present collection: our decision will be on aesthetic grounds. The painting 
that we don’t choose will be bought by a private collection and we will no t have a 
chance to buy it again. I think that we should purchase the Flemish landscape, 
which I think (correctly, let us say) is aesthetically supenor to the Italian portrait. In 
making a case for it to you, I could appeal directly to the truth o f its aesthetic 
superiority. I could insist that we purchase it on this basis. But it is reasonable to 
disagree about this, at least w hen these two paintings are in question /so  to insist on 
purchasing it on the basis o f its aesthetic superiority simpliciter w ould be 
u n reaso n ab le .^  recognise this, so although I may still appeal to the truth o f its 
aesthetic superiority, I do so conscious that my case for it has no force at all if you 
don’t accept that it is aesthetically supenor. I can, o f course, point out my reasons 
for taking it to be so. But w hen all is said and done an appeal to the Flemish 
landscape’s aesthetic supenonty  as grounds for its purchase m ust be, to justify its 
purchase to you, an appeal to your acceptance o f its supenonty. I don’t say: “it’s 
aesthetically supenor— so let’s buy it.” I say: “ we're agreed that ids aesthetically 
supenor— so let’s buy it.”
The burdens o f judgm ent make it appropnate to treat moral judgments like the 
aesthetic judgm ents in this example. This is not to say that moral judgments are not 
true or false. It is to say that it is unreasonable to appeal to then  truth and
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falsehood to justify the im position o f a moral conception. Instead, we m ust appea] 
to the fact o f individuals’ acmal endorsem ent o f them. Each person’s acmal 
endorsem ent o f  a m oral conception (or a basis for that m oral conception— see the 
final section o f this chapter) is essential to justi.fi' its im position, and it is to that 
endorsem ent that we m ust appeal in justifying its im position to them. To do 
otherwise is unreasonable in the light o f  the burdens o f judgment. So here we have 
a burdens-of-judgm ent basis for acmal contractualism.
I said that from  her own po in t o f  n e w , a person mav se^fhe imposition o f a 
moral c o n c e p tio n 's  justified because o f  its truth. W hat the burdens o f ludgment 
suggest is that o thers’ justifications to her o f the im position (i.e. society’s imposition) 
o f that moral conception upon her can nevertheless reasonably appeal only to the 
fact o f her acmal acceptance. It is som etim es suggested that left-wingers are 
perfectly welcome, in a low tax society, to contract themselves into paying higher 
taxes, if they think that such taxes ought to  be imposed. So I m ight sign such a 
contract. I could then see the higher taxes im posed upon me as justified because 
they accord with principles I take to  be true, yet at the same time refuse to accept 
your appeal to their truth, rather than to  the fact that I signed the contract, as your 
justification for forcing m e to pay them . I can consistently refuse to accept as a 
justification from  you w hat I accept as a justification from  myself- The same is true 
in respect o f the im position o f m oral conceptions. The burdens o f judgment, in the 
m odal contractualist fram ework, help to show us why.14'
145 Cf. Stephen Darwall, “Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay’'. especially pp. 204-5, 
where Darwall emphasises the contrast between justifying something to someone and justifying
something in som eone’s presence.
As we saw above, Rawls does not invoke the burdens o f judgm ent to support a 
thoroughgoing actual contractualism. Instead, by wav o f conclusion to the passage 
that I quoted on p. 130 above, he claims th |^ re a s o n a b le  persons see that the 
burdens o f judgm ent set limits on w hat can be reasonably justified to others, and so 
they endorse some form  o f liberty o f conscience and freedom  o f  thought.’^ ^ T h i s  
restricts the range o f the acmal contractualist test in Rawls’s view. But here Rawls 
is, I think, m istaken. lib e rty  o f conscience and freedom  o f thought are 
com ponents in m oral concepnons that are no less subject than any other to the 
difficulties raised by the burdens o f judgment. The claim that these are just, like the 
claim that extra eccksiam nulla saiusl~ is “a claim that all equally could make; it is also 
a claim that cannot be made good by anyone to citizens generally” .148 \XTiat would 
be required to give liberty o f conscience and freedom  privileged status w ould be 
some internal connection with or entailm ent by acknowledgm ent o f the burdens o f 
ju d g m e n ^ /^ u t acknowledging the burdens o f judgm ent is merely acknowledging 
that reasonable people can disagree with in their moral n e w s  w ithout its being the 
case that there m ust be a mistake in the reasoning by which they came to hold 
opposing p o s itio n s.^ A n d  it’s no t the case that the basic liberties m ust be affirm ed 
in virtue simply o f the first aspect o f the reasonable.) Y ou could consistently 
acknowledge the acmal contractualist test that I claimed a m om ent ago is grounded 
in acknow ledgm ent o f  the burdens o f judgm ent and yet deny that others should be 
free to  act upon  their opposing views. Instead, you w ould suppose that die 
question which n e w  can reasonably determ ine how  people may jusdy act can be
14(1 PL, p. 61.
14 “Outwith the church there is no salvauonP See PL, p. 138.
148 PL, p. 61 (quoted m ore fully above).
found out only by ascertaining which view is actually accepted by everyone. You 
w ould deny that in the absence o f  actual agreem ent that justice should give its seal 
o f approval to  any m oral conception. The burdens o f judgm ent explain how  people 
can disagree w ithou t fault; they do no t set out ideal epistemic conditions for moral 
reasoning on the basis o f  which we can reach the conclusion that liberal principles 
are just.
N o r will it do to  say that since each person may reasonably differ about w hat 
her own behaviour should be, it would be unreasonable for anyone to propose 
m oral conceptions which do not perm it each individual the freedom  to determ ine 
her own behaviour (consistent with the same freedom  for all). The poin t o f the idea 
o f  the burdens o f judgm ent is that people may reasonably differ in the moral 
conclusions they drawy their conclusions may not haye this kind o f individualisnc 
liberalism built in to  them . A salient fact about at least some com prehensive 
doctrines that have existed is that realisation or furthering o f  the good as they 
specify it involves the behaviour o f  no t only those wTho adhere to the 
com prehensive doctrines in question but also those w*ho d o n ’t. So, for example, 
som e religious com prehensive doctrines n e w  the good as requiring the behaviour o f 
all individuals— as opposed to only those wTho adhere to the religion in quesnon—  
to conform  to  the prescriptions o f some central religious text. M oreoyer, some 
such doctrines do n o t require that the relevant behaviour m ust be voluntarily 
undertaken for the good  to be secured or furthered: free faith is n o t necessary for 
the realisation o f  the good .149 Religious regimes may som etim es make conform ity
149 Rawls notes at PL, p. NO that he “perhaps too optimistically” supposes that “all the main 
historical religions admit o f [an account o f free faith]” . I take ‘an account o f free faith’ to mean an 
explanation or assertion o f the value or necessity o f the free adoption o f  faith. The optimistic
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with religious requirem ents obligatory regardless o f w hether a person believes in the 
religion or requirem ents in question or not. So people may reasonably differ about 
w hat their own behaviour should be; bu t they may also reasonably differ about w hat 
each other p erson ’s behaviour should be. N oth ing  in the idea o f  the burdens o f 
judgm ent gives us grounds to deny this.
I f  Rawls w ere right about the conclusions licensed by the burdens o f judgment, 
the best articulation o f  his n e w  would be the hvbnd view with a less thoroughgoing 
actual contractualist com ponent. The burdens o f judgm ent w ould provide reason 
to  reject any m oral conception which did no t include provision for at least the basic 
liberties o f conscience and thought. But he is w rong about the conclusions. The 
burdens o f  judgm ent alone provide no basis for the supposition that there is any 
m oral conception that it w ould be unreasonable to affirm apart from  those which 
fail to acknowledge the acmal contractualist consequence o f the burdens o f 
judgm ent them selves. Thev ne\~ertheless do produce that acmal contractualist 
consequence; that it w ould be unreasonable to im pose a m oral conception on 
som eone w ho did n o t accept it.
W hat Rawls supposes we seek w hen we seek to find a basis for the overlapping 
consensus is a basis for unanim ous acceptance o f a specific liberal m oral 
conception— in Rawls’s favoured case a specific liberal egalitarian m oral 
conception— am ong individuals w ho are already unanim ous, by definition (as 
reasonable), in their acceptance o f the necessity o f some liberal m oral conception.
judgm ent, k  also deny that it makes sense to care about a basis for unanim ous
But since I deny that he is right about the conclusions licensed by the burdens o f
supposition is o f course consistent with its being the case that ah the main historical religions have 
existed and do exist in versions which do not in fact include an account o f free faith.
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acceptance only am ong those w ho are already unanim ous in their acceptance o f 
some liberal m oral concep tion ./f)oes this m ean we should be looking for a basis for 
consensus am ong no t only reasonable bu t also unreasonable individuals?
W e answer this question by determ ining w hether the burdens o f judgm ent basis 
for acmal contractualism  provides a rationale for a restncnon  in scope to reasonable 
in d in  duals in som e sense. If  liberalism follows automatically from  the burdens o f 
judgm ent we do have such a rationale: if your fundam ental prem ise is som ething 
that entails acceptance o f  liberalism, you have no reason to care about anyone’s 
acmal acceptance w ho is second-aspect unreasonable— which includes anyone with 
illiberal political n ew s. A theory built on a liberalism-entailing fundam ental premise 
need no t try to  accom m odate the actual n ew s o f those w ho deny the prem ise or the 
entailm ent, though it may perfectly well take itself to be required to accom m odate 
the n e w s  that these people would accept if  they did accept the prem ise and 
entailment. The trouble is that while such a requirem ent entails a liberal moral 
conception, to  get from  there to a specific m oral conception requires knowledge o f 
a hypothetical w hich we surely can’t haye. XKTuch specific liberal m oral conception 
w ould som eone w ho is illiberal (i.e. w ho does no t endorse the basic liberties) accept 
if she were liberal? H er acmal n ew s in m ost cases will give us no guide at all. So it 
makes sense to  concentrate on those w ho are second-aspect reasonable alone, and 
seek an overlapping consensus am ong their n ew s rather than am ong both  their 
n ew s and those that second-aspect unreasonable ind induals w ould have if  they 
were second-aspect reasonable. This at least partly explains Rawls’s restriction in 
the scope o f  his acmal contractualist elem ent to  reasonable indinduals.
But I am  denying that liberalism does automatically follow from  the burdens o f 
judgm ent, and therefore we do no t have this rationale for restriction in scope to 
second-aspect reasonable indinduals. D o  we have any other? Y ou might suppose
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that since we continue to affirm the burdens o f judgm ent and their actual 
contractualist consequence, we have a rationale for restricting the scope o f our 
actual contractualism  to those w ho also affirm the burdens o f  judgm ent and acmal 
contractualism . W hy should we care about w hat individuals w ho deny the 
fundam ental prem ise o f acmal contractualism  accept or reject? But this would be 
analogous to  a H obbesian’s refusing to require, as necessary for her to have the 
political obligation, the consent o f an individual w ho rejects the necessity o f consent 
to political obligation. H obbesians don’t do this for the following good reason: at 
the level o f  the im position o f m oral conceptions against the H obbesian  moral 
background, w hether or n o t anyone accepts that m oral background itself is 
irrelevant. W e are interested m their acceptance o f first-order n ew s as articulated in 
m oral conceptions, no t their views about how  or w hether these m oral concepnons 
should m eet the ideal o f individualistic justification. O ur own second-order view, 
w hich determ ines the details o f the m oral background, itself entails no  particular 
first-order n e w .13" Consider by analog}' the right to vote in a constitutional 
democracy. Suppose that som eone in such a democracy believes that ideally we 
w ould have socialism im plem ented by a benevolent dictator. In an election she 
votes for the socialist candidate, though it is constitutionally im possible that the 
w inning candidate should establish a dictatorship and end the democracy. The fact 
that the vo ter rejects the democratic system which grants each person a vote in the 
first place has no  bearing on w hether her views about socialism should be taken into 
account by that system. Those new s are com patible with the affirm ation o f
150 Contrast Locke, whose second-order n ew  does entail a moral conception— that which obtains in 
the Lockean state o f  nature. This includes certain inalienable rights; so if your n e w  leads you to 
reject those rights, your consent is not necessary for the justice o f the imposition o f a moral 
conception to which you did no t consent.
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democracy, so there is no thing offensive in their inform ing a person 's vote. H er 
vote should be counted like any other; the result o f  the election should reflect 
everyone’s views about the first-order policies to  be im plem ented, no t just those of 
people w ho accept the second-order dem ocranc view about how  the first-order 
policies are to  be chosen.
M atters are different, however, if the second-order n e w  about how  first-order 
policies are to  be chosen entails certain first-order policies. Suppose now  that it is a 
fact that dem ocracy is impossible unless even' voter is literate. In that case, it 
should be constitutionally impossible in our constitutional dem ocracy no t only that 
a w inning candidate should establish a dictatorship but also that she should 
im plem ent policies which bring about less than full literacy rates. Votes for such 
policies should n o t be counted or, better, possible (because no party may propose 
such policies). In this case the situation is analogous to the acmal contractualism  
which follows from  a liberalism-entailing conception o f  the burdens o f judgment. 
Thus for such a view we arrive at a position according to which there is a rationale, 
as I explained two paragraphs ago, for restricting acmal contractualism ’s scope to 
those w ho are second-aspect reasonable.
So the revision to  Rawls’s hybrid view that I advocate denies that liberalism 
follows from  acknow ledgm ent o f the burdens o f judgm ent and it therefore relaxes 
the restriction in the view ’s acmal contractualist scope to those w ho are second- 
aspect reasonable. I shall discuss first-aspect reasonableness in the next section, in 
the context o f the puzzles for hybrid contractualism  that I raised at the end o f 
Chapter 2. Before that: is there a rationale for any other restriction m die revised 
Rawlsian m ew’s acmal contractualist scope? Well, just as the Lockean restricts his 
acmal contractualist scope to those w ho are capable o f the freedom  that is protected 
by the necessity o f  consent for the im position o f  a m oral conception other dian that
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o f the state o f  nature, so the revised Rawlsian can restrict her actual contractualist 
scope to those w ho are capable o f the kinds o f judgm ent about which the burdens 
o f  judgm ent show  us that individuals may reasonably disagree. So we need not 
worry* about the actual acceptance o f those w ho are no t capable o f form ing and 
revising their conception o f the good. W e can, that is, follow Rawls in assuming 
that everyone (that we are interested in) has his ‘second m oral pow er’ and the 
capacities that underpin  it.131 These include a m inim um  degree o f  rationality, 
theoretical ability*, and self-direction.
4. The hybrid mew and the actual contractualist motivation
The revised Rawlsian view is a hybrid theory with a m ore thoroughgoing acmal 
contractualist com ponent than Rawls’s official view. It says thaj/it is unreasonable 
to expect each person to accept any m oral conception that she actually does not 
accepty/l w ant to argue that this view is the basis for a plausible elaboration o f 
Rawlsian egalitarianism which incorporates the attractions o f bo th  m odal and acmal 
contractualism . T o do this requires me to do the following. First, I m ust explain 
how  this hybrid view solves the turn puzzles that I in troduced at the end o f the last 
chapter. I try to  m eet this requirem ent in the rem ainder o f this chapter. In C hapter 
4 I shall go on to  connect this hybrid framework in m ore detail w ith Rawls’s 
strategy o f  political constructivism , thereby explaining how  we m ight go about 
showing that (what I am calling) a moral conception could be justified on the hybrid 
n ew . H ow  should it be argued that any particular m oral conception would actually 
be accepted by each relevant person in society*? In the final chapters o f  the thesis
131 See FL, pp. 18-20, "’2.
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I ’ll elaborate and endorse Rawls’s own argum ent that specifically the e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  
o f justice as fairness w ould be actually accepted in the way necessary for it to be 
mdividualistically justified on the hybrid view.
Given the burdens o f judgm ent as an explanation o f the fundam ental basis o f 
acmal contractualism , it makes sense, as xce saw above, for an acmal contractualist 
to restrict scope to  those individuals w ho m eet the following condition: they m ust 
be capable o f  the  lands o f judgm ent about which individuals may reasonably 
disagree, given the burdens o f judgment. There is nothing objectionable in an 
acmal contractualist’s restricting scope in this way when her view is founded on her 
acceptance o f  the burdens o f judgment. But it w ould be objectionable, because 
incom patible with her stated m otivation, for her to restrict scope in o ther ways. If, 
for example, she also excluded those individuals whose views were very right-wing, 
or those w hose eyes were blue, her view w ould no longer retain the attractions o f 
actual contractualism regardless o f  the appeal (for us, say) o f the m oral conception that 
popped  out at the end. To retain those attractions a theory m ust remain true to 
acmal contractualism ’s fundam ental m otivations— m this case appreciation o f the 
burdens o f  judgm ent. The non-acceptance o f those w ho m eet the condition 
m entioned  above, that is, m ust delegitrrmse proposed m oral conceptions.
This brings up once again the second puzzle for hybrid theorists that I raised at 
the end o f  C hapter 2. There, I said that a hybrid contractualist can consistently 
ignore the non-acceptance o f people who are unreasonable m the sense that they 
fail to recognise the reason that there is (that the m odal contractualist elem ent o f the 
hybrid mew takes there to  be) to find and comply with a m oral conception that each 
person actually accepts. O therw ise she seems to  allow w hat she takes to be unjust 
mews to contam inate the content o f justice. The difficulty is this: this further 
restriction in scope restricts the constituency o f those w hose acmal acceptance is
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necessary for a m oral conception to be just beyond the limits which follow from 
appreciation o f  the burdens o f judgment, the actual contractualist m otivation. So 
doesn’t the hybrid view fail, after all, to  incorporate the attraction o f acmal 
contractualism r Insofar as we are actual contractualists, shouldn’t we care about 
acceptance o f  p roposed  m oral conceptions by even those w ho aren’t reasonable in 
the m odal contractualist and Rawls’s first sense? I called this ‘the puzzle o f scope 
reconciliation’.
H ow ever, the hybrid view can be elaborated in a way that deals with this w orn '. 
To explain how  this can be done involyes explaining how  it can overcom e the other 
puzzle that I outlined at the end o f Chapter 2. This was the ‘arbitrariness puzzle’: 
w ithout the in troduction o f  factors about which their view provides no guidance, 
hybrid theories have no  determ inate outcom e, and any outcom e they have is from  
the theory’s po in t o f  H ew  arbitran'. The problem  anses precisely because o f the 
nature o f the first aspect o f  reasonableness, necessary from  a m odal contractualist 
po in t o f  n e w  for an m d m dual’s non-acceptance o f some m oral conception to give 
reasonable grounds for its rejection. Reasonable indinduals care about finding and 
complying with principles or moral conceptions that everyone can reasonably be 
expected to accept. A ccording to the burdens o f judgm ent, ind induals can 
reasonably be expected to accept only principles or m oral conceptions they actually 
accept. It is plausible to suppose that they actually accept only w hat does not 
conflict w ith their own m oral com m itm ents.13- But if  they are reasonable (m the 
first aspect) them selves— and notw ithstanding the puzzle o f  scope reconciliation, 
those w hose non-acceptance we have reason to care about will be— then this may 
m ake them  willing to alter their moral com m itm ents to m ake it possible to find
]5:1 say m ore about this m the following section.
142
principles that do no t conflict with anyone’s m oral com m itm ents. It will make them  
willing to do this if  they give the reason that they have to find and comply with such 
principles absolute or near-absolute weight. That bem g so, no  one reasonable will 
be firmly com m itted  to any m oral conception; her com m itm ent will depend on how  
other reasonable individuals’ moral mews turn out to  be. But they will be all in the 
same position. Therefore w ithout coordination no m oral conception will m eet the 
hybrid contractualist test. Yet the coordinating m echam sm s which could bring 
about that som e m oral conception meets the test seem to involve an inappropriate 
arbitrariness.
The arbitrariness puzzle is all the m ore puzzling in that the hybrid mew which 
produces it seems, as I po in ted  out in Chapter 2, to capture som ething that m odal 
contractualists wish to  claim for their theory. This is the idea that the fact o f 
reasonable individuals’ m otivation to find principles upon which all could 
reasonably be expected to agree makes a difference to the conten t o f  w hat all could 
reasonably be expected to agree upon. W hen the Individualist Restriction- 
respecting reasons that there are m support o f some principle or m oral conception 
are based on the relative levels o f well-being, or the non-arbitranness o f  d istribunon 
o f goods, for example, it seems that being m otivated to find and comply with 
principles based on those reasons is simply a m atter o f sufficient clear-sightedness 
and willingness; the reasons themselves are independent o f  w hether anyone is this 
clear-sighted or willing. So the m odal contractualists’ claim is no t justified. But 
hybrid theorists’ identification o f acmal non-acceptance as grounding a reason for 
the rejection o f  som e principle or moral conception changes this. Being m otivated 
to find principles and m oral conceptions that are best-supported  by die reasons that 
there are changes the reasons that there are because it subjects one o f the grounds o f 
reasonable rejection to possible change itself. A nd this captures very well what
m odal contractualists presum ably have in m ind when they claim that a reasonable 
individual is p repared to modify her claims in the light o f the reason that she has to 
find and comply w ith principles that everyone could reasonably be expected to 
accept.
The arbitrariness puzzle arises, evidently, w hen reasonable individuals give such 
weight to  the reason that they have to find and comply with principles that everyone 
could reasonably be expected to accept that they are ready to alter any o f their other 
m oral com m itm ents in any way at all in order to conform  to that reason. A 
solution, then, m ust plausibly recast the interaction betw een a reasonable person’s 
com m itm ent to conform  with that reason and her other m oral com m itm ents.
There are three desiderata. First— for it to be a solution to the puzzle in the first 
place— the result m ust be such that m ere coordination is no t normally sufficient for 
the hybrid contractualist test to produce a determ inate result: a just moral 
conception m ust be determ ined at least in part by the conten t o f individuals’ moral 
com m itm ents considered apart from  their com m itm ent to conform  with the reason 
that they have to find and comply with principles that everyone could reasonably be 
expected to accept. Indeed, the possibility m ust be left open that at least in 
p rin c ip l^n o  m oral conception w ould be jusyin some cases because no moral 
conception could secure the acmal acceptance o f all reasonable people. Second, 
recasting the interaction betw een a reasonable person’s m oral com m itm ents m ust 
involve giving sufficient weight to her com m itm ent to the m odal contractualist 
reason for her to  be counted by a hybrid theorist as reasonable in the first place. 
Som eone w ho acknowledges that reason bu t w ho is no t ready to  m odify claims 
deriving from  her o ther com m itm ents at all surely cannot be counted reasonable. If 
she were, the solution to the puzzle w ould com e at the cost o f  underm ining the 
hybrid view’s appeal. Finally, the recasting m ust nevertheless give sufficient weight
to reasonable individuals’ other m oral com m itm ents. I f  acknow ledgm ent o f the 
burdens o f  judgm ent forces us to accept that som eone may reasonably believe that 
extra ecclesiam nulla salus, then our description o f  the interaction betw een that belief 
and her acceptance o f the m odal contractualist reason m ust offer a plausible 
rendering o f  the idea that she really does believe that extra ecclesiam nulla salus, that this 
is a real m oral com m itm ent for her rather than an arbitrary starting poin t in the 
m odal contractualist negonanons. It is in satisfying this last desideratum  that the 
description I have been giving to draw out the puzzle in the first place fails.
W hat we need, then, is to relax the extent to which giving appropriate weight to 
the reason that she has to find and comply with principles that everyone could 
reasonably be expected to accept makes a reasonable person ready to abandon her 
o ther m oral com m itm ents. A hybrid theorist m ust be m odest in her claims about 
the weight o f the m odal contractualist reason: giving it absolute weight precludes 
the satisfaction o f  the first and third desiderata. But can she do this? Can she 
consistently affirm , that is, that we haye reason to find and comply with principles 
that everyone could reasonably be expected to accept and at the same time that this 
does n o t have absolute priority over the reason that we (take ourselves to) have to 
comply with principles that others could not reasonably be expected to accept? I 
think that she can and that she should. The revised Rawlsian hybrid n e w  is built in 
part on a recognition o f  the burdens o f judgm ent, a recognition that each o f us may 
reasonably take herself to  be bound to comply with m oral principles that others may 
reasonably reject. In  the context o f that recognition, the force o f  the hybrid 
theorist’s assernon that we all have reason to find and comply with principles or 
m oral conceptions that everyone can be reasonably expected to accept surely cannot 
be that it w ould be unreasonable for us to be anything other than ready to drop 
evert' com m itm ent that an appreciation o f  the burdens o f judgm ent shows that we
may reasonably have. But no r can it be that there is a specific degree by which we 
m ust alter our views to bring them  m ore into harm ony with o thers’. It is perfectly 
plausible to suppose that two people w ho see the moral landscape initially in exactly 
the same way m ight, in recogniuon o f the reason that they have to find and comply 
with principles that everyone can reasonably be expected to accept, modify their 
mews in different ways, to different degrees, and yet neither be complying m ore or 
less than the o ther with the modal contractualist reason.
Rather, the assertion that we all have reason to find and comply w ith principles 
or m oral conceptions that everyone can be reasonably expected to accept m ust, I 
think, be read as a plea for us to be ready to reconsider and perhaps m odify— but 
n o t simply ignore— those com m itm ents. Being reasonable in this sense is 
analogous to being reasonable in the realm o f aesthetic interpretation, for example: 
it is being willing to reconsider w hat one sees with a mew to appreciating (or trying 
to appreciate) w hat others see and perhaps adjusting one’s own im pressions as a 
result. But the result o f  our reconsidering our m oral com m itm ents, like the result o f 
reconsidering our interpretations o f music and paintings, may be that we do no t 
alter them  at all. A person may reasonably conclude that that she simply cannot 
change her position.
This offers a satisfying interpretation o f N agel’s com m ent that the unanim ity he 
is interested in is one “which could be achieved am ong persons in m any respects as 
they are, provided  they were also reasonable and com m itted w ithin reason to 
modifying their claims” .1 ^  The problem  for Nagel is that since he has identified 
already the considerations which count in favour o f p roposed  principles— relative 
well-being and ability to pursue one’s interests— and can determ ine, from these, the
l3? TP, p. 33.
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content o f a just m oral conception, the unanim ity he is interested is the unanimity 
o f a society in which everyone sees those same considerations, and gives them  the 
same weight, as Nagel him self does. The unanim ity the hybrid theorist is interested 
in is, by contrast, n o t som ething that can be know n in advance like this. For the 
extent to which som eone w ho is ready to reconsider and perhaps m odify her moral 
com m itm ents in appreciation o f the reason that she has to find and comply with 
principles that everyone can reasonably be expected to accept actually does modify 
those com m itm ents in appreciation o f that reason is no t som ething we can know 
w ithout finding out w hat she actually does. To repeat: there is no  specific am ount 
o f  m odification which is the am ount that is reasonable. So we really are interested 
in a unanim ity o f reasonable people, rather than in everyone’s com ing to see things 
as we do.
This also offers us a solution to the arbitrariness puzzle. The conten t o f a 
hybrid mew for a given society will no t be open to arbitrary determ ination in the 
sense that factors besides those privileged by the view itself (reasonableness, the 
reasonably differing m oral judgments o f individuals) will determ ine it. A 
coordinating m echanism  m ight be necessary to solve inform ation problem s, b u t it 
will not, now , also be the arbitrary determ inant o f which m oral conception is just. 
The m ew works as follows. The individuals whose actual non-acceptance is 
grounds for reasonable rejection o f a moral conception are those w ho  are 
reasonable in the following sens
the way they see the m oral landscape in the light o f o thers’ differing judgments 
about it and the reason that they take themselves to have to  find and comply with 
principles that everyone could reasonably be expected to accept.^ff^some moral 
conception cannot gain the acmal acceptance o f each person w ho is reasonable in 
this sense— if it is no t such that after reconsidering and perhaps m odifying their
er. they are ready to reconsider and perhaps modify
judgm ents about the m oral landscape each person is willing actually to accept it—  
then it is no t reasonable to  expect each person to accept it. W e have, however, no 
way o f  know ing in advance, even w hen we knowT what people’s m oral com m itm ents 
are apart from  their recognition o f the m odal contractualist reason, which m oral 
conception— if anv— will m eet this test. For how7 far it is reasonable to  m odify 
one’s m oral com m itm ents in recognition o f the m odal contractualist reason and 
o thers’ reasonably differing com m itm ents is no t som ething that can be knowu 
w ithout knowledge o f how  far a reasonable person actually does m odify her m oral 
com m itm ents in recognition o f these things.
It is this fact which explains how  the hybrid theorist can sidestep the puzzle o f 
scope reconciliation. The puzzle wyas that by restricting scope to those w ho take 
themselves to have reason to find and comply with a m oral conception that 
everyone can reasonably be expected to  accept the hybrid view' forgoes an 
im portant part o f  the attraction o f  acmal contractualism. For that restriction 
appears to  be at least in tension W'lth the underlying m onvation for caring about 
acmal acceptance in the first place: appreciation o f the burdens o f  judgment. As I 
claimed in C hapter 1, it makes sense for acmal contractualists to restrict scope in 
W'ays dictated by the m otivation for their acmal contractualism. But the further 
restriction to  those w ho take themselves to be subject to the m odal contractualist 
reason is n o t w arranted by anything inherent in the hybrid view7’s actual 
contractualism . A t best som ething seems to go missing; at w7orst the possibility is 
raised that the hybrid view' is internally inconsistent.
B ut the solution that I offered to the arbitrariness puzzle show's us how' w'e can 
get around the puzzle o f scope reconciliation too. The crucial elem ent in the 
solution to the arbitrariness puzzle is precisely the fact that acceptance o f the m odal 
contractualist reason does no t determ ine any specific degree to which a reasonable
person may reasonably be expected to modify her o ther m oral com m itm ents in the 
light o f the reason that she has to find and comply 'with principles that everyone can 
reasonably be expected to accept. |This means-7^1 re p e a t^ f iia t  for any given society 
the m oral com m itm ents o f any person w ho fulfils only the conditions set by a 
burdens-of-judgm ent-based actual contractualist specification o f  scope could be the 
same as those that she w ould affirm if she fulfilled also the full set o f  conditions set 
by the hybrid view ’s specification o f scope— even if as a m atter o f fact she does not 
fulfil the further condition o f acceptance o f the m odal contractualist reason which 
those full conditions include. INow note the following feature o f  the hybrid n e w
J
that I did no t dwell on w hen I introduced it m Chapter 2. A ccording to that view, a 
m oral conception is just if  it is reasonable to expect each person actually to accept it. 
I have concentrated  for the m ost part on one aspect o f this formula: that it is 
reasonable to expect a reasonable person to accept a moral conception just if she does 
actually accept it. But a second aspect is that it is reasonable to expect an 
unreasonable person  to accept a m oral conception no t if all reasonable people accept it, 
bu t rather if everyone accepts it or would accept it if they were reasonable. W e know  that 
we only have reason to care about individuals’ acmal acceptance insofar as they are 
reasonable. W e d o n ’t, that is, have reason to care about their acmal non-acceptance 
insofar as it is /^reasonable. But we do have reason to  care about w hat individuals 
could reasonably be expected to accept, which is w hat they w ould accept if they 
were reasonable; and as it now  turns out this gives us reason to care about the actual 
acceptance o f  even those wdio aren’t reasonable.1"4 For w hat these people could
154 This brings out the wav in which Rawls's modal contracrualism runs counter to the com mon 
supposition that (for Rawls) ' ‘unreasonable citizens are rightfully excluded from the constituency of
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reasonably be expected to accept— w hat they w ould accept if they were 
reasonable— might be just w hat they actually accept anyway.
To see this m ore clearly, com pare again a m ore straightforw ard m odal 
contractualism  according to which the absolute leyel o f well-being o f the w orst o ff
person, say, is w hat grounds the reasonable rejection and acceptance o f principles.
/ 0
Even som eone w ho is unreasonable in the sense fhat she fails to  recognise the
0 ' 
reason that she has to  comply with principles which maximise the absolute level o f
well-being o f  the w orst o ff person nevertheless does have reason to comply with
such principles. She has reason to do what she would do if she recognised this
reason. N ow  suppose that w hat she would do if she recognised this reason partially
determ ined the conten t o f  w hat she would have reason to do even if she did not
recognise it. Suppose, that is, that rather than entailing compliance with maximin
principles, recognising the reason that we have to find and comply with principles
that everyone can reasonably be expected to  accept entailed compliance with
principles that w ere partially determ ined by a com bination o f w hat e v e r y o n e  actually
would accept independently o f the m odal contractualist reason and their acceptance
o f  that reason itself. This, o f course, is w hat the hybrid view says. Again we w ould
have to  ask w hat everyone— even unreasonable people— would accept insofar as
they were reasonable. But the solution to the puzzle for hybrid theorists show ed us
that w hat unreasonable people would accept if and insofar as they were reasonable
m ight be no  different from  w hat they actually do accept. So although unreasonable
actual rejections, m sofar as they are unreasonable, are to be excluded from  the
determ ination o f  just m oral conceptions, that doesn’t in fact give us reason to
public justification” (Jonathan Q uong, “The Rights o f Unreasonable Citizens”, p. 314; cf. E nn  Kelly 
and Lionel M cPherson, “O n Tolerating the Unreasonable” .)
ignore, as a basis for reasonable rejection, the actual non-acceptance o f 
unreasonable people. Their acceptance m ust be sought as well: only then can we be 
sure that a m oral conception really does m eet the hybrid theorist’s contracm alist 
test. So we avoid the w orn ' that we are ignoring those w hom  our actual 
contracm alist m otivations give us reason n o t to ignore.
The heart o f  the hybrid theon ' and its contrast with straightforw ard m odal 
contractualism  rem ain intact in this picture. H ybnd theonsts think that w hat is just 
is w hat everyone can reasonably be expected to accept. But they also have the 
actual contracm alist in tuition that a moral conception’s conflict w ith a person’s all- 
things-considered m oral com m itm ents is grounds for the conclusion that she 
cannot reasonably be expected to accept it. The difficulty has been that a hybnd 
theonst’s com m itm ent to the reason (the ‘m odal contracm alist reason’) that we all 
have to find and comply with principles that eyeryone can reasonably be expected 
to accept implies that no t everyone’s non-acceptance o f some m oral conception on 
grounds o f its conflict w ith her all-things-considered m oral com m itm ents is grounds 
for saying that she cannot reasonably be expected to accept it. So we have had to 
w ork out w hat to say about people w ho don’t accept the m odal contracm alist 
reason; the worn* was that our conclusions w ould show that the hybrid view is not, 
after all, actual contracm alist in any way.
But the w orry was assuaged. Identification o f actual non-acceptance as the only 
grounds for reasonable rejection safeguards this view’s actual contractualism. 
Requiring that it be that o f reasonable people, or unreasonable people if they were 
reasonable, does n o t jeopardise it for two reasons. First, because, unlike on a 
straightforw ard m odal contracm alist view, no other grounds for the reasonable 
rejection o f a proposed  m oral conception are specified— such as the relative levels 
o f  well-being o f the least well-off, for example— die restriction to those w ho are
reasonable does no t make the acceptance condition a m ere proxy for such other 
grounds. A nd second, because the indeterm inate nature o f the difference that bemg 
reasonable m akes to a person’s aU-things-considered m oral com m itm ents means 
that we cannot say o f  any unreasonable person that she would, if she were 
reasonable, accept a m oral conception that she actually does no t accept, no  one is 
excluded from  the scope o f  those w hose acceptance is necessary for the justice o f a 
p roposed  m oral conception. The hybrid view really does com bine the attractions o f 
bo th  m odal and actual contractualism.
5. The hybrid view and acceptance
Before we turn to  C hapter 4 and the task o f connecting the hybnd fram ework with 
Rawls’s elaboration o f justice as fairness as a political conception, it remains for us 
to consider exactly how  the hybrid n e w  specifies the yanable o f acceptance (see 
Chapter 1, section 3). Evidently the salient fact about actual acceptance, for the 
burdens-of-judgm ent based ren sed  Rawflsian hybnd n ew , is that it indicates 
congruence betw een an individual’s moral outlook and the m oral conception bemg 
proposed, since the m oral conception bem g p r o p o s e r s  elaborated from basic ^  
elem ents shared by a l^ C o  the hybnd theorist’s assignm ent o f the yanable o f 
acceptance should reflect this. But traditional construals o f actual acceptance— in 
terms o f  consent, for example— w on’t do that. Even once we have constrained 
consent so that it is free, inform ed, considered, and so on— as even traditional 
actual contractualists may plausibly be said or m odified to do— there will remam the 
possibility that a person m ight consent to  som ething which conflicts with her own 
m oral new s. If  she were m a very weak bargaining position, for example, it might
make sense for her to consent (assuming that she understood  consent to be 
necessary for the im position o f a m oral conception) to a m oral concepnon that 
treated her or others in a way inconsistent with her own m oral views. But this 
w ould n o t be a case in which the Rawlsian hybnd view w ould say that the m oral 
conception that she consented to had been justified to her.
So we say instead that the hybnd view’s construal o f w hat it m eans for som eone 
to  accept a m oral conception should be som ething along the following lines: that 
she endorses a com prehensive m oral conception which includes or supports the 
grounds employed in the elaboranon o f that m oral conception. But two concerns 
that som eone m ight have about this are as follows. First, she m ight suspect that 
this construal o f  acceptance underm ines the actual contractualism  o f  the theory that 
employs it, rather as construing acceptance as som ething like ‘consent to the tru th ’ 
would. Second, even if she conceded that this construal o f actual acceptance was 
indeed actual contracm alist, she m ight nevertheless deny that it could be the 
foundation o f a plausible actual contractualist view. She m ight deny, that is, that 
there is any reason to  appeal to actual acceptance in this sense (as opposed to 
inform ed consent, for example) to jusufy the im posinon o f a m oral conception.
T o some extent, I have already laid out the materials for replies to these m o  
concerns in C hapter 1, section 3, and in section 3 o f the present chapter 
respectively, b u t it is w orth  pulling them  together here in order to make the replies 
clear. T o  begin w ith the first. As we saw in Chapter 1, actual contracm alist theories 
are legitimacy views, which is to say that they make the justice o f  a moral 
conception conditional upon its reflecting facts about the particular, distinct 
individuals that the society in question is com posed of. The fact about each 
individual that actual contractualists take to be im portant is the fact o f their acmal 
acceptance. They do this because they suppose that it is plausible to  invoke the fact
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o f an lndividuaTs actual acceptance in jusnfving the im position o f  the moral 
conception to  her, and they seek to justify the im position o f the m oral conception 
to each person individually.
N ow , appealing to individuals’ consent to the coercive im position o f a moral 
conception w ould have the obvious advantage, as a construal o f  actual acceptance, 
o f drawing on our everyday practice o f taking on obligations by consenting to them . 
But that doesn’t show that consent in some form  is the only plausible construal o f 
actual acceptance in an actual contracm alist theory. As I suggested, the essential 
po in t from  a structural po in t o f view is that w hat is invoked as justification to 
som eone for the im position o f  norm s upon her is an exercise o f her agency.
W ithout that, actual contractualism  ceases to  be distinct either from  legitimacy n ew s 
m ore generally or else from  regulative conception new s. For in that case its 
justification takes the form  o f  an appeal either simply to who the individual is or else 
to  the way the (moral) w orld is. This is w hat would be the problem  respectively 
with construing actual acceptance m term s o f m em bership o f such-and-such a 
family, for example, and with construing it in terms o f consent to the truth. The 
essential po in t can be respected, however, w ithout construing actual acceptance in 
term s o f  consent. A nd this is w hat construing actual acceptance in term s o f 
endorsem ent o f a set o f  m oral judgments does. Appealing to a person’s 
endorsem ent o f  these m oral judgments constitutes an appeal to w hat can be 
conceived as an exercise o f  her moral-epistemic agency: she endorses them , she judges 
them  to be true. (The idea o f the burdens o f judgm ent encourages this conception 
o f us as m oral-epistem ic agents.)
The question then is: is this som ething that can b e plausibly appealed to in order 
to justify to som eone the im position o f  a given m oral conceptions Part o f the 
worry here is assuaged simply by pointing out that a p erson ’s endorsem ent o f
principles and values is, because o f  the norm ative nature o f these things, endorsem ent 
o f their im plem entanon. If  som eone endorses a set o f principles and values, with 
their norm ative im plicanons which include, sometim es, the leginmacY o f coercion in 
accordance w ith o ther principles in the set, then she just does endorse the 
norm anve implications. This is simply w hat is involved in endorsing the principles 
and values.0 '
But a m ore challenging worry is that a person’s endorsem ent o f a set o f 
principles and values w o n ’t stand as grounds for the justification o f the im position 
o f  a m oral conception that can be elaborated from  them  in the way that her 
endorsem ent o f the m oral conception i/W/ would, because she doesn’t actually 
endorse the m oral conception itself even if  she would were she to think about it 
carefully, say. This is m ore challenging because it calls into question, after all, the 
actual contracm alist nature o f  the hybnd view, as follows. I f  it’s no t the case that a 
person (call her S) actually endorses, in some sense, anything that can be elaborated 
in a way that follows from  her conception o f  the principles and values that she 
actually endorses (call these PY), then we seem to  be presented with the following 
dilemma. E ither (a) we justify the im position on S o f a m oral concepnon (call this 
MC) which is elaborated in a way that follows from  her conception o f  PY by appeal 
to the fact o f  her endorsem ent o f PY even though PY is no t MC; or (b) we justify 
the im position on S o f MC by appeal to the fact that she w ould have to  endorse MC 
if she considered the m atter, given that MC follows from  PY. The trouble with (a) 
is that it appears less plausible than (b); the trouble with (b) is that it’s no t obviously
1=51 do not assume, in saying this, that some form of motivational mternalism is true. Endorsing a 
principle is endorsing its norm ative implications, but that does not entail being motivated to comply 
with it. It entails endorsem ent o f the proposition that one ought to comply with it.
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a justification which appeals to anything consumable as actual acceptance— it 
doesn’t seem, that is, to appeal to any acmal exercise o f S’s agency. For S may never 
have considered the matter. It would make our theory too  dem anding to suppose 
that justice cannot be achieved until we bnng  each person to consider w hether they 
endorse, as part o f  their m oral outlook, the moral conception that we w ant to 
impose.
H ow ever, there is in fact no dilemma here. In appealing to the fact that S w ould 
have to  endorse MC if she considered the m atter, given that MC follows from  PY, 
we are appealing to  the fact o f  her acmal acceptance— of PY. Given that S m ight 
reasonably not accept PY, our justification o f the im posinon o f MC m ust appeal to 
her acmal acceptance o f  PY in order to work. (This was the poin t that followed 
from  the burdens o f  judgment: recall the example o f the buyers for the art 
museum.) As I em phasised above, the essential feature o f acmal contractualism  is 
that justification o f  the im position o f a m oral concepuon on som eone appeals to an 
exercise o f her agency. That is w hat determines w hether or no t it is acmal 
contracm alist. W hether the n e w  is plausible or no t is a different question, and that 
depends on how  plausible the particular appeal that we make to the particular 
exercise o f  a person’s agency is. My claim is that it is plausible to appeal to the 
actual exercise o f S’s agency that is involved in her endorsem ent o f  PY, with its 
internal connecnon  to MC, to justify the im position o f MC on S. This is n o t a far­
fetched claim. In a different context, Ronald D w orkin claims that
[i]f a doctor finds a m an unconscious and bleeding, for example, it m ight be 
im portant for him  to ask w hether the m an w ould consent to a transfusion if he 
were conscious. I f  there is every reason to think that he would, that fact is 
im portant in justifying the transfusion if  the patient la te r .. .condem ns the doctor
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for having p ro ceed ed ... [Tjhe patient’s hypothencal agreem ent shows that his 
wiU was inclined tow ard the decision at the time and in the circumstances that 
the decision was taken. H e has lost nothing bv n o t bem g consulted at the 
appropriate time, because he would have consented if he had been .136
N ow  D w orkin is ng h t about the plausibility o f the justification, bu t m istaken to 
suppose that the key poin t is the patient’s hypothetical agreement. W ho knows 
w hat he would have agreed to  had he been conscious? Perhaps he is a highly 
irrational m an. Perhaps he w ould have taken a n o le n t dislike to the doctor.
Perhaps the bleeding w ould have underm ined his ability to think straight. W hat’s 
really underlying D w orkin’s reasoning is the idea that the patien t’s actual acceptance o f
a certain outlook (‘'his will was inclined toward the decision”) can plausibly be
/   . . .  ’ ,
appealecy to in justifying acting in accordance with principles that foDow from  that
outlook.^A nd this is precisely my claim also. j
Som eone m ight object to this as follows. S could, in response to the attem pted
justification o f  MC by appeal to her acceptance o f  PY, claim: “bu t I never accepted,
and d o n ’t accept, A40.” Since this could be true, and the failure to accept MC not
irrational (it’s no t irrational, for example, no t to consider every implication o f the
principles and values that one affirms), surely it’s the case that we can’t simply go
ahead and im pose MC anyway, claiming to be justified on acmal contracm alist
grounds?
This seems right. But it doesn’t underm ine the plausibility o f  an appeal to S’s 
acceptance o f  PY if S hasn't claimed that she doesn’t accept MC. (If she never 
considers the question, for example.) A nd it doesn’t alter the fact that that appeal is
l3fj Dworkin, “The Original Position’', p. 19.
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an appeal to S’s actual acceptance and therefore part o f an actual contracm alist strategy 
o f justification. It underm ines the plausibility o f  the appeal to S’s acceptance o f PY 
only in the case w here S does offer the non-acceptance claim.
In this latter case, meanwhile, it is no t clear how  we should proceed. I t’s no t 
obvious that the acmal contracm alist justification that appeals to S’s acceptance of 
PY has been show n to be altogether implausible. After all, S does, ex hypothesis 
accept PY, and all o ther things equal it is plausible to appeal to  her acceptance o f 
PY in justifying the im position o f a moral conception which follows from  it. The 
problem  is that it’s also the case that she rejects MC, and this seems to  underm ine 
the plausibility o f  the PY -based justification.
The norm s o f rationality' apply to S, however, and so if MC really does follow 
from  PY, the onus is upon  S either to affirm MC in the light o f her acceptance o f 
PY or else to reconsider PY given her rejection o f MC. The burdens o f judgment 
show us how  it can be reasonable to differ from  others in one’s judgments about 
the moral landscape, b u t they do no t excuse inconsistency. There is, however, no 
clear reason to  suppose that S ought to take one or the o ther o f these two routes. 
Perhaps MC includes principles which appear to her so plainly w rong tha |4he  I Y "  
thinks she m ust revise her acceptance o f PY. O n the o ther hand, she might, in 
appreciation o f  the fact that MC follows from  PY, decide that her rejection o f MC 
was a mistake. So there is no  clear reason to suppose that we ought to privilege her 
endorsem ent o f  PY  over her rejection o f MC or vice-versa in thinking about the 
justification o f  the im position o f MC. W e are in a position analogous to that o f the 
children o f a m an w ho, days before his death bu t lucid and apparently rational, 
verbally disinherits one o f  them — for reasons which date back decades— but who 
discover, shortly after his death, a recently-made will which divides his estate equally 
am ong all o f  them . The legal question here may have a clear answer, but the moral
one surely does not: justification o f either an equal division or the exclusion o f the 
verbally disinherited child from any inheritance could with some plausibility be 
m ade by appeal to  w hat the father actually accepted.
In the case o f the dead man, nothing further can be done to  determ ine w hat 
division o f  his estate would be justified. But in the case o f som eone w ho has 
expressly rejected a moral conception which is elaborated in a way that follows from 
principles and values that she endorses, we can wait to see w hether she changes her 
m ind about w hich principles and values she accepts or w hether instead she changes 
her m ind about the rejection. A nd since she has now raised the question o f her 
own acceptance o f  the relevant m oral conception and is faced with the fact o f the 
inconsistency o f her position, it seems to m e plausible to suppose that if, after a 
reasonable period, she has effected no change in the principles and values that she 
endorses, we may take that to constitute tacit acceptance o f  the moral conception 
that she rejected. O n the o ther hand, if she effects a change in the principles and 
values that she endorses, then our acmal contractualist justification m ust plausibly 
appeal to her acceptance o f the new principles and values if  it is to succeed. In the 
m eantim e, we may say that the justice o f the moral conception in question is 
indeterm inate. B ut this indeterminacy, because short-lived, does not create a great 
problem  for the hybnd view.
To repeat: none o f this underm ines the plausibility o f the acmal contractualist 
justification by appeal to S’s acceptance o f PY in the case w here she does not 
consider the question o f  her acmal acceptance o f MC itself. This will be the case 
for many people (m ost people don ’t spend m uch time thinking about the 
justification o f  the polm cal order at all). It does bnng  out die fact that the type o f 
acmal contracm alist jusuficanon that underlies the hybnd view is no t once-and-for- 
all in the way that a justificanon which appeals to a person’s having consented is.
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C onsent cannot be undone, whereas a person can alter her m oral com m itm ents and 
so underm ine a justification which appealed to them. But I think that this, if 
anything, is a virtue o f the hybrid new . It interprets individualistic justification as 
an ongoing process, answerable to individuals as they are, no t as they once were. 
N evertheless, this is, because it appeals to an actual exercise o f agency on the part o f 
S, a genuinely acmal contractualist interpretation o f the individualistic ideal.
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Rawls’s political liberalism answers ‘yes’ to the following question: can we develop 
justice as fairness in such a way that when we come to ask the question o f stability, 
we can answer that justice as fairness is stable for the right reasons? A ccording to 
the hybrid contracm alist reading o f Rawls that I developed in Chapter 3, this answer 
is determ ined by w hether or no t justice as fairness can secure the acmal acceptance, 
construed in term s o f endorsem ent o f  the fundam ents o f  the political conception o f 
justice as fairness, o f each m em ber o f society, justice as fairness m ust pass an acmal 
contracm alist test.
In this chapter and the next, I draw on elements o f Rawls’s argum ent in P L  to 
justify the expectation that justice as fairness, and m ore particularly its 
egalitarianism, can indeed pass the acmal contracm alist test that the Rawlsian hybnd 
framework sets. This will involve three distinct tasks. The first two, which I set 
about in this chapter, are as follows. First, I discuss the grounds supplied by
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Rawls’s ‘political constructivist’ strategy for supposing that justice as fairness can 
secure the support o f the range o f com prehensive doctrines likely to persist in a 
pluralist liberal society. In section 2 o f Chapter 3 above I no ted  that Rawls’s 
intention in discussing the overlapping consensus at length in PL, is to illustrate, and 
not merely assert, that support for justice as fairness leaves room  for a variety o f 
accounts o f the realms o f non-political values. Here I survey, then, the various 
illustrations that he provides and connect them  to the m ore am bitious acmal 
contractualist test that I advocate. I suggest that political liberalism’s shallow 
foundations and limited applicability clear some o f the obstacles to  an overlapping 
consensus o f all com prehensive doctrines. But w hat fundamentally explains the 
expectation that justice as fairness passes the acmal contracm alist test is a variant o f 
part o f Theory's ‘congruence’ argum ent together with illustrations o f the way in 
which different com prehensive doctrines support the values o f the political 
conception o f justice as fairness and, finally, the idea that the values o f the political 
realm  have a certain inbuilt priority over other values.
M uch o f this explanation o f how  justice as fairness can pass the acmal 
contracm alist test relies upon the distinctive way in which Rawls approaches the 
question in the first place. W hen Rawls asks about the likelihood o f individuals’ 
acceptance— w hen he considers the likelihood o f an overlapping consensus on the 
political conception o f justice as fairness— he asks about the likelihood that
acceptability in the abstract. This ‘head-first’ approach contrasts with many acmal 
contracm alist approaches, which, if they specify die m otives o f  the contracting
13 ■ See PT, pp. 140-1.
individuals in a society already shaped by justice as fairness will accept it.1" That is
w hat it m eans to  ask about the stability o f justice as fairness rather than its
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parties at all, take them  to be those o f individuals shaped by and seeking escape 
from  the snpulated moral backdrop.l3h It also contrasts, o f  course, with non-actual 
contracm alist approaches to justice. Such approaches may concern themselves with 
stability, bu t obviously no t stability in any sense which entails an acmal 
contractualist test as opposed to, say, the assurance that conditions in a society 
governed on their conception w ould not deteriorate to  a state o f civil war.
(Consider, for example, the kind o f interest a utilitarian m ight have in the stability o f 
utilitarianism.)
This approach has some clear disadvantages. Forem ost am ong them  is that it 
invites the charge that its stability, if indeed it is stable, is o f no particular value, 
since just about any m oral conception might be stable once there was no one left in 
society w ho w asn’t shaped by (or brainwashed into accepting) it. Dealing with this 
charge is the second o f the two tasks which I address in this chapter. I consider 
four form s o f the objection that the stability for the right reasons o f justice as 
fairness is based on indoctrination. I argue in reply that justice as fairness is no t 
reliant, first, upon anyone’s having (by its standards) false beliefs or, second, upon 
anyone’s failing to think through her beliefs. N or does it rely, third, upon 
individuals’ acting against their own interests. And, fourth, it does no t rely upon  a 
version o f  the acmal contracm alist test that is set against the w rong background. I 
conclude therefore that the indoctrination objection fails.
But the Rawlsian "head-first’ approach also has im portant advantages. So long 
as it can deal w ith the charge o f indoctrination, it allows us to draw on plausible
138 This is how  I read H obbes, Locke, and Nozick (see Chapter 1). Rawls w ould dispute my reading 
o f Hobbes, w hom  he (tentatively ] interprets as adopting the head-first approach. See lectures on the 
History of Political Philosophy, pp. 30-4.
principles concerning individuals’ moral developm ent under the kinds o f institutions 
that justice as fairness requires to help explain why individuals’ acmal acceptance, in 
the sense we seek, w ould be forthcom ing. In other words: we can m ake use o f 
m uch o f the theonsing  about individuals’ m oral psychological developm ent that is 
familiar from  Part III o f Theory. M oreover, whereas traditional acmal contracm alist 
theories can rely on at best only inform ed guesses about the m otives o f the 
contracting parties, shrouded in the mists o f the pasts as these people, the moral 
backdrop, and their contract m ust be, Rawls’s answer to the question w hat each 
person actually accepts is inform ed by our own experience o f liberal institutions. 
(Indeed, the problem  with Theory as Rawls sees it is precisely that individuals w ho 
are brought up under liberal institutions cannot reasonably be expected to endorse 
the same com prehensive doctrine. This is a prem ise that we are prepared to grant 
because we have first-hand evidence for it as well as because o f its moral- 
psychological plausibility.) \XTien we ask Rawls’s question o f stability* for the right 
reasons, then, we ask it w ith a reasonable hope o f an inform ed answer. W e are 
familiar with the range o f com prehensive doctrines that individuals affirm in liberal 
societies and therefore well positioned to judge the likelihood o f their hypothetically 
consenting to various proposed moral conceptions.1"9
The challenge that faces us is therefore som ew hat different from  that which 
faces traditional actual contracmalists— even dual/m ixed condition acmal 
contracm alists w hose theories display the kind o f unity I talked about m Chapter 1. 
For although they too are interested in the moral com m itm ents o f  each individual,
1i'J Cf. Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case o f Epistemic Abstinence” . p. 6. Raz writes that the fact that 
Rawls’s “firm starting point is the society o f the here and now ” is “one o f die very attractive features 
o f his position.”
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and present their argum ents as m oral argum ents which w ould m otivate each 
individual to consent to  the moral conception they advocate, the basis for their 
hypothesis o f individual acmal acceptance o f those argum ents is speculative at best. 
Individuals, though they may be alike in fundam ental nature, differ widely in their 
conceptions o f  values, needs, and goods. We m ight hope for m ore from  those with 
acmal contracm alist com m itm ents than the m ere assertion that everyone will or did, 
as a m atter o f  fact, accept their regulative conception view in the first place. And 
this is w hat we find in Rawlsian political liberalism, which aims to  show how  the 
basis o f justice as fairness is actually endorsed by people like us— people w ho affirm 
the various com prehensive doctrines that persist in liberal societies.
The third task which m ust be com pleted in order to justify the expectation that 
justice as fairness’s egalitarianism can pass the acmal contracm alist test set by the 
Rawlsian hybrid contractualist fram ework is to show that it is plausible to attribute 
to each individual the specific interpretations o f the elements out o f which the 
political conception o f justice as fairness is built that are necessary to sustain the 
difference principle. This I attem pt to do in Chapter 5 below.
2. The problem of practical conflict
The idea o f  the overlapping consensus is that a variety o f com prehensive doctrines 
endorse the political conception o f justice as fairness— the moral conception w hose 
essential feature is Rawls’s familiar two principles o f justice— “each from  its own 
point o f view” .16,1 Each person who is part o f the overlapping consensus affirms a 
com prehensive doctrine from  which she derives reasons to support the political
160 PL, p. 134.
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conception o f justice as fairness. For the Rawlsian hybrid contractualism  I have 
been developing, this overlapping consensus m ust be a consensus o f all m em bers o f 
society (see C hapter 3, section 4 above). That is w hat the thoroughgoing Rawlsian 
acmal contractualist test requires.
N otice the difference between the idea that each person affirms m oral grounds 
which provide support for the political conception and die idea that each person 
merely derives reasons for her to support the political conception from  her 
com prehensive doctrine. This latter is no t the foundation for an overlapping 
consensus. The idea o f an overlapping consensus is that values from  each different 
com prehensive doctrine provide direct support for the substance o f the political 
conception o f justice as fairness, no t merely that each different com prehensive 
doctrine gives its adherent reason to support the political conception. For the latter 
is consistent with an understanding o f the political conception as w orth supporting, 
for example, until such time as it is possible to replace it w ith a conception o f justice 
expressive o f the values o f the com prehensive doctnne in question. If  everybody 
affirm ed the political conception o f justice as fairness only for this reason, what 
w ould obtain w ould be a m ere modus mvendv. a state in which parties are “ready to 
pursue their goals at the expense o f ... otherjs], and should conditions change ... 
may do so” .161 A modus mvendi would not be a state in which the kind o f actual 
acceptance that we are interested in is secure. The kind o f acmal acceptance that we 
are interested in requires an alignment o f a person’s moral com m itm ents and the 
proposed m oral conception .16'  The form er should support the latter, or at least not 
conflict with it. In an overlapping consensus, the political conception and its
161 PL, p. 14".
162 See my discussion o f ‘unified' dual condition actual contractualism in Chapter 1 above.
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account o f  justice and the political virtues are justified on the basis o f moral 
grounds to  individuals w ho actually accept those moral grounds.16"
If  the overlapping consensus is secured, that will represent a trium ph in the face 
o f the following problem . A com prehensive doctrine implies a set o f  m oral values, 
principles, and requirem ents that run across the board to cover m ost (if no t all) 
actions, relationships, and situations.164 That includes the political actions, 
relationships, and situations o f the basic structure o f  society. The political 
conception o f  justice as fairness, meanwhile, entails at least some values, principles, 
and requirem ents o f its own, although these are restricted in applicability to the 
basic structure. G iven the wide range o f comprehensive doctrines that we find in 
liberal societies such as that engendered by the m stituuons o f justice as fairness 
itself, it is natural to suppose that the chief obstacle to an overlapping consensus will 
be conflict betw een the values, principles, and requirem ents o f justice as fairness 
and those o f at least some o f those com prehensive doctrines. In particular, justice 
as fairness may require that the world be one way while individuals’ comprehensive 
doctrines require that it be another. It will therefore fail the acmal contracm alist 
test. This is the problem  o f practical conflict.
W e have seen (m Chapter 3, section 2) that the point o f developing the political 
conception in accordance with the strategy o f political constructivism  is to address 
the problem  o f  practical conflict as it arises with com prehensive conceptions o f 
justice such as that o f  the Kantian Interpretation o f justice as fairness from  Theofj. 
But political constructivism  does no t suffice on its own to show that the 
overlapping consensus can be secured. The overlapping consensus requires not just
163 See PL, p. 142
164 See PL, pp. 11-5, and Chapter 3, section 2 above.
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1 1
that practical conflict be less likely bu t that it be ehmmated^jJTns is why it is so 
im portant that the polmcal concepnon has no t only shallow bu t shared foundanons. 
Shallow foundations and limited applicability clear the way for an overlapping 
consensus by eliminating certain clear grounds for supposm g that the overlapping 
consensus couldn't be secured.163 If  they are n o t stressed, we m ight suppose that 
w hat is bem g proposed  is a com prehensive conception o f justice. But they aren’t 
sufficient on their own to show that the overlapping consensus would be secured 
under justice as fairness.
Y et for all we have seen so far, the assernon o f the shared foundations o f the 
political conception is no m ore than an assertion. Shallow foundations and limited 
applicability help to explain why we shouldn’t contradict it outright. But they don ’t 
vindicate it. So w hat does?
3. S hared premises and the priority of justice
Tw o m oves are necessary to solve the problem  o f practical conflict. The first is to 
attribute, plausibly, endorsem ent o f the elem ents o f the public political culture out 
o f  which justice as fairness m its political presentation is constructed to each 
m em ber o f  society. W e m ust argue not only that they are to be found m the public 
political culture b u t also that the public political culture— at least insofar as it 
includes these elem ents— is part o f or implicitly supported  by the norm ative views 
o f the individuals w hose acceptance we are m terested in. O therw ise there is no 
reason to expect the shallowness o f the foundations o f the political conception to
165 As does epistermc abstinence (see Chapter 3, section 2, note 103 above) if we are prepared to 
grant what I called the doctrine o f the em beddedness o f truth.
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be sufficient for its non-conflict with individuals’ com prehensive doctrines. The 
first m ove, then, is to show that the pohucal concepnon has shared foundations. 
The second m ove is to show no t onlv that these elements are shared in this wav but 
that the conception o f justice which is constructed out o f them  will have priority 
over other elem ents in individuals’ moral views. Otherwise there is no  reason to 
suppose that w hen w hat justice as fairness requires and what other values that a 
person affirm s require conflict, as they may even if a person affirms the elements o f 
the public political culture out o f which the polmcal conception is constructed, 
individuals will come down on the side o f justice as fairness.
Rawls makes bo th  o f  these moves. The first is partly constituted by his 
endorsem ent o f  a broader version o f part o f Theory s argum ent that justice as 
fairness “generates its own support.” 166 Rawls supposes that according to plausible 
principles o f the psychology o f m oral developm ent and o f hum an nature, m em bers 
o f a Rawlsian society would com e to endorse justice as fairness.16 Scanlon calls the 
argum ent for this conclusion a “purely factual or causal argum ent” .168 It appeals to 
the consistency o f justice as fairness with empirically plausible principles concerning 
the way in which children develop m oral sentiments. In PL, Rawls advances an 
argum ent to the effect no t only that individuals will have a sense o f justice but that 
they will see them selves and society in the term s which underlie the political 
conception. H e draws in his elaboration o f this argum ent on the idea o f a
166 Theory, p. 1 154.
1(r See Theory, §T0-~’3 ° f  die psychology o f moral development) and C~4 (human nature^
as well as § (p 5 -T  (both). (This is onlv a rough classification o f the subject m atter o f the relevant 
sections.)
168 Scanlon, “Rawls on justification”, p. 158. H enceforth I shall call it the ‘causal-factual argument'.
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‘conception-dependent desire’, a desire to act on principles which are understood as 
part o f a political ideal:161
Plainly, for us the main case is the ideal o f citizenship as characterized in justice 
as fairness. The structure and content o f this conception o f  justice lay out how, 
by the use o f the original position, the principles and standards o f justice for 
society’s basic m stm iuons belong to and help to articulate the conception o f 
reasonable and rational citizens as free and equal. Thus we have an ideal o f 
citizens as such p e rso n s .. .not only are citizens norm al and fully cooperating 
m em bers o f society, bu t further they want to be, and to be recognized as, such 
m em bers .. .they w ant to realize in their person, and have it recognized that they 
realize, that ideal o f  citizens. [...]
Thus, the account o f justice as fairness connects the desire to realize a 
political ideal o f citizenship with citizens’ two moral powers and their norm al 
capacities, as these are educated to that ideal by the public culture and its 
historical traditions o f in terpretation.1
So individuals come to want to be and be seen to be citizens according to the 
political conception’s articulation o f citizens because the institutions o f justice as 
fairness engender that desire in them. As long as the m oral psychology winch this 
relies upon is plausible, this is a perfectly reasonable expectauon.1 1 N otice that the
1 ('<J Rawls takes this idea from Nagel. See his The Possibility o].Altruism, pp. 2~-~6.
!7<‘ PL, pp. 84-6.
r i  Rawls stresses that the moral psycholog}' o f this argument is ‘philosophical not psychological’ (PL, 
pp. 86-8). But that does not mean that it is immune to considerations of empirical plausibility. 
Rawls’s point is that we are not constrained to identify and use some empirical account o f human
argum ent implies individual acceptance o f the fundam ental conceptions o f person 
and society which the poliucal conception articulates. Individuals w ould come to 
see themselves in a way which is necessarily articulated in term s o f  the political 
conception, which itself involves the object conception o f society as a fair system of 
cooperation betw een citizens seen as free, equal, reasonable, and rational (see 
Chapter 3, section 2 above). Thus this argum ent involves the attribution to 
individuals o f  the ‘fundam ental ideas’.
W e need n o t rely only upon Rawls’s conjectures about the m oral psychology o f 
individuals in the Rawlsian society in order to grant the attribution o f the 
fundam ental ideas. Rawls often voices the thought that the fundam ental ideas 
derive from  “the main m oral and philosophical conceptions o f a constitutional 
dem ocratic regim e” .1 " They are part o f the nature o f the enterprise o f society itself 
as it is understood in democratic cultures3 ’ That understanding o f society' brings in its 
train the fundam ental ideas, including the appropriate conception o f those involved 
and on w hat kinds o f  terms they should base their in teractions.1 4 We are not 
constrained, therefore, only to imagine the self-understanding that w ould be 
prevalent in a Rawlsian society. We can also look at our own m ore-or-less liberal,
nature as the basis o f our view. We are constrained onlv to respect the limits set by hum an nature.
As he writes: “W hether [this moral psycholog}'] is correct for our purposes depends on whether we 
can leam and understand it, on whether we can apply and affirm its principles and ideals in poliucal 
life, and on w hether we find the poliucal conception o f lusuce to which it belongs acceptable on due 
reflection. H um an nature and its natural psycholog}' are permissive: they may limit the viable 
conceptions o f persons and ideals o f citizenship, and the moral psychologies that may support them, 
but do no t dictate the ones we m ust adopt.” 
r2 PL, p. xli.
See e.g. PL, p. 38, n. 41.
1 4 See PL, p. 301.
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m ore-or-less dem ocratic surroundings. (As I pointed  out above, this is one o f  the 
great advantages o f the Rawlsian approach.) A nd the fact that there is a great deal 
o f disagreem ent am ong us about exactly w hat contested ideals such as fairness 
require should n o t blind us to the plausibility o f supposing that we do indeed share 
the view that society is, or ought to  be, a fair cooperative system am ong equals 
conceived as free and capable o f cooperation and the pursuit o f  conceptions o f the 
good.
Because the fundam ental ideas and their elaboration are com ponents in a theory 
o f justice with shallow foundations, attributing them  to individuals w ho grow up 
under justice as fairness’s institutions is compatible with attributing divergent 
fundam ental m oral com m itm ents to those individuals as well. People may affirm 
the fundam ental ideas bu t also affirm other moral values and principles which may 
at times come into conflict w ith those o f the political conception. To show that 
such conflicts will no t arise, or that if they do arise the values o f the political win 
out, the second o f the two m oves required to solve the practical conflict objection 
m ust still be made. As Rawls says:
[W]e need the second, and complementary, part o f the answer to how  political 
liberalism is possible. This part says that the history o f religion and philosophy 
shows that there are many reasonable ways in which the wider realm  o f values 
can be understood  so as to b l i t h e r  congruent with, or supportive of, or else 
no t in conflict w ith, the values appropriate to  the special domain o f the political 
as specified by a political conception o f justice^ftiistory tells o f a plurality o f no t
unreasonable com prehensive doctrines. This makes an overlapping consensus 
possible, thus reducing the conflict betw een the political and other values. ?
As I said above (section 2) the kind o f support that the values o f the political 
conception are supposed to get from the ‘wader realm o f values’ as interpreted by 
different individuals in Rawlsian society is itself moral. The values are supposed to 
give us reason to  endorse the political conception— not merely to uphold  it until 
such tim e as we can im pose a political order which is m ore suited to our 
fundam ental com m itm ents.1 6 So the substance o f the second m ove required to 
solve the practical conflict objection is to a degree a m atter o f examining the lands 
o f com prehensive doctrines likely to persist in a Rawlsian society' and asking 
w hether they include grounds for support and prioritisation o f the values o f the 
political conception. This task can be approached in two (complementary) ways, 
bo th  o f which can be found in TL. First, we can run through a range o f likely 
com prehensive doctrines and ask w hether they include values which w ould give 
som eone w ho affirmed them  grounds to affirm the values o f the political 
conception. Second, we can consider the values o f the political conception itself 
and ask wdiether they do no t have their priority built into them  in some sense.
Rauds offers a schematic overview7 o f the first o f  these approaches in a short 
survey o f  the com prehensive doctrines in his ‘m odel case’ o f the overlapping 
consensus.1 These are a “religious doctrine” with an “account o f free faith” ; “a 
com prehensive liberal m oral doctrine such as those o f K ant or Mill” ; the
1-5 P L
1 6 See PL, pp. 14~-8.
r " The model case is introduced at PL, p. 145. The survey is at pp. 168-T .
utilitarianism o f Bentham  and Sidgwick; and an unsvstem anc view which includes 
bo th  the freestanding political conception and “a large family o f nonpolitical values” 
in which “each su b p a rt.. .has its own account based on ideas drawn from  within it, 
leaving all values to be balanced against one another, either in groups or singly, in 
particular kinds o f cases.”1 8 Rawls sets out a moral basis to be found within each 
doctrine apart from  the religious doctnne for a person to endorse a liberal poliucal 
concepuon, stressing that “ [n]o one accepts the poliucal concepuon driven by 
poliucal com prom ise” .1 J O f  religious doctrines he says only that “ I shall suppose—  
perhaps too optimisncally— that, except for certain kinds o f fundam entalism , all the 
main historical religions admit o f [an account o f free faith]” .18" This survey would 
plainly be inadequate as a full explanauon o f the basis o f the overlapping consensus. 
Rawls intends it merely as an example, however, designed “to illustrate some o f the 
possible relauons betw een com prehensive views and a political conception.”181 So 
he does not take him self here to have explained exactly how  the political 
concepuon— that is, justice as fairness in its poliucal construcuvist guise— is related 
to the various com prehensive doctrines in a Rawlsian society. B ut we see how 
diversity in com prehensive doctrines needn ’/ entail conflict with the poliucal 
concepuon (or at least its principles). Nevertheless, m ore still m ust be said.
O ne reason that Rawls offers but that the n e w  that I recom m end cannot accept, 
o f course, is that reasonable individuals accept liberal principles straightforwardly as 
a consequence o f  their acceptance o f the burdens o f judgment. I have argued that 
Rawls’s derivation o f the basic liberues from  the burdens o f judgm ent is a mistake.
1 ;8 PL, pp. 145 and 169.
179 PL, p. 171.
180 PL, p. 170.
181 PL, p. n o .
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However, insofar as it is supposed to be a consideration in favour o f the 
overlapping consensus and therefore stability for the right reasons, one assum ption 
that this m istaken conclusion relies upon is som ething we can accept. That 
assum ption is that there are many reasonable individuals: many, and many m ore 
than there are unreasonable in d in  duals. For as we know, Rawls takes the fact o f 
reasonable pluralism  as a given.18'  A nd he takes political liberalism to be addressed 
to reasonable individuals: an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness among 
them is its aim .181 So if justice as fairness can secure stability for the right reasons, it 
is for the right reasons because o f the overlapping consensus am ong reasonable 
people. But it is stability because, presumably, the presence o f unreasonable 
individuals w ho are no t covered by the consensus is nevertheless insufficient to 
bring about instability. Rawls writes o f unreasonable views that “there will always 
be such new s. But they may no t be strong enough to underm ine the substantive 
justice o f the regime. That is the hope; there can be no guarantee.”18" \Xhat justifie 
even the hope? Ultimately, it is Rawls’s view that individuals simply are (in the 
main) reasonable, that we can take this as basic. Endorsing Scanlon’s idea that we 
are simply are m oved by the reason that we have to find and comply with principles 
that no  one could reasonably reject, Rawls writes that “in setting out justice as 
fairness we rely on the kind o f m otivation Scanlon takes as basic.” 18” As we saw 
earlier, Rawls sees bo th  aspects o f his conception o f  reasonableness —  
acknowledgm ent o f  the burdens o f judgm ent and the desire to find and comply
182 See e.g. PL, p. 36.
183 Rawls explicitly says this at PL, p. 36.
184 PL, p. 65.
185 PL, p. 50, n. 2 (earned over from p. 49).
with principles that each person could reasonably be expected to accept— as “two 
related expressions o f this desire” .186
\Khat this m eans from the point o f view o f  our reconstruction o f  Rawls’s 
egalitarianism on a hybrid contractualist foundation is this. I f  we can follow Rawls 
in taking the attribution o f reasonableness to m ost individuals as a given, then we 
can take it as a given that m ost individuals are ready to reconsider and perhaps 
modify their fundam ental m oral com m itm ents, the way they see the moral 
landscape, in the light o f others’ differing judgments about it. For this is, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, w hat the hybrid theorist’s interpretation o f Rawls’s first aspect o f the 
reasonable am ounts to. This means that in general there will be a pressure towards 
consensus— individuals will in general be aware o f the differing judgments and 
ready to reconsider their own in the light o f this. M oreover, this pressure would be 
towards consensus on justice as fairness. It will tend to erode conflicting new s. 
Each person will have, as per the causal-factual argument, at the vert’ least a 
disposition to  accept the fundam ental elements out o f which the political 
conception o f justice as fairness is constructed. To the extent that her 
com prehensive view tends to conflict w ith these elements and with the n ew s o f 
others, she will be ready to reconsider those aspects o f it which conflict. The desire 
to find a m oral conception which does n o t conflict with anyone else’s fundam ental 
n ew s will tend to  bring her to accept w hat each o f  them  has in com m on even as the 
“ free exercise o f  hum an reason” tends to lead her to m oral conclusions which are 
no t in other respects the same as those affirm ed by others.
The survey o f  the ways in which the political conception may be seen to be 
congruent with a range o f com prehensive doctrines, the tendency towards
186 PL, p. 49, n. 2.
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convergence created by reasonableness, and the existence o f the disposition towards 
the values o f the object conception predicted by the causal-factual argum ent 
com bine to allay, to an extent, the w orn - that no t only the nonpolitical bu t also the 
political aspects o f individuals’ comprehensive doctrines will conflict w ith the 
political values o f  the political conception. But it is w orth emphasising that this is 
merely a tendency that we can plausibly expect, given the attribution o f 
reasonableness, rather than a dem onstration that the overlapping consensus will 
obtain. N one o f it is supposed to constitute proof. Rawls supposes that given 
sufficient num bers o f  reasonable individuals, their acceptance o f the consequences 
o f  the burdens o f judgm ent should secure an overlapping consensus on liberal 
principles. The hybrid view I am endorsing offers no guarantees even when 
everyone is reasonable; and in any case as we saw in Chapter 3 it requires in practice 
the actual acceptance even o f die unreasonable, since their views m ight be no 
different if they were reasonable and w hat we care about is w hat they could 
reasonably be expected to accept. Still, a tendency towards the overlapping 
consensus on justice as fairness offers hope, as does Rawls’s schematic overview of 
the ways in which radically divergent com prehensive doctrines may include within 
them  the means to support the fundam ental ideas o f die political conception.
The second approach to the question o f  the priority o f justice strengthens this 
hope. 'NJCTiat was required, recall, was that it be explained no t only how  individuals 
come to share the fundam ental ideas o f the political conception, bu t also why there 
should be any expectation that they will prioritise the values expressed thereby. 
W hat Rawls says about the priority o f justice is as follows. To begin with, he states 
that the “values o f  the political are very great values and hence no t easily
overridden” .18 But what justifies this claimr Further on. during his discussion o f 
the objection that the political conception m ust be com prehensive in order to 
provide guidance in “the many conflicts o f justice that anse in public life” ,188 Rawls 
writes:
values that conflict with the political conception o f justice and its sustaining 
virtues may be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with the 
very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing o f 
m utual respect.189
In the discussion immediately preceding this passage, Rawls appears to be arguing 
that because a Rawlsian distributive scheme enables everyone to pursue her 
conception o f the good, it “rem oves from  the political agenda the m ost divisive 
issues”— an argum ent which seems simply to ignore that there m ight be a conflict 
o f  the sort we are discussing in the first place.191’ I t’s no t obvious how  the quoted 
passage is supposed to follow from  this. But it offers Rawls’s best answer to the 
question in hand. The essential thought is that society, conceived as a co-operative 
system, is m ade possible only when the values o f the political do normally outweigh 
o ther values that come into conflict with them. As Rawls says earlier in PR, “these
ltr PL, p. 139.
188 PL, p. 154.
m  PL, p. 15L
iyd gee pp  154-"’.
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values govern the basic framework o f social life— the very groundw ork o f our
■ . 33 1 91existence .
\Khat explains why the values articulated by the polmcal conception take priority 
over other values advanced in reasonable individuals’ com prehensive doctrines, 
then, is those individuals’ recognition that society is the ‘groundw ork o f their 
existence’— the structure which shapes their lives and enables them  to do better for 
them selves than any might do on her ow n19-— and so that the values associated with 
its regulation are o f  param ount importance. They m ust be given priority because 
otherwise cooperative society is threatened. Since the values associated with its 
regulation are the values o f justice (the virtue which regulates cooperation), and 
since individuals tend towards support for the political conception in the ways that 
the first m ove in reply to the practical conflict objection suggests, the values o f die 
political conception will have priority over other values in individuals’ 
com prehensive doctrines.
191 PL, p. 139. It is also w orth emphasising once again the intuitive im portance o f justification o f a 
system of coercion. See P L  p. 13L Rawls develops the idea o f the basic structure (which is the 
realm o f the political as Rawls understands it) as the ground o f our existence as the people we are 
with the culture and conceptions of the good that we have in Lecture VII o f P L  (‘'The Basic 
Structure as Subject”). See especially pp. 269-~l.
192 The first o f these two features is one o f the grounds Rawls gives for making the basic structure 
the primary subject o f justice: the second is an idea that Rawls puts forward at times m Theon for 
more on which see Chapter 5 below).
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4. Indoctrination
All o f this takes us only so far. The causal-factual argum ent explains why we should 
expect individuals to conceive o f the enterprise o f society in a certain way that is 
essential to the developm ent o f the political conception o f justice as fairness. The 
review o f the com prehensive doctrines in the ‘model case’ shows us broadly how  we 
m ight find grounds for support for the political conception in individuals’ deeper 
moral com m itm ents. The assum ption o f reasonableness gives us hope that 
individuals’ deeper m oral com m itm ents will tend not to stray too far from  the 
affirm ation o f values which do support the political conception. And the idea that 
society is the groundw ork o f our existence suggests that individuals will prioritise 
the values o f justice.
But two large difficulties remain. One o f them  is that even if we are prepared to 
accept the causal-factual argum ent’s attribution o f the object conception to each 
individual, such adjectives as ‘fair’, ‘free’, and ‘equal’ are open to interpretation 
which we m ight expect to differ radically from one com prehensive doctrine to the 
next. It needs to be argued that the understandings o f these concepts employed in 
the construction o f justice as fairness are plausibly attributable to m em bers o f the 
Rawlsian society. For if different individuals do no t share the same understandings, 
the im portance o f the ‘groundwork o f their existence’ will no t in all cases entail the 
priority o f  the values o f justice as fairness as opposed to the values associated with 
whatever they see as the appropriate elaboration o f the object conception given 
their different understandings o f the concepts it invokes. In C hapter 6 I shall make 
a case for the plausibility o f attributing to individuals in Rawlsian society a Rawlsian 
understanding o f  the fairness that underpins justice as fairness’s egalitarianism.
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For the rem ainder o f the present chapter I shall address the second large 
difficulty, which is as follows. As we have just seen, to a large extent the 
expectation that justice as fairness in its political constructivist presentation will be 
stable for the right reasons is founded upon the supposition that individuals will 
share the fundam ental ideas out o f which it is constructed. They will, that is, view 
society as a fair system o f cooperation between individuals regarded as free, equal, 
reasonable, and rational. But the plausibility o f this supposition is itself explained to 
a large extent by the causal-facmal argument, which says that am ong other things 
individuals in the Rawlsian society will as a m atter o f fact come to conceive o f 
society that way. Yet if the explanation o f stability for the right reasons— of a lack 
o f  conflict betw een anyone’s com prehensive doctrine and the values o f justice as 
fairness— is ultimately that each person’s upbringing tends to bring about 
congruence betw een com prehensive doctrine and the values o f the political 
conception, we m ight worry that the stability, someone m ight object that essentially 
the Rawlsian claim is simply that we needn’t w orn ’ about the conflicts in question 
because we can brainwash people into conceiving o f society and the values o f the 
political as we w ant them  to. Its stability might be for the right reasons in one 
sense— it isn’t reliant upon coercion which individuals couldn’t reasonably be 
expected to accept— but that doesn’t capture w hat seems to be im portan t about ‘the 
right reasons’ in the first place.
I can see four different ways in which som eone m ight press the charge that 
political liberalism, in the form that I have been arguing for, is reliant on 
indoctrination. I distinguish and describe these below. I shall argue that the charge 
is unfounded whichever version we adopt. The four versions are as follows:
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1. Political liberalism is reliant upon individuals’ having false beliefs (the false 
beliefs objection)
2. Political liberalism is reliant upon individuals’ failure to  think through their 
beliefs (the loose beliefs objection)
3. Political liberalism is reliant upon individuals’ acting against their own 
m terests (the mistaken interests objection)
4. Political liberalism is reliant upon individuals’ having been brought up in 
conditions other than those under which they ought to have been brought 
up (the wrong background objection)
I shall address them  in this order.
5. False beliefs and loose beliefs
The false beliefs objection is obviously a charge o f indoctrination. The thought 
underlying one form  o f it would be as follows. Political liberalism, m order to m eet 
the necessary condition o f stability for the nght reasons, requires an overlapping 
consensus on justice as fairness in its political presentauon which in turn requires 
each individual to conceive o f society as a fair system o f cooperation between 
individuals conceived as free, equal, reasonable, and rational. It requires, that is, that 
each individual should have certain beliefs about the nature o f society. These 
beliefs are false. Therefore political liberalism relies upon individuals’ having false 
beliefs. Alternatively, if it is argued that reliance upon beliefs that happen to be 
false, as opposed to  reliance upon the inculcation o f  such beliefs, is no t reliance upon 
indoctrination, the objection can be extended as follows. If  each individual does
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conceive o f society in the relevant wav, it’s because (as the causal-factual argum ent 
shows) the m stm iuons o f justice as fairness engender individual m oral developm ent 
which involves individuals’ coming to conceive o f it thus. So political liberalism 
relies upon the inculcanon o f certain beliefs about the nature o f society. These 
beliefs are false. Therefore political liberalism relies upon the inculcation o f false 
beliefs.
This is n o t a convincing objection. It is true that political liberalism relies upon 
the inculcation o f the object conception o f society. But it is n o t obviously true that 
the object conception is false, in the sense that it is the wrong conception o f society*. 
M oreover, if  it is false, then this objection is no t primarily an objection based upon 
the idea that political liberalism relies upon indoctrination. It is an objection to the 
content o f justice as fairness itself as a regulative conception. If  it were primarily an 
objection based upon the idea that political liberalism relies upon  indoctrination, it 
w ould be best employed as a modus toilens argum ent against the regulative 
conception. T hat is, the objecnon would run: justice as fairness, as a regulative 
conception, can be stable and therefore acceptable only by inculcating certam beliefs 
about society*; therefore it may inculcate those beliefs; bu t inculcating those beliefs 
constitutes indoctrination and therefore is no t permissible; therefore justice as 
fairness cannot be acceptable. However, this objection is no t best em ployed thus.
It is best em ployed as a direct challenge to the content o f jusnce as fairness: since 
justice as fairness is elaborated from fundam ental assum ptions about society as a 
fair system o f  cooperation between free, equal, reasonable, and rational individuals, 
if those assum ptions are false, then we have reason to reject justice as fairness so 
elaborated.
If  the object conception o f society were false that would, o f course, underm ine 
any claim that a friend o f Rawls m ight make to the effect that the stability* o f justice
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as fairness may be adduced as supporting grounds for it. To that extent the charge 
that it is false works as a charge o f indoctrination: the fhend o f Rawls adduces 
justice as fairness’s stability in its favour and the objector replies that this stability 
relies upon indoctrination since justice as fairness is based on false assum ptions.
But the prim ary charge is that the assum ptions that justice as fairness relies upon are 
false, n o t the charge o f indoctrination. It’s analogous to the charge that utilitarians 
rely upon indoctrination just because the stability o f utilitarianism w ould depend 
upon  individuals’ accepting the theory itself, which is false. Contrast this with the 
charge that they rely upon indoctrination because they rely upon individuals’ 
believing a m oral theory that they themselves take to be false, in the sense highlighted 
by W illiams’s ‘G overnm ent H ouse utilitarianism’ jibe.19’
The false beliefs objection m ight also be put as an analogue o f that jibe, 
however. H ere the thought w ould be not that the object conception is false, but 
that Rawlsians them selves take it to be false even as they rely on individuals’ 
acceptance o f  it in w hat they see as a just society. But there is no  reason to suppose 
that Rawlsians do take it to be false. First, we should rem em ber that Rawlsians and 
we m em bers o f liberal W estern socieues alike are taken to affirm  reasonable 
com prehensive doctrines o f the sort that would be affirm ed by some individuals in 
the Rawlsian society, and so we are supposed to be able to endorse the object 
conception and justice as fairness as consistent with our own new s. \KTien we 
advance the theory we are no t taking a stance which we suppose no individual in the 
Rawlsian society itself could take.194 Second, note that Rawls’s head-first approach
193 See Williams, “The Pom t o f View of the Universe” , p. 166.
194 See PL, p. "70: “As for the pom t o f n ew  of you and me— the pom t o f n e w  of the full justification 
o f justice as fairness m its own terms— this pom t of n ew  we model bv our description of the
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can be seen as an aspect o f a unified dualist theory in which a regulative conception 
is affirmed bu t also subjected to a legitimacy test, justice as fairness is affirm ed but 
subjected to  the test o f stability for the right reasons. The regulative concepuon 
com ponent does no t involve only the assertion w ithout any justification o f justice as 
fairness: it is no t an arbitrary moral conception inculcated simply for the sake o f 
unanimity. It involves arguing from premises that Rawls him self accepts— the first 
third o f Theory. Rawls makes plain in his later work that he mews Theory's argum ent 
for justice as fairness as sound, quite apart from the question o f  its stability.19"'1 So to 
the extent that justice as fairness is elaborated from the object conception in the 
regulative conception com ponent o f the dualist mew, it is clearly no t the case that 
Rawls him self does not accept the beliefs that are inculcated in individuals under the 
institutions o f  justice as fairness. Third, consider the fact that Rawls endorses in 
both  his early and his later w ork the ‘full publicity condition’, which
has to  do with the full justification o f the public conception o f  justice as it 
would be presented in its own terms. This justification includes everything that 
we w ould say— you and I— when we set up justice as fairness and reflect why 
we proceed in one way radier than another. A t this level I suppose this full 
justification also to be publicly known, or better, at least to be publicly 
available.. .if citizens wish to [carry philosophical reflection about political life 
that far], the full justificaaon is present in the public culture, reflected in its
thought and judgment o f fully autonomous citizens in the well-ordered society o f tusuce as fairness. 
For they can do anything we can do, for they are an ideal description o f what a democratic society 
would be like should we fully honor our political conception.”
19:> See e.g. PL, pp. xvn-xvm and 6-~.
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system o f  law and political m snm nons and in the main historical tradm ons o f 
their in terpretation.196
It is clear that Rawls sees this as refuting objecnons o f indoctnnanon in the sense 
currently under review:
\XTien a political conception o f jusnce satisfies [full publicity] condition, and 
basic social arrangements and individual actions are fullv justifiable, citizens can 
give reasons for their beliefs and conduct before one another confident that this 
avowed reckoning itself will strengthen and not weaken public understanding. 
The political order does not, it seems, depend on historically accidental or 
established delusions, or other mistaken beliefs resting on the deceptrce 
appearances o f institutions that mislead us as to how they w ork.1'
This also answers the loose beliefs objection— that political liberalism is reliant 
upon  individuals’ failure to think through their beliefs. This can be seen as a charge 
o f indoctrination because it implies that if individuals did think through their beliefs 
they w ould come to conclusions which would underm ine the stability for the right 
reasons o f  justice as fairness. So political liberalism is reliant upon their no t coming 
to those conclusions. I f  it prevents them  doing so, it can be argued that it relies 
upon indoctnnanon. Even if it doesn’t actually prevent them  doing so bu t merely 
relies upon their n o t doing so, that seems objecnonable in a similar way.
1% p j t 1S cjear that Rawls endorses full publicity (which is m ore extensive than the 
condition o f publicity on the principles chosen in the original position) in Theory as well. See pp. 514- 
6/451-2. 
ly" PL, p. 68.
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\Kliat Rawls says about the public availability o f the full justification o f  justice as 
fairness dem onstrates that at least Rawls him self does no t suppose that individuals’ 
thinking through that full justification— as elaborated from the fundam ental ideas—  
w ould imperil stability for the right reasons. So if the failure that the objector is 
referring to is the failure to reflect upon the full justification o f justice as fairness, 
then certainly Rawls does not take him self to be reiving upon any such thing. 
M oreover, none o f the arguments I have been offering in this chapter to suppose 
that justice as fairness could be the focus o f the overlapping consensus rely upon 
any failure on the part o f individuals to reflect upon the compatibility o f the 
fundam ental elements with their comprehensive doctrines.
6. Mistaken interests
The m istaken interests objection is that political liberalism relies upon individuals’ 
acting against their own interests. I f  justice as fairness’s stability involves the 
inculcation in individuals o f the object conception and the corresponding sense o f 
justice, and this am ounts to the inculcation o f a motivation, to act against then  own 
interests, then/w hat is at issue is plainly m doctrination ./B ut even if the charge is no t 
o f  inculcation o f  bu t merely reliance upon m otivations contrary to individuals’ 
interests, there is cause for concern. It would be good to show how  political 
liberalism avoids it.
The worry here is w hat the congruence argum ent in Theory is designed to 
address. The congruence argum ent claims that an individual’s sense o f  justice is 
congruent with her good, as understood on the thin theory o f  the good, in the sense 
that the thin theory supplies grounds for individuals to affirm and behave in
accordance w ith their sense o f justice. (The thin theory is the theory o f individuals’ 
rational advantage drawn upon in the specification o f justice as fairness. It is ‘th in’ 
in that it does n o t take into account the full specification o f individuals’ good that 
can only be offered once we know the content o f justice.) Part o f the argum ent 
offers reasons to deny that circumstances provoking conflict betw een the sense o f 
justice and individuals’ good will arise. But another part o f it relies upon Kantian 
considerations which are supposed to show that the sense o f justice is itself an 
essential part o f  individuals’ good. Briefly, the idea is that individuals’ true nature is 
expressed only in acting from  the sense o f justice, and it establishes the very strong 
conclusion that individuals would be irrational no t to act in accordance with their 
sense o f justice.198 Because it relies on Kantian considerations, it cannot simply be 
re-invoked here: the political conception cannot draw upon elements o f 
com prehensive doctrines.
W e m ight try to  answer the m istaken interests objection by running the same 
kind o f argum ent bu t with an understanding o f individuals’ good which is given by a 
theory which does not include the controversial K antian implications. So the 
challenge is to show first that we can (so to speak) de-K ant the thin theory (and also 
derive it w ithout reference to any other controversial doctrine) and second that the 
congruence argum ent can successfully employ the de-K anted version.
N ow , the political presentation o f justice as fairness is supposed to use a 
conception o f  individuals’ good which is at least no m ore controversial than the 
fundam ental elem ents o f  the political conception. Rawls argues that from  the 
conception o f  the person implicit in the object conception o f  society, together with 
“various com m on sense psychological facts about hum an needs, their phases o f
198 See the references in note 105 above.
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developm ent, and so on” ,19' we can derive a 'political idea’ o f individuals’ good 
which “respectfs] the limits of, and serve[s] a role within, the political concepnon o f 
justice.”20' This idea, as it turns out, is substantially very similar to the thin theory o f 
the good advanced in Theory,20‘ and grounds m uch the same list o f  prim ary goods as 
the interpersonal m etnc appropriate for justice as fairness. It could therefore be 
drawn upon in a version o f the congruence argument.
H ow  are we supposed to be able to derive the political idea o f individuals’ good 
from  these materials? The use o f primary goods as the basis o f interpersonal 
com parisons is said in Theory1 to be accounted for partly by the idea o f ‘goodness as 
rationality’ and partly by “general facts about hum an wants and abilities, their 
characteristic phases and requirem ents o f nurture, the Aristotelian Principle, and the 
necessities o f social interdependence.”2"' They are the goods that “it is rational to 
w a n t.. .whatever else is w anted” .2"' According to ‘goodness as ranonality’, a ‘hum an 
good’ is som ething which “has the properties that it is rational for som eone widi a 
rational plan o f life to w ant” .2"" A ranonally planned life is a life that is “consistent 
w ith .. .principles o f rational choice w hen these are applied to all the relevant 
features o f [the person’s] situauon a n d .. .is that plan among those m eeting this 
condition which would be chosen by him with full deliberative rationality, that is,
m iPL, p. 181, n.8.
20(1 PL, p. 176.
201 See PL, pp. l~6-~, n. 3, m which Rawls claims that “nearly all the structure and substantive 
content o f justice as fairness [as presented in Theory] (including goodness as rationality) goes over 
unchanged into that conception as a political one’l
202 Theory, p. 434 381.
203 Theory, p. 433.'380.
204 Theory:, p. 399 /351.
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with fall awareness o f the relevant facts and after a careful consideration o f the 
consequences.”2"3 Choosing with full deliberative rationality is “careful reflection in 
which the agent review’[s], in the light o f all the relevant facts, w hat it w ould be like 
to carry out [various available] plans and thereby ascertain [s] the course o f action 
that w7ould best realize his m ore fundam ental desires.”2"6 A good, then, is 
som ething which contributes to the satisfaction o f the careful, considered, wrell- 
m form ed plan o f som eone w ho is trying to realize her m ost fundam ental desires. 
This m uch, though fairly complex, seems uncontroversial enough to be part o f h e  
fundam ental political conception o f h e  person as rauonal (indeed Rawds says as 
m uch at PL, pp. 176-8). In P L  Rawds also endorses basing h e  thin theory on h e  
general facts about hum an w’ants and abilities and so on, adding only h a t  we are 
also to be guided by die political conception o f h e  person and emphatically no t one 
(such as h a t  o f  h e  K antian interpretation) belonging to any single com prehensive 
doctrine. H e w’ntes h a t  “to identify h e  primary goods w’e look to social 
background conditions and general all-purpose means normally needed for 
developing and exercising h e  two m oral pow’ers [for a sense o f justice and for a 
conception o f h e  good] and for effectively pursuing conceptions o f h e  good wnth 
widely different contents”2" as well as “h e  framew’ork o f goodness as rationality
and h e  basic facts o f social life and h e  conditions o f hum an g ro w h  and
_ ,, 208 nurture .
20d Theory-, p. 408/359.
206 Theory, p. 41 ~ 366.
20 PL, pp. "’5-6. For the two moral powers see p. 19.
208 PL, p. R 8 .
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Ultimately this involves “identifying a partial similarity in the structure o f 
citizens’ permissible [comprehensive] conceptions o f the good.”" ' 'Permissible 
conceptions o f the good’ here means “those that respect the principles o f  justice.”211 
That makes it seem that we are to ask about the pursuit o f  which com prehensive 
doctrines w ould be perm itted by justice as fairness and then find out which goods it 
would be rational to want regardless o f which particular doctrine am ong these one 
affirmed. But that is surely a mistake. For as Rawls notes m Theory, “ [t]he 
constraints o f the principles o f justice cannot be used to draw up the list o f  prim ary 
goods that serves as part o f the descnpuon o f the initial situation. The reason is, o f 
course, that this list is one o f the premises from  which the choice o f principles o f 
right is derived. To cite these principles in explaining the list w ould be a circular 
argument. ”~'1
W e can, however, give a non-circular sense to Rawls’s restriction to perm issible 
com prehensive conceptions. Consider how the structure o f political liberalism 
suggests that the comprehensive doctrines that we are to draw on in form ulating the 
list o f  primary goods should be identified. If  the actual contractualist justificauon o f 
the principles o f justice arises from the fact that justice as fairness is the focus o f an 
overlapping consensus (each person hypothetically consents to the political 
conception), then the basis o f the use o f the list o f  primary goods derives ultimately 
from  the fact that this list is endorsed by all m em bers o f the consensus. But if the
2tw PL, p. 180. Rawls often plays down this fact, suggesting for example that in formulating the list 
o f primary goods “ [w]e leave aside comprehensive doctrines that now exist, or that have existed, or 
that might exist” (p. 40). But identifying partial structural similarities must surely involve considering 
comprehensive doctrines as they now or might exist. ^CTiat else are we to consider.- 
21(1 See PL, p. 193.
211 Theory, p. 434, 381. . /
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overlapping consensus is secured— and for the purposes o f questions o f 
indoctrination, that is the situation that we are asking about— then it is true that 
justice as fairness receives support from  within each o f the reasonable 
com prehensive doctrines m quesnon; and m turn they each conform  to the 
principles o f  justice. So the comprehensive doctrines am ong which we should look 
for partial structural similannes in drawing up the list o f primary goods are m em bers 
o f  the set o f  permissible conceptions o f the good. M oreover, smce stability for the 
right reasons is stability for many generations,-1 ~ the range o f reasonable 
com prehensive conceptions likely to flourish, and which should therefore be 
mcluded in the survey since they will be included in the overlapping consensus, will 
tend towards the full range o f views in the set o f permissible (but still plausible) 
com prehensive concepuons. Thus Rawls’s restriction to permissible conceptions, 
though at first sight problem atic, turns out to have an m nocuous interpretation.-1’
212 See e.g. PL, p. 3.
213 This interpretation accords well with the parallel that Rawls draws between Scanlon’s 
‘conventionalist’ interpretation o f his concept o f urgency (of concerns) and the conception of 
primary goods as citizens’ needs (PL, p. 188, n. 19). The convennonalist interpretation, based on 
usefulness in circumstances o f pluralism, contrasts with a ‘naturalist’ interpretation which sees 
urgency as “the objective truth about which interests are more im portant and which are less so’ 
(Scanlon, “Preference and Urgency”, p. 668). I f  we begin at the outset with a survey o f actual 
conceptions o f the good in Rawlsian society we come closer to the conventionalist approach. I 
submit, than if  we begin with a survey of possible permissible conceptions (though in fact as it turns out 
these may be close to coextensive). For the latter survey must be premised on the idea that primary 
goods are to be conceived not as actual citizens’ needs but as possible ciuzens’ needs. Smce none of 
these need ever actually exist in order to do justifying work if they are mcluded m the survey, it is less 
plausible to suppose that we are adopting an interpretation of citizens' needs based on its usefulness 
under the (actual) pluralistic circumstances that face us.
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The thm  theory and thus the primary goods can therefore be non-circularly and 
uncontroversially derived.
The thin theory gives us some reasons to suppose that the sense o f  justice is not 
contrary to  individuals’ good. First, as in the original congruence argum ent, we can 
pom t out that a Rawlsian society provides even its w orst o ff m em bers with 
“adequate all-purpose m eans” to develop and exercise the two m oral pow ers—  
som ething which is a good for individuals w ho are conceived as essentially having 
an m terest in developing and exercismg those powers."1” Second, we can argue that 
a Rawlsian society provides the social bases o f self-respect, which also feature 
am ong the primary' goods. Third, again following the original congruence 
argum ent, we can argue that participation m a well-ordered society o f justice as 
fairness is experienced as a good."1' This might depend on the Aristotelian 
principle, as it does in Theory', bu t m P L  Rawls appears simply to draw on an 
empirical knowledge o f democratic societies. W e can also draw on Rawls’s 
com m ents about special psychologies in Theory. I n  other words, given m uch the 
same theory* o f individuals’ good we can invoke m uch the same set o f 
considerations in favour o f the view that a sense o f justice as fairness, and the 
Rawlsian society in which individuals are brought up to have that sense, will no t 
conflict with individuals’ good on that theory.
WTiat we cannot invoke, however, is the m ost powerful o f the argum ents that 
Rawls gives in Theory' to suppose that there will be no such conflict. T hat is the 
argum ent which invokes the Kantian idea that acting on the sense o f  justice is an
214 See P L  pp. 202-3, and Theory, p. 169 14".
215 See PL, PP- 204-5.
216 See Theory, p. 541 4"’4.
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expression o f individuals’ fundam ental nature. W ithout it, the considerations in 
favour o f congruence that I have just listed mav seem rather weak. In particular, 
they may seem merely to flag that justice as fairness isn’t internally inconsistent, in 
the sense that the concepnon o f individuals’ good it employs at the beginning isn’t 
underm ined at the end. In Theory this is precisely what the congruence argum ent is 
supposed to  do. But with that argument w*e are asking about a conception o f 
individuals’ good which was comprehensive. The question is: is the fundam ental 
conception o f the person which we have used in setting up justice as fairness, and 
which we assume to be true and comprehensive, supported or underm ined by the 
society which we envisage under the institutions o f justice as fairness? W hen we no 
longer take the fundam ental conception o f the person which we employ in setting 
up justice as fairness to be comprehensive, when we take it to be less than the whole 
story about individuals’ good, finding out that it is not underm ined by the society 
we envisage seems to leave im portant questions unanswered. W e w ant to sav: 
perhaps indeed the good on this, the political concepnon o f individuals’ good, is 
secured. But what about the good on individuals ’ own concepnons o f the good—  
which conceptions the conception o f the person employed in setting us jusnce as 
fairness no longer implies are simply mistaken."
This is a reasonable question, and it suggests that the m istaken m terests 
objection is no t fully answered by the appeal to congruence. H ow ever, now  that we 
have distinguished the worry from that which is answered by the appeal to 
congruence, it should be clear that we have already answered it in dealing with the 
question how  the various reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a Rawlsian society* 
are m eant to support the political conception o f justice as fairness— how, that is, the 
overlapping consensus is supposed to be secured. For the answer to that— which 
appealed to the causal-factual argument, empirical facts about the doctrines likely to
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flourish under jusnce as fairness, and the im portance o f the values o f the political—  
is also an answer to the question: is jusnce as fairness consistent with individuals’ 
good as they themselves conceive itr Their reasonable com prehensive doctrines are 
the source o f our understanding o f their concepnon o f their own good; and these, it 
is argued, also contain within them  the grounds o f each individual’s endorsem ent 
and p n o nnsanon  o f the values o f ]usnce as fairness. If  thev don’t, o f course, jusnce 
as fairness isn’t achieved anyway (so can’t be said to be reliant on anyone’s acting 
against their own good); and if they do, it evidently isn’t secured through their acting 
against their own concepnons o f the good. To the extent that we remam w orried 
about indoctnnanon after hearing this reply, I suggest that that is because o f the 
force o f the fourth and final version o f the charge o f indoctnnanon: the w rong 
background objecnon. To that I now turn.
7. Wrong background
According to the w rong background objecnon, polmcal liberalism is reliant upon 
individuals’ having been brought up in condiuons o ther than those under which 
they ought to have been brought up. If  you remain unconvinced that polmcal 
liberalism is n o t reliant upon indoctnnanon after reading my responses to the first 
three versions o f  the indoctnnanon charge, I flunk that this m ust be ultimately what 
w ornes you. The thought underlying this objecnon is that if  jusnce as fairness is 
stable for the n gh t reasons— that is, if it can be the focus o f the overlapping 
consensus in the way that we predict— that is only because its insutunons shape 
individuals under them  so that they do not affirm any o f a range o f reasonable views
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which involve rejecting the priority o f the values o f justice as fairness. So, for 
example, we can easily imagine som eone w ho fits the following catena:
(1) she is prepared to modify her views in the light o f o thers’
(2) (even after such modification) she rejects the elaboration o f fairness or 
the account o f primary goods as citizens’ needs which ultimately 
produce justice as fairness, or she doesn’t see society as a fair system of 
cooperation
The actual contractualist test that Rawlsian hybrid contractualism  sets requires this 
person’s m em bership in the overlapping consensus."1 H er endorsem ent is 
necessary for the stability for the right reasons o f justice as fairness. But her 
com prehensive doctrine conflicts with the premises o f justice as fairness, and so she 
could no t be a m em ber o f the overlapping consensus. It w ould no t be reasonable 
to expect her to accept justice as fairness. So stability for the right reasons would 
not be secured.
\XTiat the Rawlsian Hew I am arguing for says about this person is that she 
w ould n o t exist in the Rawlsian society. The account o f prim ary goods as citizens’ 
needs rests on structural similarities am ong all reasonable individuals’ 
com prehensive conceptions o f the good; every one conceives o f society as (properly) a 
fair system o f  cooperation; the elaboration o f this idea o f fairness is one which fits 
with everyone If Hew. W e predict all this in the light o f the broad causal-factual
We could in fact restrict the criteria to (2) alone and still have the problem because of the wide 
(unreasonable-including) specification o f the variable o f scope that I argued for in Chapter 3 above.
It makes the objection clearer and stronger, however, to focus on the possibility o f someone who is 
reasonable bv the hvbnd contractualist’s own lights.
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argum ent (see section 3 above), the tendencies created by the assum pnon o f general 
reasonableness, and the priority built into values associated with society, the 
groundw ork o f our existence. O f  course, it is possible that stability for the right 
reasons w on’t be secured, either because these predicnons are unjustified or because 
though they are generally jusufied they may sometimes go unfulfilled. But that is 
no t the objecnon. The objecnon is that w hen it is secured, and these predicnons are 
correct, it is secured and they are correct because Rawlsian m sntutions, particularly 
in their inculcanon o f the object concepnon and sense o f jusnce, make it so. The 
reason that the person does not exist is that Rawlsian m sntutions prevent anyone 
from  becom ing her, even though she cannot be condem ned in the basic moral com 
o f  reasonableness upon which polmcal liberalism rests. But if she had not been 
prevented from  existing, so to speak, then stability for the nght reasons would not 
have been achievable. Stability for the nght reasons is therefore nothing m ore than 
self-perpetuanon through indoctnnanon.
I w ant to  offer two replies to this objecnon. The first begins with the 
observation that no social world fails to shape the views o f those w ho are brought 
up m it. That being so, it cannot be an objection m itself that m dim duals have been 
shaped by m snm nons. The objecnon has to be that mdividuals have been shaped 
by the m sntutions o f the very moral concepnon acceptance o f which by those same 
individuals is supposed to count as an argum ent for it. But w hat are the 
alternatives? Is there some social world that the objector can pom t to m which 
individuals ought to be brought up for their acceptance o f jusnce as fairness to count 
as unindoctrm atedr Two suggesnons come to mind. First, a social world m which 
individuals are able carefully to consider the m oral landscape and freely to endorse 
the moral concepnon that they conclude is best justified after such consideranon. 
(This m ight be the suggesnon o f a Lockean.) In response to this suggesnon we can
simply point out that the Rawlsian society, in which sufficient liberties and prim ary 
goods for the developm ent and exercise o f the two moral powers are guaranteed, 
and in which full publicity obtains so that people are brought up to understand the 
reasonableness o f alternative ways o f conceiving the moral landscape, is surely as 
close to  the ideal formative social world as the Lockean objector could hope.218 
Indeed, it is one com m on criticism o f the Lockean m oral backdrop that for all its 
equality o f  basic liberties, Locke’s own proviso on the acquisition o f  private 
property  m ight perm it-19 situations to arise in which consent to a moral conception 
w ould seem to be less free than the acceptance o f justice as fairness by individuals in 
the Rawlsian society.--11
21!< Notice that the causal-factual argument does not specify how children are to be educated m 
educational instituuons. It discusses only the way in which individuals’ moral senuments are shaped 
by moral and political norms that are implemented around them. As regards education in schools, 
the Rawlsian view could easily support a normative analogue o f the solution to the ‘paradox of 
indoctrination’ (education designed to bring it about that students form beliefs on rational grounds 
involves bringing students to form beliefs on non-ranonal grounds) proposed by fames Garrison in 
“The Paradox of Indoctrination: A Solution”. The idea would be that non-liberal worldviews are 
described as possible alternatives to the liberal worldview o f justice as fairness in such a way as to 
create at least temporary suspension of belief in the liberal worldview. The causal-factual argument 
would no t obviously lose plausibility in a society where this was the educauonal pracuce.
219 W ithout anyone’s simply giving away their legitimately-appropriated shares, a possibility that is 
generally (reasonably enough) ignored in discussions o f what is perm itted by various interpretations 
o f Locke’s proviso.
22,1 See e.g. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Eauaiity, chapter 3. Cohen him self interprets Locke’s 
proviso stringently enough that such situations probably w ouldn’t anse (see pp. -8). But he goes 
on to criticise Nozick on the basis o f the relations that N ozick’s interpretation o f the same proviso 
permits between individuals— relations which are plausibly viewed as making some o f those
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The second suggesnon is that individuals ought to be b rought up in a social 
world in which there are no norms, or at least none belonging to a m oral 
concepnon, so that individuals’ acceptance o f some moral concepnon is no t shaped 
by the pre-existing moral concepnon. ("This m ight be the suggesnon o f a 
Hobbesian.) But here it is im portant to distinguish between two senses in which a 
pre-existing m oral concepnon may be said to shape the content o f w hat individuals 
actually accept. In secnons 4-6 of Chapter 1 I argued that a norm anvely empty 
m oral backdrop such as H obbes’s would make an acmal contractualist theory in one 
way attracnve in that it would be, in a certain sense, thoroughgoing: even' aspect o f 
the m oral concepnon ultimately advocated would be subject to the actual 
contractualist test o f legitimacy. Moral backdrops which are no t norm aucely 
empty— which include, that is, a moral concepnon already— do no t hold this 
attraction because the (non-accepted) moral backdrop either prevents the possibility 
that certain m oral concepnons may be accepted in a way that legitimises them  (this 
happens w hen the moral backdrop includes inalienable or inviolable rights, for 
example) or else operates as a moral baseline which informs and morally endorses 
the bargaining positions o f those individuals whose acceptance is necessary for the 
jusnce o f any proposed alternative moral concepnon. So m oral backdrops which 
are no t norm anvely empty can be said to shape the content o f w hat individuals 
actually accept in the sense that they impose norm s which may at least inform  if not 
specify those ultimately chosen.
But a different way m which a pre-existing moral concepnon may be said to 
shape the con ten t o f what individuals actually accept is via individuals’ own
individuals less free than they would be under a Rawlsian moral concepnon (which indeed Cohen 
invokes as effectively more satisfactory in this respect at pp. 8~-8).
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com m itm ents. Rather than shaping and endorsing their bargaining posm ons or 
restricting legitimising acceptance to only a certain range o f m oral concepnons, a 
m oral conception m ight simply inform  individuals’ own m oral thinking. To see the 
contrast betw een these two different ways o f shaping the ultimately accepted moral 
conception, consider the Amish practice o f rumspringa as it is popularly 
(mis)conceived. (Accuracy o f attribution doesn’t m atter for my purposes.) 
Rumspringa involves perm itting teenagers to participate in voder society and practices 
w ithout risking the severin' o f punishm ent that would be normally consequent upon 
such participation. They then have the choice either to return or to  renounce the 
Amish life (with no sanction) as they see fit. These teenagers have been educated to 
see the world in m oral terms that are set by Amish religious teachings, and thus they 
tend to see the outside world as morally inferior and choose to return to their hom e 
communities. Clearly they are shaped by Amish moral mews. But it w ould be 
w rong to say that they make their choice from a bargaining posm on which is set by 
Am ish values. Should they renounce their religion, it w on’t be the case that Amish 
conceptions o f right and w rong continue to have the norm ative force they have for 
them  as m em bers o f the Amish community. N or is their choice restricted to a 
range o f  values determ ined by the Amish moral outlook. O n the contrary, they can 
choose to embrace a completely different set o f values with no norm ative shadow 
cast by A m ish values.
By contrast, consider for example the wider laws which operate in the USA for 
the Amish and non-Am ish alike. These do restrict the range o f values that the 
Amish teenagers may embrace (or at any rate pursue), and they also affect the 
bargaining position that they hold in joining with others to pursue new moral lives. 
Perhaps, for example, a young Amish man decides that rather than return to the 
comm unity he w ould like to found a new Amish com m unity by converting non-
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Amish people he finds in the outside world. But the extent to which he can pursue, 
as part o f an Am ish community, these values is verv m uch influenced by the fairly 
liberal legal background against which he tnes to found the new com m unitv. In the 
first place, a num ber o f practices may be simply outlawed, so that even each 
individuars consent is insufficient to make them  permissible. Furtherm ore, our 
young m an’s bargaining position is weak in the sense that others can easily refuse to 
accept Am ish norm s in favour o f the norm s already set by the liberal background: 
these background norm s may allow them to take stands on the values that the 
com m unity they found will have that a different set o f background norm s (more 
religious ones, for example) would not have facilitated.
A normarively (relatively) empty actual contractualist moral backdrop is 
analogous to there being, in our second example, no laws at all in the background. 
Evidendy individuals will still have bargaining positions influenced by their 
situations p o o r to any agreement on the values o f the new comm unity. But these 
bargaining positions will not have the legal seal o f approval that they w ould have if 
liberal laws were enforced. A nd o f course there will be no practices which in 
advance we can say that the new community simply may no t employ, since there 
will be no standard beyond that which they themselves agree. Such a normatively 
empty* backdrop is perfecdy compatible, however, with its being the case that the 
founders all have moral views influenced by their own m oral upbringings. O ur 
young m an could still have been brought up to be Amish.
This being so, we m ust ask w hether the suggestion about the appropriateness o f 
individuals’ acceptance not being shaped by the Rawlsian institutions under which 
they are brought up is a suggestion that the m oral backdrop be normatively empty 
or a suggestion that individuals should no t be shaped by those Rawlsian institutions. 
I f  it is the form er, we can simply agree: it is perfectly com patible with a normatively
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empty m oral backdrop that individuals should have been b rought up m a Rawlsian 
society. It is no  part o f the view I recom m end that if justice as fairness fails to 
achieve stability for the right reasons, we m ust fall back on justice as fairness as the 
default m oral conception anyway. If, on the other hand, it is the latter suggestion 
(that individuals should not be shaped by Rawlsian institutions), we can ask: how 
should they be shaped? It is utterly implausible to suppose that w hat we care about 
is the acceptance o f individuals with no moral upbringing at all— if such a thing can 
be conceived. A nd it seems to me that the suggestion m ost likely to be acceptable 
to the objector is that individuals should be brought up to be, in some sense, 
autonom ous in their m oral judgment. But this takes us back to our reply to the 
'Lockean’ suggestion: the Rawlsian society, we can say, m which sufficient liberties 
and primary goods for the developm ent and exercise o f the two moral pow ers—  
which include the capacity to form  and revise one’s judgm ent about the moral 
landscape— are guaranteed is surely as close to the objector’s ideal form ative social 
w orld as we could hope.
I now  turn to  the second o f my two replies to the indoctrination objection 
which claims that individuals brought up in a Rawlsian society are b rought up under 
conditions o ther than those under which they ought to have been b rought up, and 
that therefore the Rawlsian society is self-perpetuating only through indoctrination. 
The objection appealed, recall, to the possibility o f a perfecdy reasonable individual 
w ho nevertheless did not subscribe to the overlapping consensus. The thought was 
that therefore the prevention o f such a person’s existence in a Rawlsian society m ust 
be the p roduct o f  indoctnnauon on the part o f the institutions o f  that society. The 
second reply to this is as follows: it is true that the Rawlsian society is inhospitable 
to certain new s, many o f which may be held by reasonable people. But that is not 
evidence o f indoctrination. S o  moral conception w ould engender a society in
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which all n ew s, or even all reasonable new s, flourished. This is part o f the 
significance o f Rawls’s repeated reference to Isaiah Berlin’s n e w  that there is no 
social w orld w ithout loss.-1 If  the objector’s point is simply that a Rawlsian society 
excludes som e comprehensive doctrines which are not unreasonable, then either the 
indoctrination this implies is something that no m oral conception can avoid or else 
som ething further m ust be said to vindicate employing this po in t as an objection 
against specifically the Rawlsian new .
O ne such further thing that the objector could say would be as follows. She 
could concede that justice as fairness might be stable for the right reasons, w ithout 
indoctrination, once it has been im plem ented and perpetuated over generations.
But w ouldn’t it have to rely upon indoctrination in the first place, in order to get 
started." For unless we have the good fortune to find ourselves confronted  with a 
society in which everyone already accepts the fundamental ideas o f the political 
conception, the only way to im plem ent justice as fairness and have it m eet the 
hybrid contractualist test o f acceptance will be somehow to  indoctrinate or fool 
people w ho w ouldn’t otherwise accept it. So either it relies upon such 
indoctrination somewhere along the line, or else it is condem ned to irrelevance, 
since only societies that are already just by its lights stand any chance o f  achieving it, 
and there are no such societies.
Again, Rawls has a response to this objection. In the first place, he 
acknowledges that justice as fairness is indeed suitable only for certain socieues at a
221 Rawls makes reference to this idea at PL, pp. 5~, 1 S’" n. 2, 196-~. See also J ,4F. pp. 36. n. 26. and 
154. For Berlin’s statement of the new , see “On the Pursuit o f the Ideal” : and also “Two Concepts 
o f Liberty” , pp. 212-4.
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certain stage in history. A society w ithout the democratic tradition which gives us 
the fundam ental ideas from  which jusuce as fairness is constructed  cannot achieve 
it. The fact that the overlapping consensus could not be secured w ould be 
sufficient to  show that a necessarv condition o f justice was n o t met. N ow  
presum ably a program  of indoctrination could alter this situation so that the 
overlapping consensus could be achieved after all. But is that an objection to 
Rawlsian justice? Surely almost any theory o f justice could see the conditions o f its 
realisation achieved by a prior program  o f indoctrination. Suppose that merely 
reading a political philosopher’s theory o f justice to a person while she slept (i.e. so 
that no reasoning on her part was involved) were sufficient to bring it about that she 
would do everything she could to realise that political philosopher’s conception o f 
justice (consistent with that conception— so no m urders, for example, if that account 
forbade m urders for the sake o f bringing about a just society). The num ber o f 
philosophical accounts o f justice which are inconsistent with their own reahsauon 
by m eans o f the actions o f individuals w ho had been read to in their sleep is surely 
zero. They m ight no t endorse anyone’s reading to people in their sleep, bu t given a 
society o f people who had been read to, it’s not clear that anything about those people 
w ould render their efforts to bring about justice on the relevant b o o k ’s account 
delegitimising.
The possibility o f its realisation by means o f the actions o f  people w ho had been 
systematically indoctrinated in this way m ight constitute an objection to a theory o f 
justice, I suggest, only when this possibility is necessaij for the realisation o f jusuce 
on that theory. I think that we are m ore inclined to criticise a theory o f jusuce on 
these grounds if  we cannot see how a just society on its conception could arise except
222 See e.g. J.4F, p. 14.
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by a pattern o f systematic i n d o c t r i n a t i o n ( E v e n  then, if we are sufficiently 
convinced that the resultant society w ould be just, we m ight no t count this an 
objection to the theory. But this seems less likely for an actual contracm ahst theory 
o f the sort I am advocating.) So the dilemma facing the Rawlsian is this: either 
explain how  justice as fairness could be realised w ithout a pattern o f  systematic 
indoctrination, or face accusations o f irrelevance.
In light o f this objecuon we can see the significance o f Rawls’s story o f the 
‘steps to overlapping consensus’.-' 4 Rawls tells this story in response to the 
objection “that an overlapping consensus is utopian: that is. there are no t sufficient 
political, social, or psychological fo rces.. .to bring about an overlapping 
consensus” .--3 The idea is that as a m atter o f empirical fact, it can be argued that 
there are sufficient forces present in a diverse range o f societies for convergence on, 
first, a liberal constitutional consensus (in which liberal principles are accepted by all 
“as providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife”)-2' 
and thence on the political conception o f jusuce as fairness. W Tat starts out as a 
liberal modus vivendi, accepted largely because o f its necessity for peace, achieves a 
certain stability founded on three facts:-- first, it fixes the basic polincal rights and 
liberties so that the possibility o f societal breakdown into destrucnve civil strife is 
pushed back over the horizon; second, its applicauon and enforcem ent is relatively 
simple and can be specified in non-divisive terms and procedures, m aking it m uch
2:3 O f course it's possible that exactly the same set o f actions that would be involved in a program of 
systematic indoctrination could come about by chance. I assume that we can safely ignore that here.
224 See P L  pp. Id S -T .
225 PL, p. 158.
226 PL, p. 159.
22 See PL, pp. 161-3.
205
less open to suspicion as merely the cover for the advancem ent o f facnonal aims; 
and finally, it tends to encourage citizens’ reasonableness, which as we have seen 
creates a tendency towards c o n s e n s u s . S i m p l e  pluralism, Rawls claims, “moves 
towards reasonable p l u r a l i s m . W 'T i a t  then makes the constitutional consensus 
into the overlapping consensus on justice as fairness-’1 is the need for non-drvisive 
discussion o f policy with the aim o f creating majorities as well as the need for some 
conception o f the justification underlying the political system in place, in order to 
facilitate society-wide political self-understanding.-’1
H ow  convincing is this? It is true that liberal societies— at least societies with a 
liberal constitutional consensus o f the kind that Rawls describes— have arisen around 
the world, and from diverse beginnings. Rawls’s story about the steps to 
constitutional consensus (he tells a m ore detailed version in the introductions to PL) 
is at any rate n o t obviously implausible as an account o f their origins. But even if it 
turns out to be false, it is also surely false that liberal constitutional consensuses 
have arisen as a result o f the sort o f systematic indoctrination which, if  it were 
necessary for justice as fairness, would provide the basis for the objection. O f  
course, it m ight be claimed that the societies which take the first steps to
228 It is interesting that Rawls explicitly connects reasonableness with “a readiness to meet others 
halfway” in this section [PL  p. 163). This is not something that is obviously part o f die Scanloman 
understanding o f reasonableness which Rawls elsewhere appears to endorse; but it fits very well with 
the characterisation of reasonableness that I have argued the hybrid contractualist m ust endorse to 
avoid the arbitrariness puzzle (see Chapter 3 above).
229 P L  p. 164.
23(1 O r some other moral conception among a class o f liberal such conceptions: Rawls claims of 
justice as fairness only that it is central in this class.
231 See P L  PP- 165-C I take it that this last point is an acceptable gloss on Rawls's comments on pp. 
166-“’.
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constitutional consensus are the way they are as a result o f  systematic 
indoctrination. So does justice as fairness rely upon / /^ r  having indoctrinated their 
m em bersr N o t in the sense that our obiector was worried about. The thought was 
that justice as fairness excluded through indoctrination a range o f views no t 
conducive to  its own stability. Such new s are not excluded by the moral 
conceptions prevalent in the diverse first-step-taking socienes which have 
converged on the constitutional consensus. So the constitutional consensus, at any 
rate, cannot be accused o f relying on their doing so. We are, then, halfway there.
\KTiat o f the m ove from the constitutional consensus to the overlapping 
consensus? D oes that require systematic indoctrination? Again, Rawls’s story seems 
plausible enough, which suggests that it might not. But it is also w orth  highlighting 
his com m ents on the construction o f justice as fairness and the role o f political 
philosophy. A t one point he writes:
N o  political conception o f justice could have weight with us unless it helped to 
pu t in order our considered convictions o f jusnce at all levels o f generality, from 
the m ost general to the m ost particular. To help us do this is one role o f the 
original position.
Political philosophy cannot coerce our considered convictions any more 
than the principles o f logic can. If  we feel coerced, it may be because, when we 
reflect on the m atter at hand, values, principles, and standards are so form ulated 
as ones we do, or should, accept. W e can use the original position to further 
this recognition. O ur feeling coerced is perhaps our being surprised at the
20 " ’
consequences o f those principles and standards, at the implications o f our free
recognition.
The dilemm a that Rawls faced was this: either show how  the overlapping 
consensus could come about without systematic indoctrination, or be condem ned 
to irrelevance. I have suggested that the constitutional consensus certainly can (and 
has) com e about w ithout systematic indoctrination. But clearly there is no 
overlapping consensus on justice as fairness anywhere as yet. N ow , however, we 
can turn to the argum ent o f Theory, its developm ent o f the original position from 
assum ptions that it is contended are fundamental elements m our dem ocratic 
culture, part o f  the liberal constitutional consensus to which we subscribe, and 
consider it in a new light as an attem pt to persuade us to adopt jusuce as fairness 
and thereby bring about the overlapping consensus. So far I have said m uch about 
the forces that tend to make jusuce as fairness, once achieved, stable for the right 
reasons. But I have not offered any aruculation o f the central idea: the poliucal 
concepuon o f justice as fairness. It is the putative fact that this is an elaborauon o f 
the fundam ental ideas that all citizens share which plays the m ost im portant role in 
securing stability for the right reasons. Similarly, it is the putative fact that tins is an 
elaborauon o f the fundamental ideas that we all share which will play the m ost 
im portan t role in bringing about the overlapping consensus in the first place. If  we 
are convinced by Rawls’s argum ent for the principles o f jusuce, and if we can 
convince others, so that jusuce as fairness can be im plem ented, this will no t have
23: PL, p. 45. Cf. p. 2~: we employ the original position “to show how the idea o f society as a fair 
system o f cooperation can be unfolded so as to find principles specifying the basic rights and 
liberties and the forms o f equality m ost appropriate to those cooperating, once they are regarded as 
citizens, as free and equal persons.”
208
come about through systematic indoctrination, and the objection will be met. In 
Chapter 5 I try to  m eet it in this way insofar as it applies to justice as fairness’s 
egalitarianism.
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1. Introduction
An egalitarian conception o f justice with the hybrid contractualist foundations that T 
have been describing in the preceding chapters stands or falls by the plausibility of 
its analysis o f what it is that each person actually accepts. So far, we have seen that 
Rawls’s political conception o f justice as fairness is supposed to be developed from 
the object conception o f society as a fair system o f cooperation between citizens 
regarded as free, equal, reasonable, and rational. The object conception is 
som ething which each individual in a society o f justice as fairness would share 
despite their disagreements about the correct com prehensive conception o f the 
good. Y et surely, we might ask, these divergent comprehensive conceptions would 
tend to give com peting meanings to the various concepts in the object conception? 
In particular, those hopm g to vindicate Rawls’s egalitarianism m ight suspect that the 
idea o f a fair system o f  cooperation is open to too many divergent construals for 
there to be any consensus on the derivation o f (any single set of) egalitarian 
principles from  it.
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M y aim here is to argue that Rawls’s distributive egalitarianism is derived from a 
construal o f fairness which it is plausible to attribute to each person in a Rawlsian 
society. In the light o f our conclusion in the preceding chapter that part o f the 
argum ent for jusuce as fairness appeals also to the acceptability o f its bases to all in 
liberal dem ocrauc pluralist socieues such as our own, the aim is also to show that 
this construal o f fairness is something that individuals in such socieues do in fact 
endorse as part o f their moral oudooks. I don’t take this to  be solely a m atter o f 
empirical surveys, however. Rather, it will involve arguing that the construal o f 
fairness we are interested in is itself constructed out o f uncontroversial com ponents.
Success in this chapter, then, will be consututed by reasoning which plausibly 
takes us from ideas that it is plausible to suppose that we share— that is: you, me, 
those w ho share a liberal dem ocrauc culture, and Rawlsian citizens— to conclusions 
which support the egalitarianism o f justice as fairness. (Rawls’s difference principle 
is a highly egalitarian principle by m ost standards.)' ” Rawls takes the argum ent 
from the original posiuon to be largely independent o f the argum ent o f PL: the 
thought is that if we can connect its prem ises to the overlapping consensus, then
233 Nagel, for example, says it is ‘strongly egalitarian' at “Equality” , p. 109. (Cf. "Equality and Partiality^ 
p. ”’3.) Raz classes it as ‘strictly egalitarian' at The Moraht) of Freedom, p. 232. Some philosophers 
think that it is not egalitarian enough (see e.g. G.A. Cohen, “W here the Action Is: O n the Site o f 
D istnbuuve justice”) and others that it is not egalitarian at all (see e.g. Larry Temkin, “Equality. 
Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection”, especially p. 134). To a large extent, however, these 
philosophers dispute the propriety of categorising the difference principle Math principles which give 
the value o f equality (as they understand it) a more dominant role rather than disputing that the 
difference principle produces outcomes which are highly egalitarian Shawls emphasises that the 
inequalities perm itted by the difference principle would not be great at e.g. J A F , p. 6”). Cf. 
Yeromque M unoz-D arde’s discussion of the difference between ‘political' egalitarianism and 
philosophical egalitarianism in Chapter 2 o f her Bound Together Claims of Others and the Seeds of Selves.
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the fact that it is to be viewed as a deductive argum ent m eans that we have done 
enough to  show that there is an overlapping consensus on its conclusions. I have 
suggested that there seems to be a gap between what the overlapping consensus is a 
consensus on (society as a fair system o f cooperation) and the specific sense of 
fairness which grounds the egalitarianism o f the difference principle. The argum ent 
o f this chapter is intended to close that gap. But it is independent o f the hybrid 
contractualist justificatory structures that I have been discussing hitherto  in the 
same way that the original position itself is.
As a result, the argum ent will resemble other argum ents for egalitarianism 
familiar from contem porary political philosophy m that it will be an attem pt to 
persuade the reader that her own normative intuitions about fairness support 
egalitarian conclusions— that if she thought through those intuitions carefully and 
rationally, she would come to endorse the conclusions.' 4 These contrast with 
arguments which attem pt to derive egalitarianism from  rationality or natural facts, 
for example. Sometimes an appeal to intuition in m oral argum ent can appear to be 
a disappointing dead end, especially when it seems but a short hop from  intuition to 
conclusion. In the hybrid contractualist fram ework I have been elaborating, 
however, arguments which are based ultimately on such appeals are on a sure 
footing, for if  we take pluralism and the burdens o f judgm ent seriously we accept 
already that at the root o f people’s norm ative views are (and should be) intuitions 
about the m oral landscape. That is the concepuon o f moral reasoning that we build 
into our view.
23-4 Cf. for example Temkin, “Inequality: a Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative N otion”, p. 
334.
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The dangers o f this approach, from the hybrid contractualist point o f view, are 
as follows. O n  the one side, there is the nsk that the elaboration o f fairness will be 
insufficient to explain the egalitarianism o f the difference principle at all. It might 
be that minimal accounts o f fairness (such as one, for example, that construes it as 
merely non-arbitrary application o f principles) are uncontroyersial in the sense that 
each person accepts that they should inform  the construcnon o f  principles o f 
justice, but that they are neyertheless insufficiently strong to ground the difference 
principle. O n the other side, there is the nsk that the elaboranon o f  fairness will 
rely on norm ative assumptions which are too strong for it to be plausible to 
suppose that they are shared by eyen'one. The challenge is to steer a course 
between these dangers.
The familiar other arguments from intuitions about the badness o f unfairness or 
the equal yalue o f each person’s utility might slot equally well m to the hybrid 
contractualist framework, in the sense that they too aim at elaborating intuitions 
they take it to be plausible to attribute to us all. The plausibility o f  the overall view 
w ould depend in part on then plausibility as elaborations o f our intuitions. But 
these arguments would not lead to the specifically Rawlsian egalitarian conclusions 
that I w ant to defend. In what follows I try to articulate the conception o f fanness 
from  which Rawls elaborates his egalitarianism and the fundam ental assum pnons 
from  which that conception is elaborated. By starting from  these assumptions, the 
argum ent in effect assumes that you accept them , and so that we can appeal to them  
as part o f an actual contractualist justificanon o f the im position o f the principles 
that are part o f the argum ent’s conclusions. Thus it attem pts to vindicate Rawlsian 
e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  as a view that we should endorse insofar as we are hybrid 
contractualists.
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2. The informal argument\ stage 1: arbitrariness and the erosion oi pnor claims
We know that the two principles are supposed to be derived, ultimately, from the 
object conception o f society as a fair system o f cooperation betw een citizens 
conceived as free and equal, as per the polmcal presentation o f justice as fairness. 
Evidently the concepuon o f individuals as equal goes some way to explaining the 
egalitarian cast o f the two principles. But it seems that there are plenty o f other, less 
egalitarian ways in which a moral concepuon could express the equality o f citizens. 
A dvocates o f megalitanan libertarian theories, for example, do no t suppose that on 
their concepdons individuals are seen as unequal.
\5CTiat does the m ost substannal work in establishing Rawls’s strong 
egalitarianism is the idea o f fairness. This dictates the aspects o f the original 
posiuon— the veil o f ignorance in parucular— which determ ine the parues’ choice 
o f principles. So how does fairness connect up with equality.- In Theory, Rawls 
appeared to be offering two arguments: that which proceeds from  die original 
position, whose conditions are intuitively w hat we w ould accept as fair condiuons 
for the hypothetical social contract, and w hat has since come to be known as ‘the 
informal argum ent’. The original posiuon argum ent, Rawls claimed, was the official 
argum ent; the informal argument was not, “ s tried v speaking, [an] argument for the 
[difference] principle” ."'' But in his later work Rawls ceases to distinguish so clearly 
betw een them . In parucular, the idea that the principles o f jusuce express a 
concepuon o f  ‘reciprocity’ which is aruculated in terms drawn from the informal 
argum ent is explicidy invoked as an elaborauon o f the idea o f fair terms o f
233 Theory, p. 104. 89.
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cooperation."36 So something akin to the informal argum ent should be seen as part 
o f Rawls’s official argument for the difference principle after all. Thus the original 
position, to  the extent that it too is an elaborauon from the idea o f fair terms o f 
cooperauon, m ust also reflect this concepuon o f reciprocity. O therw ise the original 
posiuon cannot adequately elaborate the idea o f fairness implicit in the idea o f 
society as a fair system o f cooperauon (assuming that the difference principle is 
arrived at by only one such elaborauon).
It is no t altogether clear that the original posiuon is based on the same 
elaborauon o f fairness that the idea o f reciprocity expresses. The fairness o f the 
original posiuon seems to be, rather, the fairness o f a bargain— indeed, Rawls says 
as m uch at the outset o f Theory.~’ The idea o f a fair bargain seems different from 
the idea o f reciprocity as Rawls elaborates that. But this is no t im portant for my 
purposes here, since for the hybrid theory the aim is merely to elaborate from 
assum puons about fairness that are plausibly attributed to all to the egalitarianism of 
the difference principle. If  this can be done w ithout employing the original position 
as a device o f representation,"’8 then there is no  need to w orn ' w hether the original 
position also succeeds.
Let us work through the argum ent which takes us from  a broad conception of 
society as a fair system o f cooperation to specifically the difference principle, then.
In Theory, Rawls writes:
216 gee pj___ p yfr and ^4J2 pp "’6_~ ancj 122-4.
23 See p. 12 11.
238 Rawls stresses that this is how  we are to understand the original position: as a device of 
representation o f premises that we accept. See PL, p. 2".
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[A]lthough the difference principle is no t the same as that o f redress [the 
principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress], it does achieve some of 
the in tent o f  the latter princip le... The difference principle represents, in effect, 
an agreem ent to regard the distribution o f natural talents as in some respects a 
com m on asset and to share in the greater social and econom ic benefits made 
possible by the complementarities o f this distribution. Those w ho have been 
favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on 
terms that im prove the situation o f those w ho have lost out. The naturally 
advantaged are not to gain merely because they are m ore gifted, bu t only to 
cover the costs o f training and education and for using their endow m ents in 
ways that help the less fortunate as well. N o  one deserves his greater natural 
capacity nor merits a m ore favorable starting place in society .. .the basic 
structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the 
least fortunate. Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up 
the social system so that no one gams or loses from  his arbitrary place in the 
distribution o f natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or 
receiving com pensating advantages m turn.-3"
But is the difference principle unfairly biased, he asks, towards the least favoured?
D o  the m ore favoured have a reasonable complaint?
Subject to the usual constraints (defined bv the priority o f the first principle and 
fair equality o f  opportunity), society could maximize the expectations o f either 
[the best o ff  or the w orst o ff group] but not both, since we can maximize with
2yj Theory, p. S-7 m the revised edition.
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respect to only one aim at a time. It seems clear that society should not do the 
best it can for those initially m ore advantaged; so if we reject the difference 
principle, we m ust prefer maximizing some weighted mean o f the two 
expectations. But if we give any weight to the m ore fortunate, we are valuing 
for their own sake the gams to those already m ore favored by natural and social 
contingencies. N o  one had an antecedent claim to be benefited in this way, and 
so to maximize a weighted mean is, so to speak, to favor the m ore fortunate 
twice over. Thus the m ore advantaged, when they mew the m atter from a 
general perspective, recognize that the well-being o f each depends on a scheme 
o f social cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life; they 
recognize also that they can expect the willing cooperauon o f all only if the 
terms o f the scheme are reasonable.'41'
Finally:
[Tjhe m ore advantaged representauve m an cannot say that he deseryes and 
therefore has a nght to a scheme o f cooperauon in which he is perm itted to 
acquire benefits in ways that do no t contribute to the welfare o f others. There is 
no  basis for making this claim.-4
240 Tbeori, p. 88 in the revised edition. The text o f the original edition (p. 103 ) makes it less clear that 
the lack o f antecedent claim to greater benefits for the more advantaged is what is supposed to drive 
the conclusion.
241 Theory, p. 104 in the original edition: see also pp. ~2-4 (62-4 in the revised editions. Although to 
an extent any inequalities which benefit everyone relative to the equal baseline do contnbute to the 
welfare o f the w orst o ff group, it is nevertheless true that by com panson with those permitted by the
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The first key claim o f this argum ent, expressed in various form s in these three 
passages, is that the distribution o f natural and social endow m ents is arbiTran' 4‘ 
W'diat does this mean? By 'natural and social endow m ents’ Rawls means the 
capacities and potential capacities, skills and potential skills, influences and possible 
influences, and upbringings the use o f which tends to be rem unerated in primary 
goods by others— i.e. which tend to have a high m arket value. By the distribution of 
natural and social endowments, Rawls m eans the way in which different people 
have different capacities etc. or have the same capacities etc. bu t in different 
degrees. A nd in claiming that this distribution is arbitrary Rawls means to highlight 
merely the lack o f  normafiye justification for it. Some m ight read the passages 
above as well as certain passages elsewhere as prom oting the (stronger) n e w  that 
the arbitrariness o f the distribution o f native and social endow m ents was morally 
objectionable. This would be a m istake.'"' (I shall say m ore about this shortly.; 
Rawls is 00/ implying that there is any distribution o f native and social endowm ents 
which w ould be morally preferable.-44 N ow here does he suggest that something
difference principle, inequalities not perm itted bv the difference principle but still beneficial to all 
relative to equality include for the better o ff benefits which do not contribute to the welfare of others 
alongside those diat do, in the sense that there are wavs in which reduction in the total benefits for 
the better o ff could result in a higher total for the worst o ff
242 At /.-IF. p. 55 Rawls adds that the distnbuuon o f benefits and burdens arising from luck is also (of 
course) arbitrary.
244 See also for example JAF. p. 56; Rawls makes it clear that this would be the wrong reading at 
JAF. p. “ 6.
244 Cohen reads Rawls this wav. See for example Rescuing Justice and FLquaht). p. 1 84. He does 
consider the n e w  I am proposing here (pp. 1 9 5 - but  rejects the consequent inferences to the 
difference principle as too egalitarian to be internally consistent. See below.
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should be done about the distribution itself (such as attem pting to equalise it, for 
example). As he writes,
[t]he natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; no r is it unjust that persons 
are bom  into society at some parucular posiuon. These are simply natural facts. 
WAiat is just and unjust is the way that insutunons deal with these facts.24’’
The next step in the argument is to draw on the fact o f the arbitrariness o f the 
d istnbuuon o f natural and social endow m ents to support the conclusion that no 
one desewes the set o f natural and social endow m ents that she has. Rawls takes this 
to be obvious, I think, in its own righ t.'46 but in any case it follows from the lack of 
any norm auve jusuticauon for the d istnbuuon o f  endow m ents. Nevertheless it is 
im portant because o f the way it is appealed to in the next cmcial step in the 
argument. This step am ounts to the asseruon that no one has a claim to advantages 
in term s o f incom e and wealtigjust in virtue o f her occupying a given place in the 
distribution o f en d o w m en ts^
A great deal turns on this assertion, so it is w orth  focusing on it. It is not 
supposed to be the claim that people w ho are in some sense capable o f 
com m anding m ore primary goods than others outwith society' (in some kind o f state 
o f nature) have no claim to those goods. For Rawls denies that any primary goods 
w ould be produced  w ithout social cooperauon.-4 Thus we are not supposed to see
24- Theory, p. 102 8".
246 His defence o f  the claim in /H T  rests on the rhetorical question: AXTio would denv iH \ See pp. 
"4-5.
24 He emphasises this onlv in J.4F (see p. 61). But it is. as we shall see, hugely important. It 
undermines P arfif s suggestion that the unequal distribution of talents is equivalent to an unequal
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the principles o f justice derived from  the original position as redistributing 
advantages that individuals would have had prior to or outside o f the society 
regulated by those principles, w hatever they turn out to require. The idea is not that 
no one has a claim to the fruits o f her endow m ent (whether in cooperation or not;, 
bu t that no one has a claim to any particular share o f the fruits o f cooperation just in 
virtue o f her place in the distribution (among those cooperating) o f endowments. 
H ence the distribution o f natural endow m ents should not inform  our choice of 
principles o f distnbuuon in one particular sense: we should not be concerned to 
respect anyone’s claims on the primary goods produced  through cooperauon under 
such principles as we choose when we make our choice of principles. (Clearly once our 
choice o f principles has been m ade we should be concerned to respect the claims on 
the primary goods produced through cooperation which are generated by those 
principles.)
The role o f the preceding claim about desert here is as follows. At this point in 
the argum ent we have just m oved from  an asseruon o f the lack o f any norm auve 
jusuficauon for the distribution o f endow m ents to an assertion o f the lack o f any 
norm auve jusuficauon for those with endowm ents which have a high m arket value 
(in some particular m arket— no claims are being made about the absolute or cross­
m arket values o f endowm ents) to com m and a share o f incom e and wealth 
p roporuonate  to that value. I t’s not, however, clear at all that arbitrariness in the 
distribution o f  m eans o f coming by som ething entails demal o f one’s claims to it. If 
I find a pound  in the street because I happen to be the first person to pass by after
distribution o f  manna falling from the sky (see ‘‘Equality or Priority?”, pp. 10-1 lj. For the manna 
does not fall on/) when everyone engages in cooperauon. Parfit implies that Rawls would agree with 
him that the inequalines m manna should be redressed. But this isn't clear at all. See below.
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som eone else has dropped it. the arbitrariness o f the fact that I found it rather than 
anyone else does not ordinarilY lead us to  think that I have no m ore claim to it than 
anyone else. O n the contrary, if restoration o f lost property to its original owner 
proves impossible, we often suppose that it should be given to the person who 
found it. So it seems that the absence o f norm ative justification for arbitrarily 
derived advantages nevertheless m ight not leave the field o f justification completely 
open so that we can go on to select any principle o f distribution that we like.
Instead, we m ight think that one’s having the arbitrarily derrred adyantage gives 
principles which give one claim to it a pnma jade head start over others.
N ow  the claim about desert operates, I think, no t as a stage in the argum ent but 
as a rhetorical device intended to erode this kind o f thinking. \\TThen it is observed 
that my finding the pound in the street was a piece o f luck, it doesn’t seem 
particularly strange to reply that that doesn’t m ean that I don ’t have a greater claim 
to it than you, w ho didn’t find it. But w hen it is observed that I don’t desen>e my 
luck, this m ight be thought to underm ine my greater claim to it com pared to yours 
(all other things equal) m ore than does the observation that my being lucky is 
(obviously) arbitrary. The thought that people should not be perm itted to hold on 
to undeserved advantages is m ore seductive than the thought that people should not 
be perm itted  to hold on to fortuitous advantages.
W e shouldn’t place m uch weight on the claim about desert. It is, o f course, 
entailed by the arbitrariness o f the d istnbuuon of natural talents. If  arbitrary 
d istnbuuons are all that causes me to have something, then it’s clearly not the case 
that I deserve that something. But pointing this out gives no greater force to the 
idea that I shouldn ’/ have that som ething than does pointing out that the causes o f my 
having it are arbitrary. In either case it is open to me to agree with the premise but 
reject the conclusion. As Allan G ibbard notes, “ from the bare assum puon that
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fertility [in the example o f differently fertile single-occupancy islands] is morally 
arbitrary, no  obligation to share follows. The lucky ones could admit that their luck 
is morally arbitrary, and still ask "WTiy share?’”-48 \KTiat is needed is a positive reason 
to deny claims to the unequal shares to which the arbitrary distribution may give 
nse.
3. The injoivnal argument, stage 2: equality and the significance of cooperation
Some critics, faced with Rawls’s endorsem ent o f equality as a 'benchm ark’ at around 
this stage o f the argument, suppose that in order to supply a positive reason o f the 
sort required Rawls must endorse die stronger version o f die first claim in the 
argum ent after all— the claim, that is, that the arbitrariness o f die distribution of 
endow m ents is in itself morally objectionable.-49 For if that is the opening claim, 
then a distribution o f incom e and wealth which reflected and therefore ‘rubber- 
stam ped’ this morally objectionable distribution could plausibly be supposed to be 
morally objectionable itself. This w ould seem to open die way for us to ask which 
distribution w ould be morally preferable and then to answer: an equal distribution. 
B ut such critics fail to take into account die significance o f Rawls’s supposition that 
no  (significant am ounts of) primary goods would be produced w ithout cooperation. 
This is, as I said above, hugely im portant. It gives sense to such assertions as that
248 G ibbard, “Constructing justice’? p. 269.
249 See for example Cohen, who says at p. 196 o f Rescuing Justice and RLquahty that the weaker 
interpretation o f the claim about moral arbitrariness with which the informal argument opens “does 
n o t . . .yustifv beginning with equally  (or. indeed, with anything m particular).. .it does not follow that 
inequality faces a case to answer."
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“ some w orkable arrangem ent is a necessary condition o f the good o f all" and that 
“the well-being o f each depends on a scheme of cooperauon w ithout which no one 
could have a sausfactory life.”-3'
^ T y  is this significant:- The answer is that since cooperauon is a necessary 
condition o f the producuon o f an) ( significant num bers of) primary goods, the 
d istnbuuon o f the primary goods that a given cooperative scheme produces should 
incorporate acknowledgment o f the con tnbuuon  of all. A nd this gives us an answer 
to the quesuon ‘why share?’ The answer is: ‘because these advantages are made j' 
possible only because o f everyone's co n tnbuuon .’ That is no t to say that no 
advantages could be made possible w ithout a con tnbuuon  from  everyone. Rather, 
it is to point out that these advantages are m ade possible by the contnbuuon of 
everyone. This is no t an answer that can be straightforwardly given in the case of 
the found pound. It does no t take social cooperauon to turn my luck from a place 
in an arbitrary d istnbuuon into a financial advantage. But it does take social 
cooperauon to turn my place in the arbitrary d istnbuuon of endowm ents into a 
share o f primary goods.
This is the positive reason needed to deny claims to any unequal shares to which 
an a rb itran  d isuibuuon o f endow m ents among these contnbutors may give nse. 
Shares o f  any (significant) size depend upon everyone’s contnbuuon; the quesuon, 
now, is which parucular set o f shares is jusufied, given that fact together with the 
fact o f  the arbitrariness o f the distnbuuon o f endowm ents. This opens up a 
norm auve space— not clearly opened up until we acknowledged the necessity of 
cooperation to the production o f primary goods— which Rawls fills with a
25f- Theory, p. 103 88. The revised edition omits the first version o f the claim. See also pp. 126- 
8/108-9, /-4F, p. 61, and below.
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presum ptive principle o f equality. For since everyone’s cooperation is a condition 
o f anyone’s having any primary goods, it will no t do to take the default distribution 
to be merely as it happens to be under just any circumstances o f cooperanon. That 
distribution may not adequately reflect the fact that eyeryone’s continued 
cooperanon was a condinon o f anyone’s having anything. An analog)- may help to 
illustrate this. Suppose that I lift you into a tree to collect some apples. You collect 
the applies and jump down again. Then you give me a couple o f apple cores that 
you d o n ’t want, and refuse to give m e anything m ore even though you acknowledge 
that it was completely arbitrary that you were the one selected to pick the apples and 
1 was the one selected to lift you into the tree to pick the apples and that therefore 
it’s as a result o f  that arbitrariness that you have all the apples now. If  you had 
merely found the apples on the ground, die arbitrariness o f die fact diat it was you 
and not I w ho found them  w ould n o t imply diat any principle o f distribution of 
apples betw een us should be applied. But the arbitrariness o f the fact diat it was 
you rather than I w ho picked the apples opens up space for such a principle given 
that we cooperated to bring it about that there were apples available to either of us at all. And so 
you m ust jusnfy your g iv ing  me only apple cores in die apple-picking example in a 
way that you needn’t in the apple-ion ding example.
O ne m ight object at this point that even if cooperation rem oves any default 
claim to such advantages as one may recerce under the circumstances of 
cooperation that happen to arise, the m ost natural choice o f distnbutrce principle to 
fill the space opened up by the acknowledgm ent o f our dependence for any 
advantage upon  the cooperation o f all is one which awards each o f us a share o f the 
total p roduct o f  cooperation in proportion to our contribution. W hat would be 
wrong with my g i v i n g  you only cores in the apple-picking example would be, 
according to this thought, that your contribution to the enterprise was greater than
is reflected by the share that I give you o f the overall proceeds. This principle, 
however, while admitting that no t just any distnbunon will do in view o f the 
necessity o f cooperanon, fails adequately to take into account the arbitrariness of 
the distribution o f endowments. Even if we could isolate each person’s 
contribunon to the total product o f cooperanon (som ething that Rawls demes: see 
note 267 below), the pom t is that it is arbitrary that this is the contnbunon that each 
person is able to make. Im portantly, this is no t only because it is arbitrary that each 
o f us cannot make m ore o f a contribunon to this type o f cooperanve enterprise, but 
also because it is arbitrary that this type of cooperative enterprise is the one that is best for us 
all. To see this, consider the apples again. Suppose that you are very light and I am 
very tall, and that we agree that my con tnbunon  to the apple-pickmg is smaller than 
yours, perhaps because we could have nearly as many apples if I were shorter (there 
are just a couple o f branches that I couldn’t lift you to) whereas we couldn’t have 
even half so m any if you were heavier (almost all the branches would break). Now  
it is still arbitrary, m the relevant sense, that you were the one selected to pick and I 
was the one selected to lift, because the distribunon o f lightness and tallness is no 
less arbitrary than the flipping o f a com. But it is also arbitrary that picking apples is 
the activity that produces the m ost food for us, and not, for example, nckling trout 
and then flipping them  onto the river bank. My height enables me to reach right 
down under trou t in a way that you cannot; your role in this cooperative venture 
w ould be to stop the trout from  wriggling back into the river. We could have 
alm ost as m any trou t if you were heavier (you would be a little less nimble, so one 
or two m ore trou t w ould escape you and wriggle back into the river) but we 
couldn’t have even half as many if I were shorter (most o f the trout hang around at 
my current arm ’s length below the surface o f the water). If  trou t were m ore 
num erous, or apples trees less num erous, my contribution to our food production
would be the greater. Thus the contribution that we are able to  make to a given
/
scheme o f cooperation is arbitrary in a second wav. An^i7sp /to  each according to 
her con tribunon’ is no t a sansfactory choice o f principle to fill the normative gap 
opened by the arbitranness-of-endow m ents based denial o f any claim to the shares 
achieved through cooperation as they happen to turn out (without including, that is. 
the results o f any further principle o f distribution).
The idea so far, then, is to underm ine the thought that people have prior claims 
to  any unequal share o f the fruits o f cooperanon. e do this by (a) pointing out 
that the im portance o f each person’s contribution derives from  factors which are 
arbitrary: her own abilities and (more importantly) the suitedness o f those abihnes to 
the scheme o f cooperanon that society adopts; and (b) pointing out that these fruits 
o f cooperanon are made possible only through the cooperation o f these contributors,
i.e. the cooperating m em bers o f society. Even if one disputes the idea that one’s 
talents are arbitrarily one’s talents ((perhaps because they are inextricably bound up 
with one’s identity), it is hard to deny that it is only in the light o f the suitedness to 
circumstance o f the system which makes one’s talents as socially useful as they are, 
together with o thers’ willingness to cooperate in that system, that one could offer 
even the first premise in an argum ent for a greater share o f the fruits o f cooperation 
on grounds o f productive talent. In the light o f these facts, it seems that it would be 
prima facie unfair to set things up so as to reward peopl^/differentially their role in 
the cooperative system. M oreover, it seems plausible to suppose that we are 
operating here with afi^uncontroversial conception o f faim ess^/If society is a j 
cooperanve system, a process governing the way that individuals are brought 
together in order (among other things) to produce goods, then for it to be a jair 
cooperanve system is for that process to be fair. But it w’ould not be fair at all if it 
privileged som e on the grounds o f their fortuitous suitedness to this parncular
system w hen others would have been better suited than them  to different— but still 
cooperative, and productive— systems and, m oreover, w hen their suitedness is in 
part the p roduct o f training and education which is itself the product o f the 
cooperation o f all. \Jvlien all are contributing inputs to the cooperative system and 
none are entitled to their suitedness to that system, fairness requires equality.
4. The informal argument. stage 3: from equality to the difference principle
The prima jade claim o f each to an equal shareydien, is the next stage in the 
argum ent, and it can then be finessed into the difference principle in recognition of 
the fact that some inequalities may lead to greater shares for everyone than anyone 
receives under an equal d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h e  finessing works as follows. Since no 
one has a prior pnm a facie claim to any m ore than an equal share o f the social and 
econom ic benefits that the cooperation o f individuals with their various natural and 
social endow m ents brings with it, any inequalities in distribution m ust be o f benefit 
to everybody, relative to the baseline o f equality. Unequal distributions under which 
some have less than anyone w ould have under an equal distribution are therefore 
obviously impermissible. But there may be a num ber o f unequal distributions 
which satisfy the condition that they should be o f benefit to everyone relative to the
251 Someone might object that the greater shares are objectionable all the same because o f the various 
undesirable effects o f the inequality they bring with them. However. Rawls denies that these 
undesirable effects would be likely given the degrees of inequality perm itted by the difference 
principle (see Theory y vSC-81 and the discussion of congruence in Chapter 4 above). To the extent 
that they would anse. they could be factored into the argument to limit inequalities in a way 
analogous to the wav that Rawls supposes they would be factored into the argument from original 
position if necessary.
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baseline o f equal shares. How  to choose am ong them? Rawls’s thought is that we 
should simply do as well as possible for the group which does the least well out o f 
the inequalities— that is, for the group which sees the smallest im provem ent in their 
lot from  the baseline o f equality, which is all anyone has a pnma facie claim to in the 
first place. To set up the inequalities any other way— even if it remains the case that 
everyone benefits relative to the equal baseline— would am ount to granting some 
better-o ff groups extra advantages (namely, the difference between what they would 
get under the difference principle and w hat they get under alternative unequal 
arrangem ents satisfying the all-must-benefit-relative-to-equality condiuon^/fust / i,
because o f their suitedness to the system o f cooperation that society^Operates, a 
factor which we have acknowledged to be arbitrary. A nd it would be to penalise 
m em bers o f  the w orst-off group (again, by the difference between wdiat they would 
get under the difference principle and wThat they get under the alternative unequal 
arrangements) for their suitedness to the system o f cooperation— and this despite 
the fact that the cooperation o f everyone is necessary for the production o f these 
benefits. Recognition o f the arbitrariness o f individual suitedness to the system of 
cooperation together woth the necessity o f cooperation to the production o f benefits 
at all, and the consequent claim that no one has any greater claim than anyone else 
to the benefits o f cooperation, are inconsistent wnth a willingness then to tolerate 
inequalities, even those that benefit everyone relative to  the equal baseline, which 
reward the naturally and socially well-suited to this type o f cooperation and penalise 
the less well-suited in this way. As Rawls puts the point in PH:
Because they start from  equal shares, those w ho benefit least (taking equal
division as the benchmark) have, so to speak, a veto. A nd thus the parties arrive
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at the difference princip le .. .those w ho have gained m ore than others are to do 
so on term s that improve the situation o f whose w ho have gamed less.' "
A/
A ,
g T h e  conclusion is that the expectations o f the worst off group should be
m axm iised^K nvthm g else is “to favour the m ore fortunate twice over” .-' ’ Thus we 
arrive at the difference principle w ithout drawing on any controversial premises 
beyond those which took us to p n m a  facie equality.
L et’s highlight the point at which difference principle’s strong egalitarianism 
enters into the argument. We find an obviously strong egalitarianism in the idea 
that the sum o f  primary goods to which no one has a po o r entitlement deriving 
from  natural productive talents should be divided equally among all. This creates 
die benchm ark against which departures from equality are to be judged. But we 
also find w hat Raz calls ‘weak’ strict egalitarianism in the idea that the sum of 
primary goods to which no one has a prior enndem ent— because the cooperation of 
all is necessary to the existence o f  that sum at all— deriving from  natural 
endow m ents should be divided so that departures from the baseline o f no 
entidem ents at all for anyone are to the greatest benefit o f the w orst off.'"'"
252 PL, p. 282.
Theory , p. 88 m the revised version.
254 See The Morality of Freedom, Chapter 9. A strictly egalitarian principle has the form ‘All Fs who do 
not have G have a right to G if some Fs have G :. A weak strictly egalitarian principle tolerates 
inequalities which are such that attem pts to redistribute the extra benefit compared to an equal 
baseline cause it to disappear altogether (i.e. when we are dealing with dumpy’ goods,i. Relative to a 
baseline o f equal shares, the inequalities permitted by the difference principle appear to violate strict 
egalitarianism. But considered relative to a baseline of nothing for anvone. the unequal distribution 
permitted by the difference principle considered as a whole does not violate strict egalitarianism.
The connection between the strict egalitarianism that the difference principle expresses and the
N once that the informal argum ent does no t involve the claim that each is 
independently ennded. for some reason, to a given stock o f primary goods, a stock 
to which she w ould be enuded even if an equal division w ould not fully meet that 
enndem ent, and that an equal division will as a m atter o f fact grant everyone that to 
which she is m dependendy ennded. The informal argum ent does not employ what 
Raz calls a principle o f enndem ent."3' It employs an idea which is fully relanonal: 
because the cooperanve contribunon o f all is necessary for anyone to have any 
prim ary goods, anyone’s having primary goods indicates that everyone else should 
also have prim ary goods. The mere existence o f inequalines in the distribution o f 
primary goods, p n o r to any applicanon o f the difference principle, is sufficient to 
create the egalitarian enndem ents o f that principle.
But w hat makes room  for the strong egalitanamsm o f the difference principle’s 
treatm ent o f  the sum o f prim ary goods produced through cooperanon is Rawls’s 
denial that the distribunon o f the benefits o f cooperation needs no jusnficanon.
The grounds o f this denial are the claims that w ithout the cooperanon o f all, these 
benefits w ould no t be available for distribunon at all and that one’s degree o f 
suitedness to  the scheme o f cooperanon that we adopt is arbitrary. The quesnons 
are therefore, first, which schem e o f cooperanon to adopt and, second, how to 
distribute the benefits that arise from  it. It is here that the strong egalitanamsm of 
the difference principle makes its entrancey^iven that w ithout the cooperanon o f all 
there w ould be no  benefits, #hd given that it is arbitrary diat for any given scheme 
of cooperanon any given person is able to contnbute as m uch as she does, we
reasoning o f the informal argument m at be stated as follows: if some Fs have G, all Fs have a right 
to G, because some Fs have G only as a result o f the (only arbitrarily larger or smaller) cooperanve 
contnbunon o f  all Fs.
-3D The Morality of Freedom, p. 218.
should choose the scheme and distribution which are such that the person who 
benefits least is better off than the person w ho benefits least under any other 
schem e and distribunon.
To summ arise. N o  one should receive a greater share than others except where 
no one w ith a lesser share could do better than she does when the person with the 
greater share receives that share. This is because o f the arbitrariness o f the fact that 
the scheme o f  cooperation which offers the worst o ff as m uch as this scheme does 
requires the developm ent o f  certain capacmes which the better off have and not the 
developm ent o f  certain o ther capacmes which the worst o ff have, and which might 
lead them  to be am ong the better o ff under some other scheme of cooperation.
The difference principle m am fests a recogm uon of the sacnfice that the worst off 
make for the sake o f a greater share for each person (where ‘each person’ does not, 
w hen unpacked, rigidly designate). Recall the apple-picking example: the difference 
principle as applied to the distribution o f apples mamfests recogm uon not only o f 
the arbitrariness o f my being tall and your bem g light, bu t o f the sacnfice I make by 
no t insisting that we go trout-tickling instead— that is, insisting on a cooperanve 
scheme under which I would do better.
5. Reciprocity and impartiality
Rawls stresses, especially in his later work, that this conclusion expresses a 
conception o f reciprocity .'36 Reciprocity, he wntes,
256 See especially JAL. pp. 64 and 6- . as well as Tbeon pp. 102-6 88-91 and PL. pp. 16-".
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is a relation between citizens expressed bv principles o f justice that regulate a 
social world in which even'one benefits judged with respect to an appropriate 
benchm ark o f equality defined with respect to that world."'
The poin t o f reciprocity is that individuals “do not gain at one another’s expense 
since only reciprocal advantages are allowed.”"38 N obody is to benefit from 
cooperation unless their benefiting contributes to other cooperators’ benefiting too. 
Reciprocity is n o t mutual advantage, however, because to be m ouvated by 
reciprocity is no t to be wholly self-interestedly m ouvated."' It requires individuals’ 
support for a d istnbuuon which in some cases gives them  less than other, feasible 
distributions o f  the same fruits o f cooperation might. Rawls also claims diat 
reciprocity is no t impartiality because it draws nevertheless, as an ideal o f 
impartiality does not, on the idea that cooperanve society is to the advantage o f all
25~ PL. p. 1 .
Theorj, p. 104 89.
2--' See G ibbard, “Constructing justice3', pp. 266-~l. Rawls’s own explanauon of whv reciprocity is 
not mutual advantage depends on the idea that if we were to transport people from some situation in 
which the distribution o f holdings did not sansfv his own two principles into a situation in which 
they did, some would not gain (see PL, p. \ But if we were to transport them from a situation in 
which no one had anything into the Rawlsian situation, everyone would gain. This merely serves to 
emphasise that we need some conception o f prior holdings in order to articulate a conception of 
mutual advantage; it doesn’t show that reciprocity isn’t mumal advantage. Rawls does appear to 
offer, at times, such a conception: the ‘no agreement po in t’ o f general egoism. See Tbeo/j, p.
14"1 12R and below.
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(it is no t altruistic).-6 This is im portant because it restricts the scope o f the 
difference principle’s egalitanamsm to the cooperating parties. N on-cooperators are 
no t owed any share o f the fruits o f cooperanon on grounds o f distnbunve lusuce.
I w ant now  to consider an objecnon to the thought that the lntm nons which 
support this idea o f reciprocity are sufficient to sustain jusnce as fairness. The 
objecnon concludes that we m ust a ttnbute  stronger m tm nons which support the 
ideal o f  impartiality instead. This is a senous objecnon, since the ideal of 
impartiality is m uch less plausibly a ttnbu ted  to each person in liberal democranc 
societies. Impartiality implies obliganons as strong as those that we haye to those 
with w hom  we cooperate even to those with w hom  we do not cooperate. It seems 
less likely, given our expenence o f life in liberal dem ocranc socienes, that each 
person accepts such obligations as part o f her fundam ental moral outlook than that 
she accepts ideal o f reciprocity. The obliganon itself is m uch stronger and the 
intuitions o f fairness which w ould sustain it are also less plausible, as we shall see.
So it w ould be good to refute the objecnon.
The objecnon starts with the idea that how  well individuals would do in other 
cooperanve groups m ust be factored m to the quesnon which distnbunve ideals 
w ould receive the support o f each person. I have said that it is an assum puon of 
the inform al argum ent that no (significant) goods can be produced without 
cooperanon; bu t that does no t mean that no goods could be produced without 
cooperation am ong specifically these individuals, that is, the set o f m em bers o f a 
Rawlsian or liberal democratic socien' about which we are asking w hether jusnce as
26,1 See PL, p. T ,  n.18; and also /-4F. p. T  Rawls does not in these passages offer any argument for 
this; he merely endorses G ibbard’s defence of him in “Constructing justice’’'. Tne explanation I offer 
is G ibbard’s.
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fairness m eets the actual contracm alist test (call that set R). So w hat happens when 
we factor the possibility o f altem auve cooperanve groups, com posed o f subsets of 
R, into our thinking about distnbunve principles? Nozick (who suggests this line of 
thinking as part o f an argum ent against the difference principle) thinks that support 
for the difference principle will be senouslv underm ined, since difference-pnnciple- 
regulated cooperanon among R might not be self-interestedlv ranonal for all 
m em bers o f R com pared with m ore limited cooperanon regulated by principles to 
which all can agree.26' We can also com pare difference-pnnciple-regulated more 
limited cooperanon with that among all m em bers o f R. Some might very 
conceivably do better if they w ithdrew from R and cooperated among them selves.'6" 
(In the light o f the trout-nckling example, it should be clear that diese need not, 
however, be those w hom  we m ight designate ‘the talented’ in the cooperanve 
scheme in which everyone participates.) At the very least, some might be able in 
light o f this fact to negonate better term s for them selves in the scheme o f 
cooperanon am ong all o f R.
So although reciprocity is supported as a criterion for the distribution among 
m em bers o f R o f the fruits o f their cooperanon by the intuitions about fairness that 
sustain the inform al argument, it’s no t clear that for some individuals those 
intuinons are sufficient to ground support for the cooperanve scheme which 
includes all m em bers o f R as opposed to some other scheme(s) also regulated by the
261 See .4SU , pp. 192-~.
262 Even taking into account the possibility that those withdrawn from might act aggressively towards 
them after they have withdrawn or as they are withdrawing. Gibbard seems to think that this 
possibility shouts that no one could withdraw (see ' ‘Constructing Justice’? p. 2“2 . though he 
ultimately adduces fairly similar considerations in support o f his doubts about the plausibility of 
justice as fair reciprocity.
difference principle. A m em ber o f R can accept the reasoning in favour o f the 
difference principle and vet reject, preciselv because o f the size o f the shares the 
difference principle (which she accepts) allocates her, cooperative svstems in which 
she does less well than she might— including the scheme o f cooperanon among all 
m em bers R.
If  this is right, then it one m ight suppose that Rawls m ust do something more 
than attribute the intuition o f fairness to the m em bers o f a liberal democranc society 
in order to conclude that each m em ber actually accepts the scheme o f cooperanon 
itself. For surely he needs to have som ething to say to prevent people ‘shopping 
around’ for cooperanve schemes, and so to jusnfv not only the relanve shares that 
the difference principle allocates to cooperators in a given scheme, but also 
parnciparion m that scheme and therefore those shares absolutely?
Two options m ight seem obvious. The first is to attribute a stronger intuition 
o f fairness to cooperators. This stronger m tuinon would involve seeing the mere 
fact o f the arbitrariness o f the distribunon o f  endow m ents and such goods as came 
to people other than by their own hand as sufficient on its own to ground a demal 
that anyone's shares o f any goods should be unequal— w hether they were m em bers o f 
the same cooperative group or not. In that case cooperators would support moral 
conceptions which equalised the shares o f individuals in different cooperative 
groups and outside any cooperative groups alike; and if these shares w eren’t 
equalised, they w ould see shoppm g around for cooperanve schemes as trying to take 
advantage o f one’s place in the arbitrary distribunon o f endowm ents. Consequently 
either there w ould be no advantage to be gamed by shoppm g around or else they 
would no t shop around anyway. The second opnon is to attribute not a stronger 
faim ess-based m otivation bu t a kind o f solidanty among the m em bers o f R which 
would lead them  no t to shop around even though they m ight do better by
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participating in some other cooperative scheme. The thought here is that as before 
evervone hypothencally consents to reciprocity as the criterion for the distnbuuon 
o f benefits o f any cooperanon between them  all, but now in addm on we supulate 
that no one is m onvated to look to  any other (reciprocity-governed) cooperanve 
schem e in the hope o f improving her lot.
But in bo th  cases, according to the objector, the Rawlsian hybrid contractualist 
m ust presuppose m onvanons stronger yet than those that are presupposed 
according to my elaboranon o f the inform al argument. Those presupposed m the 
second o f the two opnons are, m oreover, hard to square with the hvbnd 
contractualist foundanons I have been offering for jusnce as fairness. The 
idennficanon o f the actual contractualist test o f legitimacy as a necessary condmon 
o f jusnce arises from  the idea that it w7ould no t be reasonable to expect an individual 
to accept a moral concepuon which conflicts with her own norm anve 
com m itm ents; the m ove to the pohncal presentanon o f jusnce as fairness anses 
from  the idea that a liberal socien* is a pluralisnc one in which everyone will not rally 
round a smgle com prehensive set o f such com m itm ents. Indeed, m em bers o f a 
Rawlsian society may be very m uch opposed to one another’s moral mews in many 
respects. But we hope, with Rawls, that justice as fairness can, by proceeding from 
shallower, shared foundanons, offer a basis for a public sense o f mumal trust and 
respect. If, however, the account o f justice as fairness’s passing the actual 
contractualist test presupposes the kind o f solidarity am ong m em bers o f society 
which would prevent them  thinking about w hether they m ight do better elsewhere, 
the appeal o f  jusnce as fairness as a new basis for solidarity is limited. So the second 
opnon is no t attracnve.
This leaves the first opnon. This was to make the difference pnnciple’s 
jusnfication to all dependent upon their acceptance o f the view that pno r claims to
benefits how soever arising are to be denied. This means that even those producing 
or finding benefits w ithout cooperation would be demed any greater claim to them 
than anyone else. Rawls, o f course, demes that any such production is possible.
But it also m eans that those producing benefits through cooperation are demed any 
greater claim to them  than anyone else, including those cooperating in other 
schemes. For whereas fairness as reciprocity appeals to non-altruistic m otrres— it 
involves giving fair (i.e. no t arbitrary distnbution-reflecnng) return to each other 
w hen we have cooperated for our own benefit— the stronger idea o f fairness that 
we are considering here involves g i v i n g  fair return (i.e. not arbitrary distribution- 
reflecting) to everyone, regardless o f w hether they have been involved in a scheme for 
our benefit or not. Anydung else, on this stronger idea o f fairness, would be to take 
advantage o f  one’s place in the arbitrary distribution o f endowm ents.
This is the conten t o f the ideal o f impartiality. So the force o f this objection to 
the inform al argum ent is that Rawls cannot stop, in justifying the egalitanamsm of 
the difference principle, at the a ttnbunon  o f the m otivation o f fairness required to 
elicit acceptance o f the inform al argum ent. The ideal o f reciprocity which this 
m otivation leads individuals to endorse is insufficient to prevent individuals from 
shopping around in the way descnbed above. He m ust (so goes the argument; 
accept the ideal o f impartiality and attribute the correspondingly stronger 
concepnon o f  fairness m the m otivation o f Rawlsian individuals.
But the objection fails. W e are interested not in individuals’ choices of 
cooperative schem e b u t in their acceptance o f ideals for the regulation o f 
cooperation m the case o f a w hat Rawls calls a 'closed society’, that is, one whose 
“m em bers e n te r .. .only by birdi and leave.. .only by death.”-6. That being so, we
263 PL, p. 12.
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abstract from  the possibility that anyone could ‘shop around' for alternative 
schemes o f cooperation: this is the only one possible (and the only alternative to be 
considered is one o f no cooperation at all, which secures the idea that cooperation is 
for the good o f all). The closed society assum ption would itself be objectionable if 
it were part o f the argum ent for individuals' acceptance o f justice as fairness that 
justice as fairness was to  each person 's advantage com pared to the alternatives. For 
while that is plainly true with respect to the alternative o f no cooperanon at all, it 
might well be, as N ozick suggests, untrue with respect to a benchm ark o f the shares 
that each individual m ight get in cooperanve groups other than R. Some of the 
things that Rawls savs in places m ight lead one to suppose that a benchm ark o f no 
cooperanon is operating as the baseline in a bargaining process which produces the 
difference principle. For example, he says that “we can interpret general egoism as 
the no-agreem ent point. It is w hat the parnes would be stuck with if they were 
unable to reach an u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t  these com m ents are offered as 
descnphon o f the sim anon facing the parnes in the original posinon rather than a 
description o f the sim anon for which jusnce as fairness as a whole is constructed.-6" 
The funcnon, in this latter context, o f  the idea that no goods at all would be 
produced absent cooperanon is no t to provide a benchm ark for the purposes o f 
ascertaining an agreem ent poin t in a bargaining process which each individual is
264 Theory. p. 136 'IT - 8 .  See also p. 14~. 12L cf. pp. 15 13-4 and PL. pp. 2^8-9.
265 N once that when Rawls describes the 'circumstances o f ]usnce; at Theory, pp. 126-8 109-10, the 
generality o f the discussion suggests that Rawls new s society in general as a cooperanve venture for 
mutual advantage rather than that he takes any given instance of a society to be a venture for the 
mutual advantage o f its m embers as compared with other possible cooperative ventures.
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conceived as engaging in. It is no t invoked as a point o f com parison.201 Its function 
is, rather, is to highlight the necessity, in anv given scheme o f cooperanon, o f the 
contribution o f all the cooperators to the specific fruits o f that specific scheme of 
cooperanon.
WHien we are asking about w hat w ould be a just distribunon for a given scheme 
of cooperanon, then, we are no t interested in counterfacm als about how well 
individuals w ould do under the alternatives. So assum ing away those counter factual 
situanons by considering only the case o f a closed society does no t alter the content 
o f w hat it is that we suppose that each person w ould accept given m tuinons of 
fairness. This brings out w hat is w rong with the objecnon. The objecnon takes it 
to be im portant to explain why individuals w ouldn’t ‘shop around" for a better deal. 
But such shoppm g around w ould threaten jusnce as fairness only if it the shoppers 
used the deals that they could get m o ther cooperanve schem es to give themselves 
bargaining advantages in negotiating their shares under the Rawlsian scheme. 
However, their acceptance o f reciprocity as the appropriate ideal for governing the 
relanons o f m em bers o f the Rawlsian schem e entails that they would not do this.
So there is no need to explain why they w ould no t shop around. It is true that we 
have nothing to say to stop individuals w ithdraw ing from  any given scheme of 
cooperanon in order to join some other scheme m which they m ight fare better.
But why should he have to have anything to say about this." Should he be 
distinguishing betw een individuals w ho seek to withdraw because they feel a sense 
o f belonging in some other society and those w ho seek to withdraw because their 
talents m ight be developed differently and rew arded m orer (Consider by analogy
266 1 dispute, therefore, one com m on reading o f Rawls: see e.g. G.A. Cohen, Sell-Ownership. Freedom, 
and Equalit) , pp. 224-5. and Barbara Fried, “I f  You D on’t Like It, Leave It” , p. 40.
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som eone w ho withdraws from friendships because he doesn’t feel able to earn' the 
burdens that the dunes o f friendship impose. Should som eone w ho is trying to 
describe the dunes o f fnendship alter the content o f those dunes in light of the 
possibility o f  such a person?) E ven ' other scheme will also be regulated by justice as 
fairness, given the m ouvanons o f those involved; and this is w hat we are interested 
in.
C oncepnons o f jusnce o f the variety that Rawls aims to defend are concepnons 
o f jusnce to be applied to the relanons between the m em bers o f a single socien.
The actual contractualist challenge is to show that the m em bers actually accept this 
concepnon o f jusnce. The informal argum ent offers reasons to suppose that 
individuals m ouvated to cooperate on fair terms with those with whom  they 
cooperate— as we have supposed that in d in  duals in Rawlsian society, each sharing 
the object concepnon o f society, would indeed be m ouvated— would accept, in the 
sense we are interested in, the difference principle as regulauve o f their cooperanon. 
Stronger m ouvations w ould indeed be required if those individuals were also to 
accept that they should no t consider their prospects in altem auve schemes o f 
cooperation. But jusnce as fairness does n o t seek to show this.
Could it be objected that refusing to offer an account explaining why individuals 
would no t consider their prospects in altem auve schemes leaves Rawls open to the 
possibility o f  instability? A fter all, if individuals were constantly considering their 
prospects in altem auve schemes, it seems unlikely that a stable society could 
emerge. The answer to this objecnon is twofold. First, we can invoke once again 
the congruence argum ent and in parncular the claim that individuals would have 
sufficient m eans to live decent lives and so, given fair cooperanve terms which each 
accepts, w ould have no strong material incennve to seek altemauve schemes. W e 
can also note  that individuals’ conceptions o f the good are in general not focused on
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the need to maximise one’s absolute stock o f income and wealth. Second, and more 
prosaically, we can point to the costs o f withdrawing cooperanon. The possibility 
that individuals will w ithdraw cooperation in order to form or join cooperanve 
schemes in w hich they m ight have better expectanons in term s o f primary goods is 
real, bu t unlikely to  be realised to any great extent. This is simply because it is costly 
(not only in term s o f  prim ary goods) to leave one’s society and costly to join and 
form one also. I f  there was injustice in these costs, this m ight be an objection in 
itself. But it is no  part o f  the objector’s case that there is such an injusnce. And 
there is no reason for us to  adopt the view that there is one either.26
26 One w orn- that the criterion o f reciprocity gives nse to is the possibility that those who do not 
contribute to the social product, but w hom  we would ordmanlv see as members o f society, are not 
owed a difference-pnnciple regulated share. For die necessity o f these cooperators to these fruits of 
cooperanon is, as 1 said above, an essennal com ponent o f the defence o f reciprocity as elaborated 
from mtuinons o f fairness. Rawls puts aside the quesnon of how to deal with the candidates most 
likely to be proposed as non-contnbutors, namely diose with low levels of “physical capacmes and 
skills” (see PL, pp. 183-6; cf. Collected Papers, p. 368, and G.A. Cohen, Seh-Ownership. Freedom, and 
'Equality, p. 225, n. 33). But elsewhere he offers us the basis of an answer to the w orn- when he 
claims that “ [t]here is no  quesnon o f determining anyone's contribunon to society, or how much 
better off each is than thev w ould have been had they not belonged to it”’ (PE. p. 2~’9). The fruits of 
cooperanon, even the m atenal fruits o f cooperanon, are the product o f much more than the work of 
those in easily identified manufacturing careers and the like. A person need not be in such a career 
to be properly counted a contributor. So the realhnt beneath which individuals count as non­
cooperators will be m uch lower than the capacities of the normal subjects of these discussions would 
suggest. It might not be so implausible to suppose that individuals beneath diat line are not owed a 
difference-pnnciple-regulated share as a dun' o f justice.
242
6. Conclusion
The aim o f  this chapter was to present an argument for the egalitarianism o f Rawls’s 
principles which could slot into the hybrid contractualist framework that I have 
been recom m ending. The nature o f that framework m eant that the cntena for the 
argum ent’s success were slightly different from those that one might ordinarily 
expect. For n o t only was it necessary to present a cogent argum ent from premises 
to the egalitarian conclusion, but also it was im portant that the intuitions o f fairness 
with which the argum ent begins should not be so extreme that it would be utterly 
implausible to attribute them  to each person in the Rawlsian society or, given the 
indoctrination objections I raised in the foregoing chapter, ours.
It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that we share the object conception 
o f society as a fair system o f cooperation between citizens regarded as free and 
equal. E lem ents o f  this concepnon are appealed to regularly in polmcal argument. I 
think that it is also reasonable to suppose that we share the concepnon o f fairness 
which ultimately determ ines the egalitanamsm of the difference principle. To some 
extent this is an em pincal m atter: bu t to some extent too it is a m atter o f drawing 
out the implications o f that concepnon o f fairness and connecting it with other 
familiar and w ell-supported ideas, such the idea that the distribunon o f talents is a 
‘natural lottery’, on the way to the egalitarian conclusion. I have been less quick to 
m ove from  fairness to equality than others.26* Rawls too w ntes o f our acceptance of 
the conditions on the original posm on, a device for representing the ideas of 
fairness involved in selecting the difference principle, as fair; clearly, he supposes 
that his elaboranon o f the concept o f fairness will find support in die audience to
268 Temkin. for example. See the references to his work above.
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which he addresses his theorising."6 If  it seems reasonable to suppose that we share 
that conception, it cannot be less reasonable to suppose that individuals in a 
Rawlsian society, w ho have grown up and been educated under jusnce as fairness,
£
w ould also share it.
The twin dangers that I w arned o f at the start o f this chapter were: on one side, 
too strong a concepnon o f  fairness to be plausibly attributed to each person in a 
Rawlsian society; on the other, too  weak a concepnon of fairness to support the 
egalitarian conclusions we wanted. The argum ent o f this chapter addressed these 
dangers in different ways. The second was addressed by showing how the 
egalitanamsm o f the difference principle is substantial and well-supported by 
considering the arbitrariness o f  indm duals’ suitedness to a green cooperanve system 
together with the considerauon that the contnbunon of everyone is necessan’ to the 
creanon o f that system ’s specific social product. In other words, it is addressed by 
arncularing the inform al argum ent and m aking explicit its premises. I tned to 
address the first danger, m eanwhile, by showing that motives o f fairness associated 
with these prem ises, and no t stronger motives o f impartiality, underlie individuals’ 
acceptance o f  the difference principle. Given our tendency to think that our dunes 
o f jusnce are primarily to our fellow-cmzens, and not to all people, the motives 
required for an acceptance o f  reciprocity is much m ore plausibly attributed to each 
o f us than those required for acceptance o f impartiality.
Obviously this doesn’t show that each person does actually endorse the 
concepnon o f  fairness that the informal argum ent draws on even if she does share 
the object concepnon. O n a hybrid connacm alist new , like any actual contractualist 
n ew , w hat is just is hostage to empirical facts about what people actually accept.
2('(J See e.g. JAF , p. 80. Cf. Theory, pp. 580-2 508-10.
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A fter we have set out the foundanons. a great deal of argum ent is, as we have seen 
over this and the preceding chapter, to some extent speculauve. The best we can do 
is hope to  persuade the reader. But no less is true o f the n ew s o f Locke. Hobbes, 
and N ozick. A nd  we have the advantage that the reader’s own views are a good 
guide to those o f  the in d in  duals in w hom  we are interested. Putting the argument 
for the difference principle to her is a viable means o f persuading her that others 
actually accept it in the sense we want.
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7. The hybrid view: an oveniew
The first two chapters o f this thesis were concerned to describe two forms of 
response to the ideal o f  individualistic justification: what I called actual 
contractualism  and w hat I called m odal contractualism. In particular, I sought to 
distinguish certain structural characteristics o f the two new s. Acmal contractualists, 
I argued, are m arked by two essential features: the specification o f a moral 
background and the specification o f a legitimising process o f unanim ous 
acceptance. A key poin t about this legitimising process is that it involves an appeal 
to an actual exercise o f  each individual’s agency in order to justify the imposiuon o f 
new norm s. M ost actual contractualists also give an account o f the moral 
conception so legitimised. A m ong these, ‘dual condition’ and ‘mixed condition’ 
actual contractualist theories argue that at least aspects o f the moral conception that 
they advocate ought, for m oral reasons independent o f the acmal contractualist 
process o f  legitim ation, to be legitimised via that process. A nd among these, ‘unified’ 
theories claim that the (relevant aspects o f the) moral concepnon that they advocate 
is legitimised precisely because those individuals whose acmal acceptance is
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necessary accept )those aspects of) that moral concepnon for those moral reasons. 
There is, I suggested, som ething very sansfring about unified dual condiuon acmal 
contractualism . I then discussed the acmal contractualist new s o f Hobbes, Locke, 
and N ozick in the context provided bv this analysis, arguing that the emptiness of 
H obbes’s m oral background in parncular gives his n e w  some of the attracoon of a 
unified dual condiuon view.
Acmal contractualism  has a certain appeal as an interpretanon of the 
individualistic jusnficatory ideal in that it requires real unanimity in m dinduals’ 
actual new s. It realises the ideal by requiring that the basis for proposed moral 
concepnons be actually accepted by each in d in  dual. Unanimity is something that 
even modal contractualists see as an ideal o f indindualisnc |usnficauon; as we have 
seen, they som etim es suggest indeed that m odal contractualism is appealing itself 
because it is the closest we can realisucally get to it. How ever that may be, modal 
contractualism  also m am fests the following attracnon which actual contractualism 
does not: it is concerned from  the start that m oral concepnons should be objective]} 
justifiable, no t just jusufiable in the (even considered) opinion o f each person.
Modal contractualism , then, has its own attracnons independently o f die fact 
that it purports to in terpret the mdividualisnc ideal. In Chapter 2 I argued that what 
makes it also an interpretation o f  that ideal is its idenuficauon o f the Individualist 
Restriction on reasons for the rejecnon o f proposed moral concepnons. This 
restriction requires that any such reasons appeal to a proposed concepnon’s 
implications for smgle individuals, and no t to implicauons for aggreganons o f 
individuals or to  im plicanons for the achievement o f impersonal values. Therefore 
if the acmal contractualist reason for rejection o f a proposed moral concepnon—  
namely that som e individual does not accept it— conform s to the Individualist
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Restriction, we m ight hold out hope o f combining the com peting attracnons of 
m odal and actual contractualism  into a single “hybrid’ new .
A nd this is m deed the core o f the n e w  I have been developing: that there is a 
m odal contractualist case to be m ade for the necessary condm on o f justice 
employed by acmal contractualist theories. That condition is a condiuon of acmal 
acceptance, and we can discover a m odal contractualist case for the constmal o f it 
that I argued for at the end o f  C hapter 3 in the Rawlsian idea o f the burdens of 
judgment, according to  which individuals can and do fauldesslv differ in their 
sincere assessm ents o f  the m oral and ethical facts. Because o f the burdens o f 
judgment, it is unreasonable to expect a person to accept a moral concepnon based 
on a moral outlook that she does no t actually endorse.
This hybrid contractualist view is potenaally very attracuve. Both acmal 
contractualism  and m odal contractualism  have, as we have seen, strong appeal as ' 
in terpretauons o f  the ideal o f  individualisac justification, and the hvbnd view j 
promises to com bine them  b o th — even, indeed, to realise them  m ore fully than 
either o f the two approaches does on its own. But there are certain difficulnes. The 
appeal o f acmal contractualism  is com prom ised if its scope— the consumency of 
those whose acmal acceptance is necessary for the justice o f a moral concepnon— is 
restricted in ways w hich d o n ’t follow from  the basis o f requiring acmal acceptance 
in the first place. B ut restncnons beyond those which follow from the burdens-of- 
judgm ent basis for acmal contractualism  appear to be justified by die modal 
contractualist fram ew ork which underlies the condition o f acmal acceptance. For 
m odal contractualists have no reason to be concerned with the actual acceptance or 
rejection o f  a p roposed  m oral concepnon by those w ho don’t acknowledge, further, 
the m odal contractualist reason that they have to find and comply with principles
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that each person  can reasonably be expected to accept. I called this the puzzle of 
scope reconciliation.
M oreover, am ong those w ho do acknowledge this modal contractualist reason 
we face a further difficulty which I called the arbitrariness puzzle: if they prioritise 
this reason, as it seems that they should, and what someone can reasonably be 
expected to accept is just w hat she does accept, then why w ouldn’t each person be 
ready to  accept anything in order to reach agreement and so have complied with the 
reason that she has to find and comply with principles that each person actually 
accepts? WTiv isn’t all we need for consensus mere coordination?
Drawing on Rawls’s work, 1 argued in Chapter 3 that we can meet these two 
difficulties by affirm ing a particular concepnon o f the role that the modal 
contractualist reason should play in the reasoning o f those w ho acknowledge it. 
Acknowledging it should entail a readiness to reconsider and perhaps modify one’s 
judgments about the m oral and ethical facts. But a readiness to reconsider does not 
entail a willingness to abandon one’s judgments in the face o f o thers’ rejecuon of 
them. It creates a tendency tow ards consensus, but a consensus determined by the 
range o f (non-arbitrarv) starting points rather than by arbitrary coordination.
This solves the arbitrariness puzzle. It also allows us to sidestep the puzzle of 
scope reconciliation. F or w hat follows from  the fact that som eone might 
reasonably fail to change her view at all even though she acknowledges the modal 
contractualist reason and incorporates it into her reasoning is this. W e— the 
theorists— m ust acknowledge the possibility that som eone w ho fails to acknowledge 
the m odal contractualist reason, and w ho therefore excludes herself from the modal 
contractualist’s scope, might, even if she were reasonable, continue to accept and 
reject precisely the same m oral conceptions that she accepts and rejects now. We 
therefore cannot ignore her acceptance and rejection, since it is possible that she
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could reasonably reject the m oral conception we propose. So we have reason to 
seek the acceptance o f even those w ho are pnma jade excluded from the modal 
contractualist’s scope. Thus the restriction in the hvbnd theory’s scope which 
threatened to  underm ine its ability to share the attraction o f straightforwardly acmal 
contractualist theories is not, after all, effected.
Having thus distinguished the framework o f a hybrid contractualist theory, I 
turned to an exam ination o f  Rawls’s later mews in order to fill this framework out 
into a full egalitarian mew. I started by considering the strategy o f poliucal 
construcnm sm  as a way to  argue that individuals in a pluralistic society such as that 
regulated by justice as fairness, the m oral conception ultimately advocated by Rawls, 
actually accept that m oral concepuon. I noted that asking about acmal acceptance 
in the Rawlsian society and no  o ther (the ‘head-first’ approach) expresses our own 
acceptance o f a dual condition acmal contracmalism: we suppose that justice as 
fairness is independently w ell-grounded, bu t that to be just it m ust also pass the 
actual contractualist test set by the hvbnd theon'. In ignoring other moral 
conceptions that m ight be accepted we m anifest our supposition that these would 
no t pass the regulative conception test that is part o f all dual condition mews. I also 
noted that the head-first approach brings with it the advantage o f our familiarity 
with the norm ative mews that are likely to be held by individuals m the Rawlsian 
society together w ith the disadvantage that it m ust respond to accusations that the 
acmal contractualist test is m et only through indoctrination.
Poliucal construcuvism  relies on the ‘shallowness’ o f the foundations we can 
give to jusuce as fairness. Calling them  shallow expresses the fact that they are 
implicit in an ‘object concepuon’ o f  society as a fair system o f cooperauon between 
reasonable individuals w ho have their own concepuons o f the good to pursue, 
rather than m the deeper fundam ental judgments that we— the theorists— endorse
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after our own consideration o f the moral landscape. This fact makes it plausible to 
suppose that they m ight be shared by each person. M ore im portandy, though, it 
creates room  for us to  suggest that they m ight be the focus o f an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ o f  different com prehensive doctrines. In an overlapping consensus, 
each person afhrm s the foundauons o f justice as fairness and gives the values that 
the political constructivist elaborates from  them  norm auve priority over the other 
parts o f  her com prehensive view. W'Tv should we agree that such a consensus 
would anser I considered a num ber o f reasons: because we suppose that people in 
the Rawlsian society will conceive o f society in the way that permits the poliucal 
construcuvist p resen tanon  o f jusdce as fairness: because we suppose that people are 
in general reasonable and so inclined to reconsider n ew s which conflict with each 
other, which creates a tendency to consensus on shared elements; because o f the 
fact that the values associated with our life together in society are so im portant, 
given the idea that society is the ‘groundw ork o f our existence’; and because, as I 
w ent on to argue in C hapter 5, the concept o f fairness involved in the object 
conception, and which is the basis o f  jusuce as fairness’s egalitarianism, is m ore 
plausibly attributed to  each person  than the egalitarianism it produces might lead 
one to expect. These do no t consutu te proofs that the overlapping consensus will 
be secured, bu t they give us grounds for hope. This is not obviously a fault with the 
Rawlsian hybrid view: all acmal contractualist theories rely to some extent upon 
speculation and predicnons rather than proof. G ood  grounds for the predicnons 
are the m ost we can ask.
The head-first approach provokes objecuons that jusuce as fairness can pass the 
acmal contractualist test only through indoctrination, as I m enuoned a m om ent ago. 
The rem ainder o f  C hapter 4 analysed and replied to this objecuon. I idenutied four 
form s that it m ight take and argued that each one fails. The hybrid view does not
rely on anyone’s having false beliefs, or on anyone’s failing to think through their 
beliefs. F o r the best reasons we can think o f are offered m favour o f justice as 
fairness as a regulative conception, and a society o f justice as fairness meets the 
condition o f  full publicity whereby these same reasons are made publicly ayailable. 
M oreover, the hybnd  view does no t rely on anyone’s acting against their own 
interests. N o t by the standards o f justice as fairness, as the conception o f primary 
goods as citizens’ needs gives us reason to suppose that a society o f justice as 
fairness w ould n o t be contrary to citizens’ interests. A nd not by the standards o f 
individuals’ ow n diverse conceptions o f the good, precisely because if the 
overlapping consensus is secured, then individuals have reasons stemming from 
their own conceptions o f the good to support justice as fairness. Finally, the hybnd 
view does n o t rely on anyone’s having been brought up in conditions other than 
those in which they should have been brought up. For, in the first place, the 
conditions in which individuals m the Rawlsian society are brought up are as close 
to ideal conditions o f  non-m doctnnation  as an objector concerned about 
indoctrination could hope for. A nd in the second place, the conditions under which 
justice as fairness is realisable can be reached w ithout recourse to the sort o f 
systematic indoctrination that w ould lead us to reject a theory if it were the only 
means o f b ringing the recom m ended m oral concepuon about.
The final quesnon that I addressed in Chapter 5 was: can we use the strategy of 
poliucal constructivism  to construct an egalitarian theory? That, I take it, is also 
part o f Rawls’s aim (though no t initially m those terms) throughout his work. 
Consequently I a ttem pted  to reconstruct Rawls’s argum ent for the difference 
principle as expressive o f ‘reciprocity’ in order to show that the assumptions on 
which it is based could m deed be employed in a poliucal constructivist presentauon. 
This m eans that it w ould be plausible to see them  as elaborauons o f elements in the
object conception  that each person shares. A good test o f this is that y o u  and I. 
citizens in liberal W estern democracies and among the best real-life counterparts to 
the im agined Rawlsian citizen, find the argum ent convincing. 1 tried, therefore, 
simply to bring out the m oral intuitions— the unfairness o f anyone’s having a claim 
upon a greater share o f  the fruits o f cooperanon just in virtue o f her suitedness to 
the cooperative system in question, given the necessity o f the contribution o f each 
person to  the p roducuon  o f  those fruits— upon which the argum ent is based and to 
explain how  they support the egalitarianism o f the difference principle. The hope is 
that y o u , the reader, will find this plausible. I f  so, and we can successfully make the 
same case to others, then egalitarian hybrid contractualist jusnce is achievable.
M uch m ore w ould need to be said for a complete jusnficanon o f Rawlsian 
liberalism by appeal to  the hybrid theory. In particular. I have not addressed 
Rawls’s first principle at all, and I have not argued for the primary goods metric 
beyond explaining how  it m ust be based on ‘a partial similarity in the structure of 
citizens’ permissible concepnons o f the good’. That is compatible with non- 
resourcist metrics, though Rawls h im self rejects these. My aim has been only to 
show how egalitarianism, on w hatever metric, can be justified on a hybnd 
contractualist view.
2. The hybnd view and the actual contractualist tradition
The account I have been developing offers a (dual, unified) hybnd contractualist 
condition for the justice o f  p roposed moral concepnons and proposes that an 
egalitanan m oral concepuon can m eet it. Much o f Chapters 4 and 5 have been 
devoted to  explaining how  these two parts are connected and how the just society
according to  this account is connected with our own. This gives the account 
perhaps a peculiarly empirical aspect, considered next to many other contemporary 
theories o f  justice. Few such theories concern themselves with what each mem ber 
o f society actually thinks about moral m atters except indirectly in the sense that at 
some poin t in a dem ocranc society any policy m ust win the support o f sufficient 
num bers if  it is to  be im plem ented. O f  course they, like the argum ent o f Chapter 5, 
often start from  intuitions that the reader is presum ed to share, and in that sense, 
since the theories are addressed to anyone w ho reads them , they aim to show that 
each person accepts their conclusions. But they don’t explicitly ask about the 
likelihood o f  the assent o f  each person besides the reader. A nd in particular they 
don’t explicitly employ such assent as a criterion o f the jusnce o f implementing their 
proposals. Even acmal contractualist theories o f jusnce tend not to be thought of 
as discussing acceptance in term s o f  p roposed  m oral concepnons’ fit with 
individuals’ moral x lews. Rather, the p roposed  moral concepnons are said to meet 
the acmal contractualist condm on because o f the likelihood of consent for non- 
m oral mutually disinterested reasons by each person.
The hybnd contractualist account, then, asks about the likelihood o f agreement 
on moral foundanons am ong people w ho in many respects disagree fundamentally. 
Furtherm ore, it asks us to speculate about the likely developm ent o f individuals’ 
m oral views under parncular h istoncal condm ons. This may seem to make it in 
some ways unphilosophical. T o  a certain extent this impression is underm ined by 
drawing attention to  the ways in which an ordinary philosophical argument from 
certain intuitions for the egalitarianism o f Rawls’s difference principle, doubles up, 
in addressing itself to  you— a reader in the kind o f society* in which acceptance of 
that argum ent is hypothesised— as evidence for the empirical claim about the 
likelihood o f  acceptance to the extent that it is successful. But to some extent the
254
empirical aspect is anyway in keeping with the actual contractualist tradinon. As we 
saw m C hapter 1, bo th  H obbes and Locke speculate about how life would be and 
w hat people w ould think under conditions prior to anyone’s actual acceptance in the 
sense that is necessary for cm ] society as they conceive it. H obbes can be read as 
supposing either that each person w ould seek his own conservation or that each 
person w ould w ant a situation in which the general observation o f the laws of 
nature was guaranteed; m either case, he w ould ‘seek peace’ the only way possible: 
through the creation o f  the leviathan. Locke too can be read in two ways: either as 
proposing a need for security or as proposing acceptance o f the norm s o f the law of 
nature as the basis o f  individuals’ agreem ent to the social contract. The point of 
these speculations is to ground  a judgm ent about what people did actually accept or 
would actually have accepted, since that acmal acceptance is a necessary condition 
o f the justice o f the m oral conceptions being proposed. The proposal is hostage to 
the facts about w hat people really did or really w ould have accepted in just the way 
that the Rawlsian proposal I have offered is hostage to the facts about whether we 
do actually accept the egalitarian elaboration o f intuitions o f fairness.
The hybrid theory has advantages over the Hobbesian and Lockean approaches, 
however, m the following respect. Their speculations make no attem pt to connect 
what they suppose that individuals w ould have accepted with the moral psychology 
o f hum ans b rough t up specifically in the state o f nature. They draw instead on what 
they take to  be im m utable hum an nature. A lthough o f course our best 
understanding o f  hum an nature m ust play a part in our expectations about what 
individuals w ould  accept or not, it is surely implausible nevertheless to suppose that 
it is uninfluenced by the institutions under which they have been brought up. So 
speculations abou t w hat individuals do or don’t accept are properly also informed 
by know ledge about such institutions. Here, the Rawlsian head-first approach is
preferable: first, because it takes this idea seriously, concerning itself with the effect 
upon individuals that an upbringing under institutions o f justice as fairness would 
have; and second, because we have first-hand knowledge o f the normative beliefs 
prevalent under institutions similar to those o f justice as fairness. It is the worries 
about indoctrination  that this gives nse to— not at issue w hen one bases one’s 
speculations u pon  assum ptions about im m utable hum an nature— that explains the 
other empirical aspect o f  the view I have been developing. A plausible account o f 
the conditions o f  individuals’ acceptance o f jusnce as fairness as historically possible 
via processes o ther than upbringing under its institunons gives us reason to grant 
that a form  o f  indoctnnauon  for self-perpetuanon is no t the sole source o f that 
acceptance.
All o f this gives us, I believe, one wav o f understanding Rawls’s concepuon of 
poliucal philosophy and specifically justice as fairness as ‘realisucally utopian’.' " 
jusuce as fairness, he writes, “probes the limits o f the realistically practicable, that is, 
how far in our w o r ld .. .a dem ocratic regime can attain com plete realizauon o f its 
appropriate poliucal values” .2 1 T he utopiam sm  o f the hybnd approach lies in the 
starting pom t o f a Rawlsian society: we ask about individuals’ oudooks under 
insutuuons which are n o t those o f  our world as it stands. Part o f the story about 
the realistic pracucabihty o f jusuce as fairness, meanwhile, is told by the discussions 
o f its stability for the right reasons. B ut part o f it m ust also be told by the account 
o f how  we get to u topia from  w here we are. In this sense, a theory might be 
realisucally u topian  only with respect to parncular historical circumstances: H obbes
270 See J-4F. pp. 4-5, 1 3; cf. PL, pp. lxj-lxn. 
r] JAF, p. 13.
256
and Locke could be realistically utopian for people in the state of nature, but thev 
are n o t realistically utopian for us, now.
H obbes and Locke are in another way not realistically utopian at alb though, 
because a theory  is realistically utopian only when it is willing to probe the limits of the 
practicable. T o  take hum an nature as a starting point w ithout paying attention to its 
mutability, to the role o f  a m oral conception as educator,"" is to concentrate unduly 
on the ‘realistic’. A lthough Rawls invokes Rousseau’s ‘men as they are, and 
institutions as they m ight b e ’, it w ould not be wrong to say that realistic utopianism 
requires us to consider b o th  m en and institutions as they m ight be. For human 
nature as it is gives us scope to  consider the different ways in which we can be 
moulded.
The Rawlsian hybnd  n e w  differs from  H obbes’s and Locke’s views as well as 
their contem porary descendents’ n o t only in the ways I have ]ust descnbed but in its 
novel basis for the requirem ent o f acmal contractualist legitimacy in the first place. 
Underlying Locke’s acmal contractualism  is a conception o f individual autonom y as 
w hat I called ‘au tonom ous living’. This explains the requirem ent o f consent for the 
legitimacy o f the im posinon  on individuals o f a moral concepuon (consent 
preserves au tonom ous living); bu t as I argued, it also leads to a less thoroughgoing 
acmal contractualist condition than we m ight hope. For the concern with 
autonom ous Irving m les out a m oral background in which the condm ons o f that 
autonom ous living (as Locke conceives them) aren’t secure. Otherwise consent 
C2in\presence au tonom ous living. The moral background, o f course, isn’t subject to
r :  Rawls stresses tins function o f what I'm  calling a moral conception at PL. p. “ 1. 2 \o te  that he is 
not referring to specifically educational policies associated with a given moral concepuon. See 
Chapter 4, secnon ~. note 218 above.)
the actual contractualist test. H obbes’s actual contractualism, meanwhile, can be 
read as m uch m ore thoroughgoing than Locke’s in this sense: the moral background 
is norm atively virtually empty. As a result any moral conception m ust pass the 
actual contractualist test m order to be justified. But it’s no t altogether clear what 
the ground o f  H o b b es’s im position o f the test is in the first place; he simply claims 
that obligations, including the obligation not to exceed the bounds o f the restricted 
liberty that individuals have under the sovereign, can arise only through voluntary 
acts. The idea o f  the burdens o f judgm ent leads to an acmal contractualist test 
which has a rationale as clear as Locke’s bu t which can consistently be as 
thoroughgoing as H o b b es’s. I f  it’s reasonable to differ in moral outlooks and so 
unreasonable to  expect others to accept a moral outlook that one actually accepts 
oneself bu t that they do not, then we have reason, according to the modal 
contractualist fram ew ork that I discussed m Chapters 3 and 4, to seek and 
im plem ent a m oral conception based on fundam ental elements which no one 
actually rejects. This is an acmal contractualist test, bu t its basis is new with Rawls.
3. The hybnd mew and left -lib ert-anamsm
I said at the outset o f  this thesis that my aim was to distinguish a way o f combining 
egalitarianism w ith the attractions o f acmal contractualism. My attem pt to do so is 
not unique. In recent years there has been a revival o f interest in what has come to 
be know n as ‘left-libertananism ’ which, as its name suggests, combin 
contractualism  im plicit m libertarian theories such as X ozick’s with die
the acmal p
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egalitarianism o f  the left." I want to end with a b n e f comparison o f this approach 
w ith my ow n and to say why I take the hybnd Rawlsian n e w  to be preferable. My 
fundam ental po in t is that left-libertanamsm , though preferable to nght- 
libertanam sm  from  an egalitarian point o f view, is nevertheless no better from an 
actual contractualist po in t o f view. The hvbnd view, on the other hand, is 
preferable in b o th  respects.
Left-libertanan n e w s  involve two essennal comm itm ents: individual self­
ownership and egalitanan world-ow nership. The com m itm ent to individual self­
ownership is reflected in the assernon o f a set o f Lockean natural nghts which, 
am ong o ther things, create an acmal contractualist test for the imposition o f any 
moral concepnon  beyond that entailed by the natural nghts themselves. Left- 
libertanans are typically pohncal voluntansts." " For the im posinon o f a moral 
conception involves coercion beyond that involved in the maintenance o f our 
natural nghts," ' and such coercion infringes individual self-ownership in the sense
2 3 For a summary o f  die left-libertanan position see Peter Yallentyne, “Left-Libertananism: A 
Pnm er”. For m ore detailed defence see Hillel Steiner. -An Essay on Rights. Michael Otsuka. 
Libertarianism without Inequality, and Yalienrvne. Sterner, and Otsuka. “AXhy Left-Libertananism Is Not 
Incoherent. Indeterm inate, or Irrelevant: a Reply to Fried." For criticism see Barbara Fned. "Left- 
Libertananism: A Review Essav" and ‘Left-L ibertananism , Once More: A Rejoinder to Yallentyne. 
Steiner, and O tsuka"; and M athias Risse. “Does Left-Libertananism Have Coherent Foundations2". 
-~4 See for example O tsuka. Elbertanamsm without Inequality. Chapter 5.
2 5 Lockean left-libertanans suppose that even the maintenance of our natural nghts requires each 
person’s actual acceptance if it is perform ed bv a coercive state. But that is because a coercive state
denves its status as such from the delegation to it o f each person’s natural nght to punish. In
delegating her natural nght to pumsh m this way each person relinquishes it. After delegating it. she 
may not exercise it herself, and m a t be coerced not to exercise it. Therefore state coercion even
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affirm ed by the left-libertanan." 1 The com m itm ent to egalitarian world-ownership, 
m eanw hile, is reflected in the assertion o f egalitarian conditions on the permissible 
use or appropriation  o f external (to the person) natural resources." (These 
conditions are related to  the onginal ownership o f those resources: jointly owned, 
owned in com m on, or unow ned.) So, for example, ‘Georgist libertarians’ hold that 
“agents m ust pay the full com petitive value of the natural resources that they 
appropnate” w ith the paym ent being shared in an egalitarian m anner among the 
rem aining agents."  ^ O thers argue that agents may appropnate natural resources as 
long as no one appropriates a share that is m ore than is compatible with each 
person’s having an equally advantageous share, where ‘equally advantageous’ is 
understood in luck egalitanan terms." Smce I am interested in left-libertanamsm as 
a com petitor to  the hvbnd  n e w , I shall restrict my focus to those left-libertanans
when it is restricted to the m aintenance of our natural rights in the wav that the Lockean imagines is 
coercion which is in one sense beyond that is involved in the maintenance of our natural nghts.
-~6 Left-libertanan nghts o f self-ownership m ust be strong enough to give plausible substance to the 
idea that thev articulate a concepuon o f individuals as self-owners, but not so strong as to eliminate 
the possibility o f all acnon given the at least small chance inherent in any acuon of unforeseen 
infringement o f such nghts see Otsuka. Libertarianism without Inequality, pp. 13-15 j . 
r ’ See Yallentvne. “Left-Libertariam sm : A Pnm er", \4. 'External ( to the person / admits in left- 
libertanan thought o f a unde range o f  interpretanons, not all o f which are naturally included under 
that descnpuon. Steiner, for example, effecuvely includes germ-line geneuc inform auon as external 
in the relevant sense.
Yallentvne. “Left-Libertananism : Y P nm er’', p.l 1. This is the n ew  held by Steiner, among others, 
-■’t This is O tsuka’s new . See Libertarianism without IneauaLb  pp. 22-35.
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w ho “wish to dem onstrate that their libertarian com m itm ents are at least nearly hilly 
consistent w ith the egalitarianism o f people such as Rawls and D w orkin.”"8'
R ight-libertanan views such as N ozick’s can be seen as having two core 
com ponents. The first is a com m itm ent to nghts o f self-ownership, and as G.A. 
Cohen has argued, this is the source o f m uch o f libertanam sm ’s attraction. The 
second is a com m itm ent to— at m ost— only minimal distributive constraints on 
w orld-ow nership . In  N ozick ’s presentation o f libertarianism in ^Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, bo th  o f  these com m itm ents are elaborated simply as consequences of the 
natural nghts that N ozick takes each person to have in virtue o f their inviolable 
m oral status. T he distinctive left-libertanan move is to see that a f f i r m i n g  nghts of 
self-ownership need  imply noth ing  with respect to world-ownership, and hence that 
the attraction o f  self-ow nership is com patible with egalitarian distnbunve 
constraints on w orld-ow nership."81 H ence the twin left-libertanan commitments.
My actual contractualist analysis o f libertanam sm  in Chapter 1 suggests, 
however, that ano ther source o f libertanam sm ’s attraction m ight be the fact that the 
(coercive) im position o f  any distributive constraints in a Nozickean world would 
have to be subject to  an acmal contractualist test. N ozick’s moral background is 
broadly laisseppfaire w ith respect to  w orld-ow nership: m ore or less any distribution of 
worldly resources is com patible w ith it. M oreover, no  particular distribution would 
be the result, he dunks, o f  individuals’ acts o f acceptance against that moral
28(1 Yallentvne, Sterner, and O tsuka. "‘W hy Left-Libertanamsm is nor Incoherent. Indeterminate, or 
Irrelevant” , p. 211.
281 Otsuka plausibly suggests that in fact self-ownership maintains its attraction only if it implies 
sufficient w orld-ow nership nghts to prevent anyone’s bemg forced by necessity to work for anyone 
else. But this, in his n ew , is vat least “contingently”; reconcilable with an egahtanan distribution of 
worldly resources. See 'Libertarianism without Inequality, p. 31-4.
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background, since in his Anew no ‘patterned5 or ‘end-state5 distribum 'e principles 
would be am ong those accepted. But his argum ent ne\'ertheless leat'es open the 
possibility tha t as a result o f  its A'oluntary acceptance (which could be in principle 
irreyersible) a pa tterned  or end-state d istribu tee  principle could be coerceely 
im posed on in d e id u a ls5 holdings. It would reduce the attraction o f his Anew (and 
dem onstrate him  to be less o f an actual contractualist than I haA~e supposed him to 
be) if  the im position o f such principles was preA'ented by the inalienability o f the 
nghts o f w orld-ow nership  which form  the moral background rather than merely by 
the principles5 non-acceptance.
Some left-libertanans— those w ho see aspects o f what nght-libertanans would 
see as part o f  the self as m stead part o f the range o f worldly resources— don5t 
endorse a n g h t o f  .^//-ownership in any form  that nght-libertanans would 
recognise."8" Theirs can hardly then be said to be a reconciliation o f the acmal 
contractualism  o f  libertanam sm  and egalitanamsm, since the acmal contractualism 
o f libertanam sm  is no t secured at all. Those w ho are sufficiently talented in a 
scheme w hich includes talents in an egalitarian division o f external resources may, 
for example, find them selves uryoluntanly yet justly coerced to benefit others (by 
employing their talents as the u psho t o f their egalitanan dryision dictates) in a way 
that clearly Aoolates the principles o f  self-ownership affirmed by nght-libertanans.
But o thers endorse a concepuon  o f the self which doesn 't so obnously  conflict 
with the acm al contractualist nght. Yet ev~en these may fail to secure the actual 
contractualist attraction o f  N ozick 's A~iew. As we haA'e seen, left-libertanans are 
com m itted to  an egalitanan m oral background where N ozick’s is iaisse^-Jaire. But
282 For example: Sterner treats individuals’ germ-lme genes as a natural resource and therefore su b le t 
to the pavm ent o f rent, as more obviously external natural resources are.
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insofar as the distributive principles that this involves may not be overridden bv 
individuals’ unanim ous actual acceptance, left-libertanans fail to secure much of the 
'actual contractualist attraction o f N ozick’s v iew ^ ^fh a t they gain in egalitarianism, 
that is, they lose in acmal contractualism. This is no t to say that left-libertanans are 
com m itted to  im m utable egalitanan distributive principles. They may or may not 
be. But to  the  extent that they are, they impose those principles at the expense of 
some o f  the acm al contractualist attractions o f libertanamsm.
Insofar as the left-libertanans’ egalitanan moral background may be overridden 
by unanim ous acceptance o f  som e o ther distnbunve conception, on the other hand, 
they are clearly no  w orse o ff  in term s o f  acmal contractualist allure than Nozick is. 
But it rem ains the case that they affirm  a distnbunve concepuon as part o f the 
moral background, on the same footing as the nghts against being coerced in 
accordance with any m oral conception  that isn’t actually accepted. This concepnon 
is consequendy n o t subject to  d ie acmal contractualist test: the left-libertanaris 
egalitanan principles are, like her libertanan principles, taken to be coerciveh 
enforceable even before  anyone has agreed to anything. (This is why libertanan 
views are global ra ther than national in scope: they operate at a level more 
fundam ental than  that o f  the voluntary associanons that they see as polincal 
societies.) B ut coercive enforcem ent is, as w e’ve seen, one prim e candidate for 
individualistic jusnfication; exem pting egalitanan principles from such jusuficanon 
by excluding them  from  the acmal contractualist test diminishes the attracnon 
created by incorporating  it. The same is true, o f course, o f die libertanan principles 
o f self-ow nership. B ut in the first place, the egalitanan principles in parncular seem 
to necessitate the m snm nons o f a global state— no set o f feasible mles for 
individuals, how ever successfully followed, could conceivably ensure die attainment
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o f egalitanan jusnce on a left-libertanan view such as O tsuka’s or Yallentyne’s-8—  
about w hich it is then natural to  ask why that is no t subject to the actual 
contractualist test w hen any sub-states are.-8" In the second place, the hbenanan 
principles are m uch m ore intuitively understood as part o f the view’s actual 
contractualism  than are the egalitanan principles. And in the third place, increasing 
the range o f  principles subject to the actual contractualist test is. from the acmal 
contractualist pom t o f  view, obviously preferable to decreasmg them. Since acmal 
contractualism  has a certain attracuon denved from the fundam ental attraction of
Cf. Rawls on background  lusuce' and the necessity of a basic structure at Ph. pp. 265-9 and JAF . 
pp. 52-5.
2H4 In 'Libertarianism without Inequality. Otsuka admits that there is “a case for voluntarism .. .at the 
interpoliucal [i.e. global] level” (jp. 109; hut claims that it is overridden bv the necessity o f avoiding 
“the disorder and chaos which would ensue in the absence of such a governing body” p . 108;. He 
therefore supposes that an interpoliucal govermng body is ^usuiied. It is hard to see how. if this 
necessity does no t override the case for voluntarism at the subglobal level suppose that no one 
consents to give up her nghts to punish i, it should be able to do so at the global level (In fact, for 
Otsuka, it does overnde the case for voluntansm  at the subglobal level in many instances: if the 
populauon is sufficiently large that individuals have no choice but to “live, intermingle, and interact 
with others within the confines o f a com m unity that is much larger or more complex than a hamlet” 
[p. 94] then individuals have “an obliganon to relinquish these nghts to legislate and punish and 
instead to place themselves under a com petent and effecuve com mon governm ent” [pp. 93-4] 
Otsuka counts him self a voluntanst anvway because he supposes that individual consent sufficient 
for voluntansm  is given even in these situauons if the range of possible communities that it is open 
to someone to torn includes some that are sufficiently attractive for the relevant individuals [see pp. 
103--]. But this bemg so, one might w onder whether by his own lights, at any rate. Otsuka is an 
interpoliucal voluntanst too. [The interpoliucal government is after all attracuve. given the disorder 
and chaos that w ould obtain without it.] For m ost libertanans, I take it that the interpoliucal 
governm ent w ould plainlv not be vo luntansuc.,
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the ideal o f  individualistic justification (see Chapter 1), maximising the range of 
principles subject to  its test maximises a theory’s attraction in that sense.
So while left-libertanans are no worse o ff from an acmal contractualist point of 
n e w  than nght-libertanans, they are no better o it either. Left-libenanam sm , that is, 
represents an im provem ent on nght-libertanam sm  in one dimension (egalitarianism) 
but no t in another. The hybnd  view, by contrast, represents an im provem ent in 
both. The strong egalitanam sm  o f  jusuce as fairness enters the Rawlsian hybnd 
view at a less fundam ental level than it enters the left-libertanan view. Given a set 
o f cooperating individuals each o f  w hom  is taken to bea^^f comprehensive acmal 
contractualist n g h t against c o e r c io n ^  behave in accordance with a moral 
concepuon that she does n o t accept, we ask: can egalitanamsm pass the acmal 
contractualist test?
This route is, o f  course, one that left-libertanans could take. They could affirm 
the libertanan nghts o f  self-ow nership bu t make no claims whatsoever about the 
jusuce o f any distributive m oral concepuon. O ne jusuficauon that Michael Otsuka 
offers for his com m itm ent to the egalitanan m oral concepuon which forms part o f 
his left-libertanan m oral background is that it reflects m tuinons about fairness.~f'~
As we saw in C hapter 5, this is also, indirectly, the source o f the hybnd Rawlsian 
view’s com m itm ent to  egalitanamsm . T hat com m itm ent reflects intuiuons o f 
fairness concerning the d istribuuon am ong cooperators o f the fruits o f their 
cooperauon, given the arbitrariness o f each person’s suitedness to that parncular 
scheme. (These in tu iuons reflect a slighdy weaker concepuon o f fairness than do 
O tsuka’s— they imply reciprocity rather than impartiality and so domesuc 
egalitanamsm  rather than global egalitanamsm— but that, I take it. is an advantage
-85 See Ubertarianism without Ineauaht, , p. 23.
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w hen we try to  argue that each person actually does accept egalitanamsm.) If 
O tsuka is convinced that the intuitions o f fairness to which he appeals are shared by 
his audience, o r w ould be shared if the audience thought carefully enough about 
their own views, a libertanan version o f the hvbnd view (where all enforceable rules 
o f property  in and distribution o f external resources m ust be universally actually 
accepted) m ight represent a wav to  mcrease the attraction o f his reconciliation o f 
libertanam sm  and equality. (Indeed, if we had accepted Rawls’s supposition that the 
basic liberties follow direcdv from  acknowledgm ent o f the burdens o f judgment [see 
Chapter 3 above], we m ight have ended up with a view not dissimilar to this.)
The resultant mew w ould be preferable, then, because in one way it would have 
becom e m ore thoroughgoing  from  an acmal contractualist point o f mew. The 
m ajor differences rem aining betw een the hybnd theon ' and the revised left- 
libertanan m ew w ould then be twofold. Fust and forem ost, the hybnd theon ' 
involves a m oral background which is normatively empty whereas the revised left- 
libertanan mew w ould still include libertanan nghts o f self-ownership as part o f that 
background even once the egalitanan principles had been shifted to be subject to 
the acmal contractualist test. I have already suggested that it maximises the hybnd 
theory’s acmal contractualist attraction that its moral background is empty; and 
indeed, this poses the following challenge to left-libertanans which is connected to a 
further objection offered by Barbara Fned  in her remew essay. O ne im portant basis 
for the left-libertanan affirm ation o f the libertanan nght o f self-ownership is its 
“ann-patem ahstic and anu-m orahsnc im plications” .-86 Xozick justifies nghts o f self­
ownership by appeal to “ the fact that there are distinct individuals each with his ami
Ubertarianzsffi without Inequality, p. 2.
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life to lead” ,-8 m aking it clear that w hat’s im portant about that is that the meaning 
o f life derives from  “ [a] person’s shaping his life in accordance with some overall 
plan” that he has chosen.-88 Certainly this conception o f autonom y seems to justify 
some kind o f  acmal contractualist nght. But one might w onder w hether specifically 
the libertanan ng h t o f  self-ownership is the only way to do the idea justice. After 
all, the libertanan n gh t o f  self-ownership prevents some people shaping their lives 
in accordance with some overall plans that they might choose— not just in the sense 
that it is com patible with a person’s starving if she is sufficiently unfortunate or 
careless, bu t in the sense that it rules out anyone’s living any life that involves 
violating o thers’ nghts o f self-ownership. As Fned  notes, invoking Hohfeld and 
Coase, any distribution o f nghts and duties involves arbitrating between conflicting 
interests.-8' A rbitrating betw een them  therefore means privileging some over 
others. But the point about these conflicting interests is that they all represent 
individuals’ ways o f giving m eaning to their lives, so arbitrating between them 
inevitably means pnvileging certain ways o f  doing tins over others. There will be 
assignments o f rights and duties o ther than those affirm ed by libertarians and which 
privilege different ways for individuals to give m eaning to their lives. These could 
equally be justified by appeal to the very values invoked by libertarians. \XTiy, then, 
should we choose specifically libertanan rights o f  self-ownership as the moral 
backgrounds
28~ .4SU . p. 34.
288 A S U , p. 50. M ore precisely. Nozick ^usuries hum ans' moral status by appeal to that fact. But that 
moral status is taken to explain our nghts o f self-ownership. It would be strange if there were no 
explanatory connection from the grounds of that moral status to the kinds of nghts that beings with 
such status are supposed to have.
289 See ‘ \Le ft - Libertanamsm: A Review Essay", pp. T ff .
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In this context it seems to m e that the hvbnd th eo n '’s normatrvelv empty moral
f"
background |(i.e. involving only the nght against coercion to conform  to principles
i
U  ; ;
that one does n o t actually accept) offers an appealing way to negotiate the problem s
posed by the indeterm inacy in appropnate nghts allocation which follows from
affirmation o f the fundam ental basis that the Nozickean libertanan adopts. If  any
particular allocation pnvileges the interests o f some (as determ ined by that
fundam ental basis) over those o f others, surely a radically individualistic n e w  should
be unwilling to  pick one w ithout universal acceptance o f it am ong those whose
conduct it will regulate? O f  course, in the absence o f any particular allocation it is
no less true that the mterests o f some will be sensed better than those o f others.
But the theonst refuses to grant this situation and the bargaining positions it creates
the endorsem ent o f  morality. We have neither justice no r injustice w ithout the
im position o f  some m oral conception, and none is im posed. The view is,
m oreover, m ore thoroughgoing yet than even the revised libertanan view. It
subjects ever}'thing to the acmal contractualist test.
The second m ajor difference is that the hybnd theory adopts the "head first5 
approach. But given the left-libertanan5s own com m itm ent to egalitanamsm and 
the advantages o f this approach that I descnbed in C hapter 5, I see no reason why 
the left-libertanan should object to this. So long as one can avoid the various 
suspicions o f  indoctrination that I tned  to deal with in C hapter 4, there seems to be 
no great advantage for one with egalitanan intuiuons o f  fairness in speculating about 
the kinds o f  reasons that individuals p n o r to the establishm ent o f any cooperauon 
according to egalitanan principles m ight have taken themselves to have. (And next 
to the o ther alternative o f  im posing an egalitanan moral concepuon as part o f the 
m oral background, it does no t seem objectionably tendenuous.) Recall that 
considering tire acceptance-grounding views o f individuals w ho have been shaped
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by a given m oral conception is n o t the same as taking that m oral concepnon as the 
m oral background for the acmal contractualist test (see C hapter 4, secnon 7 above). 
The head-first approach does no t alter the m oral baseline for bargaining positions in 
an acmal contractualist view; rather, it determ ines the types o f m oral reasons that 
individuals are likely to take them selves to  have. The baseline is set by the presence 
o f the acmal contractualist ngh t and any nghts o f self-ownership w hether we adopt 
the head-first approach or not. O f  course, individuals brought up in the inegalitanan 
w orld which the imposition o f such a baseline w ould involve m ight be vert' unlikely 
to agree upon  an egalitanan m oral conception. But it isn’t clear why we should care 
especially about what they would accept as long as w e’re no t working with a 
concepnon o f  acceptance which is based on the self-interest o f hum ans conceived 
as hatting im m utable interests and nature. (In that case, caring about w hat they 
w ould accept is caring about what anyoue w ould accept.) A nd that is no t the 
concepnon o f acceptance which libertarians o f any stripe are w edded to: indeed, 
they are m otivated in part by an apprecianon that individuals’ acceptance may 
properly be gm ded by their desire to live in a comm unity which shares then  own 
norm ative ou tlook .'9'1 It is perfectly reasonable to suppose that those w hose 
acceptance we care about are (a) those w ho are subject to the m oral concepnon we 
are interested in defending, and (b) diose w hose socienes pave the way for the just 
im plem entanon o f that concepnon and thus provide us with a defence against 
charges o f  indoctrination. Discussion o f individuals w hose mews are shaped by 
experience o f  the state o f nature, then, even if we could provide a credible
290 Consider for example N ozick’s utopias (.4SU, Chapter 10) or O tsuka’s pluralistic political 
societies and momties ('Libertanamsm without lnequakt}\ pp. 101-~).
269
foundation for it, is surely irrelevant. The hvbnd contractualist n e w  is supenor in 
this respect as well.
4. Conclusion
T hat concludes my com panson o f the hvbnd view and left-libertanam sm  and this
A
u
thesis as a whole. I hope now  to have achieved the following aims. First, to 
distinguish two contrasting approaches to the contractualist ideal o f indrvidualisnc 
justification and to suggest how  they m ight be com bined m to one jusnficatory 
framework. Second, to explain— drawing on ideas that I find in Rawls’s thought—  
how  a m oral conception m ight m eet the 'hybnd ’ contractualist test o f jusnce which 
this com bined fram ework creates and to consider the ways in which a proponent 
m ight m eet certain m ajor objecnons to her approach. Third— again drawing on 
Rawls’s thought— to show how  the egalitanamsm o f ]usnce as fairness w ould m eet 
the contractualist condition o f justice on the hybnd mew. A nd, finally, fourth, to 
com pare the resulting mew with left-libertanamsm, a com peting approach which 
also aims to reconcile actual contractualism  and egalitanamsm. A thesis o f this 
length is no t sufficient to consider, m uch less resolve, every question that these aims 
give rise to. I have tned, however, to address the m ost im portan t am ong them.
O n the resultant mew o f egalitanan contractualist jusnce, the achievem ent o f a 
just egalitanan society is m ore precanous than one m ight hope. Its jusuficanon 
appeals to the peculiarly empincal factors that I discussed in secuon 2 above. In 
that sense it may seem a less satisfying theon ' than others. I hold, however, that this 
is a reflection o f the real problem s that reconciling contractualism  and egalitanamsm
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